

**Jerusalem During the First World War:
Transition From Ottoman to British Rule (1914-1920)**

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Abstract

This thesis discusses the history of Jerusalem from 1912 to 1920, with a particular focus on the period of the First World War and the British military administration of the city up to July 1920. It examines the dynamics of the transition from Ottoman to British rule and compares the two administrative structures, as well as changes which affected the foreign population of the city and its religious communities. This thesis is organised in six chapters and evolves around three main themes. The first theme discussed in Chapter One addresses the complex issue of periodisation. The re-interpretation of the transitional period from Ottoman to British rule is discussed through the historiographical approach known as microhistory, in order to highlight the methodological underpinnings of this study. The second theme considers these two periods from the perspective of continuity and change. As far as change is concerned, this thesis underlines the changes which affected the political sphere; namely, the political identities of local communities that followed the end of the war in 1917 and the establishment of the British Military administration in Jerusalem. The third theme investigated is the relationship between the city and its foreign population, focussing on the foreign impact upon the political and social milieu of Jerusalem.

Chapter Two discusses the late Ottoman administration of Jerusalem, providing a thorough analysis of the demographic structure in the transitional period. Chapter Three examines in detail the phases of the transition from the Ottomans to the British as a consequence of the military operations in Palestine. Chapter Four looks at the presence and functioning of the Christian religious institutions and their reactions to the British occupation. Chapter Five assesses the foreign presence in the city, with particular focus to some unexplored

diplomatic sources. Chapter Six examines the functioning of the British Military administration, with particular focus on the role of the military governor Ronald Storrs.

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List of Abbreviations

AGAE	Archivo General de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid
ASMAE	Archivio Storico Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome
ASV	Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Vatican City
CST	Custodia di Terra Santa, Jerusalem
CZA	Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem
ISA	Israel State Archives, Jerusalem
IWM	Imperial War Museum, London
LP	Lambeth Palace Library, London
NARA	National Archives and Record Administration, College Park MD
OA	Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı (Ottoman Archives), Istanbul
TNA: PRO	The National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew

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Note on Transliteration

For the purposes of this thesis Ottoman-Turkish words have been written following the modern Turkish vocabulary. For example I have used *maclis* (council) and *mutasarrıflık* (governor). Also for personal names I have used this form which respects the context of the person and his background. For example I have used *Cemal Paşa* and not *Djermal Pasha*.

For Arabic words and names I followed the spelling of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, thus I have used *Muhammad 'Ali*. The sing (') marks the 'ayn as in the case of *a'yan* (notables).

The footnotes and bibliography entries are arranged according to *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edition (2003).

1 Introduction: Jerusalem and the First World War

“No document can tell us more than the author of the document thought, what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even what himself thought he thought. None of this means anything until the historian has got to work on it and deciphered it.”¹

1.1 Overview of the dissertation

On the night between 8 and 9 December 1917, the German-Ottoman troops abandoned their positions in the city of Jerusalem. No battle took place, and on 9 December the British were ready to occupy the Holy City. Two days later the commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, General Edmund Allenby, made a dramatic entrance into the city, ending four centuries of Ottoman rule. Generally the British were welcomed as liberators, or rather rescuers, as the population had suffered famine and epidemics throughout the war. This was a turning point in the history of Jerusalem and of the region as a whole. The occupation of Jerusalem marked the end of the late Ottoman Palestine and ushered in the years of the British Mandate. The aim of this dissertation is to bridge these two periods by exploring the period of the First World War.

This dissertation will focus on the transition from Ottoman to British rule in order to underline the processes of change taking place in the mixed socio-political structures of Jerusalem. As far as continuity and change are concerned, these two terms are considered flexibly and this dissertation will not necessarily argue clearly in favour of one or the other. Rather, as it will become clear in the following chapters, continuity and change are not clear cut categories of analysis

¹ E.H. Carr, *What Is History?*, (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 16.

with regard to transformations which affected administrative institutions, religious organisations and the foreign presence in the city. Yet this thesis will underline a number of ruptures that followed the end of the war and the establishment of British Military rule in December 1917, with particular attention on the renegotiation of local political values between the old and new elites and national identities of the indigenous communities.

This thesis is organised around three major themes and divided into six chapters. In the first instance, this thesis addresses the issue of periodisation, which is both looked at as a theme and as methodological approach, and in doing so, it opens the transitional era from Ottoman to British rule to more research and debate. By focussing attention on this historical period and on its limited historiography produced on it, this dissertation proposes to re-interpret this transitional period by making use of the approach of microhistory. The methodological assumption of this approach is to investigate a small temporal unit to highlight particular aspects of the history of Jerusalem.

The second theme deriving from the methodological approach employed, considers the late Ottoman and early British periods from the perspective of continuity and change in relation to several spheres of urban life: political, religious and social, particularly after the British occupation of the city in December 1917. In order to understand the importance of this transitional period a number of areas will be discussed. The late Ottoman and British military administrations will be investigated in order to highlight the administrative transition and the rationales behind both administrations. This thesis argues that the process of administrative modernisation did not start with the arrival of the

British in 1917 as claimed by some scholars.² In fact, the British built on a modern administrative apparatus that had started to take shape in the 1830s following Egyptian rule and the Tanzimat reforms implemented by the Ottoman Empire. This work will also study the impact of the transitional period on the demographic structure of the city as a way to understand whether demography was a crucial factor in determine the political weight of the various communities. This weight evidently changed in favour of the Jews through the activities of the Zionist Commission after the beginning of the British military occupation of the city in late 1917. Following this line of enquiry this dissertation also discusses political changes among the local political milieu represented by Arab elites and the renegotiation of local alliances between the various religious groups as determined by the Zionist presence under the military administration. In this connection the case study of the Nebi Musa riots of 1920 is investigated as the expression of an emergent conflict among newly formed Arab and Jewish political communities.

The third theme is that of foreigners, who are investigated with reference to consuls, religious authorities, pilgrims, institutions and private citizens travelling to and residing in Jerusalem. This thesis argues that these actors were an integral component of the local milieu, with multiple influences upon the political, social, religious and economic life of the city. Through the discussion of several examples of foreign residents before and after the war (with a particular focus on British citizens and on those individuals that for various

² M. Gilbert, *Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century*, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996); N. Libertun de Duren, "Jerusalem at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century," *City Vision*, MIT (2004).

reasons remained in the city during the war), this thesis will bring in the agency of foreign actors.

As mentioned earlier, this thesis is divided into six chapters. The general purpose of Chapter One is to establish a framework to the study of Jerusalem by discussing sources, methodological approach and the historical context of the First World War in the Middle East. In the first part of this chapter I discuss the question of sources in relation to the themes of the research. In the second part I analyse and explain the meaning of the term periodisation in order to provide a methodological framework to the case study dealt with in this dissertation. At a first glance, the discussion about periodisation appears to be a philosophical one and the discussion of sources a practical one. Nonetheless, if on one hand the debate about periodisation could appear to be meta-historical, on the other hand it is strictly related to the substantial construction of history. So if discussing sources could appear as an explicit definition of history, then it also opens a more incorporeal debate about the interpretation and use of sources themselves. The last part of the chapter will outline the general historical framework of this research in order to understand the political and strategic position of Jerusalem during the First World War.

Chapter Two discusses the administrative structure of the late Ottoman period focussing on Ottoman governance in order to set the framework for the comparison with the British Military administration and the assessment of the transitional era. The study of the Ottoman administration serves also the purpose to highlight the process of administrative modernisation that took place from the mid nineteenth century. It is argued here that this process did not halt because of

the war but in fact continued under the new British rulers. Furthermore this chapter also provides also a thorough analysis of the demographic composition of Jerusalem from the late nineteenth century until the first British census of 1922. Data is investigated, discussed and interpreted in order to underline the continuities and changes brought by the war and the British occupation.

Chapter Three examines in detail the phases of the transition from Ottoman to the British rule in light of the changed policy making towards the Eastern Front and the military operations in Palestine on the part of the British. In the first section the chapter discusses how the process of mobilisation enforced by the Ottomans worked and affected the human, material and ideological infrastructures of Jerusalem. The second part focuses on the British military operations and on the plans of British policy makers in London to transform the occupation of Jerusalem into war propaganda. The last part of the chapter deals with the different reactions of local, British and international actors such as members of the Allied and of the Central Powers as well as of neutral countries to the British conquest of Palestine and occupation of Jerusalem.

Chapter Four and Five are interrelated as they discuss foreign presence and activities in the city with a particular focus on Christian institutions and consular missions. Chapter Four looks at the presence and functioning of the Christian religious institutions in the transitional period. The crucial issues of Capitulations and the Status Quo are contextualised and discussed, underlining changes that took place after the British occupation of Jerusalem. A part of the chapter is devoted to the discussion of the renegotiation of the alliance between Arab Christian and Muslim elites and residents following the issue of the Balfour

Declaration in 1917, and the arrival of the Zionist Commission in 1918, whose main purpose was to promote Jewish immigration.

Chapter Five discusses and assesses the foreign presence in the city, with reference to the activities of various groups such as scholars, pilgrims, tourists, explorers and private entrepreneurs; the main focus of the chapter, however, is on consular missions. Particularly under scrutiny are the consular missions of Italy, the United States and Spain. As these missions remained opened during the war for longer periods than their British and the French counterparts, their records represent a new historical source for the study of the period under discussion.

The last chapter of this dissertation examines the structure and functioning of the British Military administration of Jerusalem with a particular focus on the figure of the military governor Ronald Storrs. This discussion of British military rule aims to show the continuity and changes in the administrative structure that took place as a consequence of the war and the following British occupation. This chapter also discusses the role of the military in relation to local elites and to the Zionist Commission, a new actor in local and international politics. Through the discussion of the Nebi Musa riots of April 1920, which led to the dismissal of the military administration of the city, it is argued that one of the major changes that took place after the British occupation in 1917 was the renegotiation of local alliances, as discussed in Chapter Four, which eventually led to the emergence of a structured conflict between Arabs (Muslims and Christians) and Jews (Zionists).

1.2 A note on sources and themes

The question of primary sources, their availability, their interpretation and their use, is a crucial one in any historical research. As explained in the previous section, in broad terms this dissertation deals with the history of Jerusalem between 1912 and 1920. Primary sources are used to answer questions related to the late Ottoman administration of the city; to the British conquest of the city in 1917 and the establishment of the military rule; to the presence, foreign connections and the activities of the Christian churches in Jerusalem; to the communities of non-Ottoman subjects living in the city throughout the war period; and last but not least to the symbolic value of Jerusalem and its exploitation as a propaganda tool on the part of the British particularly in the period of the First World War.

Relevant primary materials regarding the history of the city are available in numerous archives. The selection of the archives has been made according to the relevance of the actors involved with a particular attention to the sources which have not been used before. The selection and nature of the sources used will be openly discussed both in this chapter and throughout this study.

1.2.1 Ottoman, Israeli and Zionist sources

The first relevant group of sources to be under scrutiny are those related to the Ottoman administration of the city in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These are useful in order to assess the changes which occurred after the establishment of British rule in 1917 particularly with reference to the impact on the urban population. The Jerusalem district at the end of the Ottoman rule

was a *Mutasarrıflık*, an administrative unit that was quite unique as the *Mutasarrıf* (district governor) answered directly to Istanbul.³ Furthermore in the 1860s Jerusalem acquired a municipality which was in charge of the management of urban services such as the cleanliness of streets and the management of the markets.⁴ In 1914, the Ottoman government, following the outbreak of the war in Europe called for a general mobilisation of all Ottoman subjects for the war effort, although the Empire was still neutral. As martial law was proclaimed throughout the Ottoman domains, Jerusalem was placed under military rule and continued to be administered by a military governor until 1917.

The documentation on the provincial and urban administration of late Ottoman period is to be found in the Israel State Archives⁵ of Jerusalem and as part of private collections which are mostly located in Israel.⁶ Moreover another great deal of primary materials, mostly unexplored, is available in the Ottoman Archives (*Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı*) in Istanbul. The documents from the Israel State Archives have been used mainly by Israeli or Jewish scholars such as Ruth Kark, Moshe Ma'oz and Haim Gerber, in order to write the institutional history of the city.⁷

Kark and Gerber's work are mainly based on the protocols and records of the administrative council (*Meclis-i Idare*) of the Jerusalem District for the years

³ H. Gerber, "The Ottoman Administration of Sanjaq of Jerusalem 1890-1908" *Asian and African Studies* 12, no. 1, (March 1978): 32-76.

⁴ R. Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality at the End of the Ottoman Rule" *Asian and Africa Studies* 14, (1980): 117-141.

⁵ The relevant sources from the Israel State Archives are: Record Group (RG) 39, Ottoman Administration. Census and Population Registers; RG 67, Collection of Documents from the German Consulates in Palestine; RG 123.1, Collection of Documents from the British Consulate in Jerusalem; RG 151, Austrian Consulate in Palestine.

⁶ Collection of documents and published material may be found in the Jewish National Library; a special collection on Palestine is held at the Library of St. George's College in Jerusalem; another important source for published materials of the nineteenth century and private papers is the Khalidiyah Library belonging to the notable Khalidi family of Jerusalem.

1910-1915 which are held in the Israel State Archives, and the minutes of the administrative council for the years 1906-1908 which were discovered in the late 1970s. These documents are not strictly relevant to the period under review but they provide good information on the period just before the war, particularly on aspects of the local administration. Other documents are available from the Israel State Archives, particularly records of births, deaths, marriages and censuses of the population (*nüfus*) for the years 1884-1914.⁸

The Israel State Archives also hold materials from the British Consulate before it was closed in 1914.⁹ There are records listing British subjects and persons enjoying British protection. Whilst British material available in the Israel State Archives has proved to be interesting but not crucial, these archives do however hold a very special collection of documents from the German consulates in Palestine.¹⁰ There are personal files of the consuls and of consulate workers, divorce and declaration of legal inability, lawsuits and claims, legacies, wills, guardianship, personal status like birth registers, marriage registers, and death registers, military service, correspondence and notices dealing with the adoption of Jewish first names and cancellation of name-changes, registration of German subjects, provision of passports, and revocation of German citizenship. Most of these records proved not to be useful; however there is a great deal of material dealing with the war and with the political situation in the Europe and in Palestine. A German Jerusalem never existed, but German material sheds light on some aspect of the Ottoman military administration of the city as German

⁷ Gerber, "The Ottoman Administration"; R. Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality."

⁸ A list of documents from archives and collections in Israel has been compiled by Moshe Ma'oz, *Palestine During the Ottoman Period*, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970).

⁹ ISA, Record Group 123.1.

officers reported on the Ottoman institutions, but also this material shed light on the value attached to the city by the German government.

With regards to the archives in Istanbul the material available relates to the local administrative institutions including documentation on the *Mutasarrıflık* of Jerusalem and the municipality. The amount of material available for the period concerning the war period is considerable, although less substantive than materials on the preceding period as the war disrupted communications between central government and local authorities. For the period 1912 to 1917 the available documentation includes police reports, administrative reports, requests for services, correspondence between the local authorities with the foreign residents as well as reports from the different administrative bodies about budget discussion and other daily matters.¹¹ Sources on the period after the outbreak of the war are of a different nature as they concern mainly the maintenance of public security and include police and prison reports.

The last paragraph of this section is dedicated to the Zionist Archives. These archives are a collection of material covering the growth of the Zionist movement worldwide, the development of the Jewish immigration in Palestine and various aspects of the history of the Jewish people in the last two centuries. These materials have been used to understand the establishment and development of the external support during the war to the Jewish communities in Palestine and Jerusalem through aid and remittances.

¹⁰ ISA, Record Group 67.

1.2.2 Jerusalem in Christian sources

As Jerusalem was an important religious centre, sources from its religious institutions are crucial in the understanding of the impact of the war on these institutions and their activities in the city during the war time. Christians were not the majority of the population; but they had connections with all the major European powers. European countries, whether Anglican United Kingdom, Protestant Germany, Catholic France, Italy and Spain, Orthodox Russia and also multifaith United States of America, fought each other on a national basis in order to protect Christian institutions. The only theocratic state, the Vatican, was indeed interested in Jerusalem however war conditions altered Vatican policies. The Vatican authorities proclaimed strict neutrality towards all belligerents, vigorously condemning the war and defending the Catholics and all the other religious institutions in the city. Given practical limitations research in the archives of the Christian Churches has been limited to the Anglican Archives in London, the Vatican Archives in the Vatican City and the archives of the Custody of the Holy Land in Jerusalem.

Despite the fact that the majority of the Christians in Jerusalem belong to the Greek Orthodox Church, I will discuss the materials from the Catholic institutions first, given the political weight of the Catholic Church. In Jerusalem the Catholics were represented by the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, re-established in 1848 after its closure in 1291 when the Mamluks defeated the crusaders and by the Custodia di Terra Santa (Custody of the Holy Land), managed by Franciscan friars since 1342. Unfortunately the archives of the Latin

¹¹ See for instance the following series in the Ottoman Archives: DH.EUM.MEM; DH.EUM.MH; DH.MB.HPS; MV; DH.KMS; DH.EUM.ECB; DH.EUM3, ŞB; DH.EUM4, ŞB; DH.UMUM.

Patriarchate are not available for consultation but the archives of the Custody of the Holy Land prove to be crucial for the history of the Catholic institutions during the war. A diary kept on daily basis by the deputy *Custos* (the Franciscan friar in charge of the whole institution), Fr. Eutimio Castellani from 1914 to 1918, sheds light on some aspects of internal life of the Custody and the social life in Jerusalem during the war. These archives also contain information regarding the conditions of the clergy during the war. Moreover they shed light on the organisation of the clergy and in their relationships with the Turkish and German officials.¹²

The *Archivio Segreto Vaticano* (Vatican Archives) contains considerable material on the political importance of Jerusalem and the Holy Places in Vatican international politics.¹³ If Catholic institutions in Jerusalem were generally concerned with the local situation, the Vatican was mainly interested in the future of Palestine and of the Holy Places, particularly after the British occupation of the city. Of interest are some materials which shed light on the relationship between the Zionist movement and the Pope during the First World War. From the reports of the meeting held in Rome between the Pope Benedict XV and Nahum Sokolow (a Zionist leader sent by the Zionist Organisation through Europe looking for support to the Zionist cause) in May 1917. The Pope, according to this report expressed sympathy for the Zionist cause and approved the establishment of a large number of Jews in Palestine provided that Jerusalem came under international administration; nevertheless the Vatican later in 1919

¹² ACTS, Diario della Guerra, Jerusalem.

¹³ See for instance: ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl.*; *Segr. Stato, Guerra (1914-1918)*; *Rubricelle*.

refuted this statement and actually stated that the Pope never approved the aims of the Zionist movement.¹⁴

The Anglican Church, whose bishopric in Jerusalem was established in 1841 in cooperation with the Lutheran church of Germany, worked like a semi-political establishment with close relations to the British government. In 1899 the agreement was abolished and the Anglican Church alone maintained the Bishopric. The jurisdiction of the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem extended to the congregations in Egypt, the Red Sea regions, Palestine, Syria, Anatolia, the Island of Cyprus and Palestine where he resided. The Anglican Church, as a newcomer, was not involved in international struggles for the control of the Holy Places, but instead was active in a process of missionary expansion mainly through educational and charitable activities. The Lambeth Palace Library in London which holds Archives of the Anglican Church has been particularly useful not only for the documentation related to the history of the Anglican Bishopric in Jerusalem but also on its activities.¹⁵ Anglicans opened several schools for the local population from the end of the nineteenth century, that proved to be of good quality and attended by both foreigner and local residents. The Anglicans played some role in the internal matters of the Orthodox Church before the war but it was after the conquest of Palestine that the Anglican Church became highly involved in the conflict between the Greek establishment and the Arab laity of the Orthodox Church.¹⁶ Since the Anglicans took under their protection the local

¹⁴ ASV, *Segr. Stato, Guerra (1914-1918)*, State Secretary to General Director of the Cult, Vatican City 8 March 1919.

¹⁵ See for instance: Papers of the Lambeth Conference; Papers of Archbishop Davidson; Jerusalem and the East Mission Reports.

¹⁶ LP, Lambeth Conference 65, p. 87, Bishop Blyth to Lambeth Conference, 6/7 July 1908 "Upon our action with the Churches of the East may depend very materially the future of Christianity amongst the sons of Abraham, the Jews and the Arab Moslems."

Arabs, it is not a surprise that among the Anglicans there was a strong opposition towards Zionism. During the war the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, resided in Cairo and no other English subject lived in the city, therefore there is not overall considerable information available on the city from this institution of the war period. On the other hand the documents hold at Lambeth Palace proved to be extremely important in the reconstruction of the history of city in the late Ottoman period, as well in the reconstruction of the city since the British took over in 1917.

1.2.3 Jerusalem in diaries and memoirs

This work will also rely on personal diaries and memoirs. Personal diaries, memoirs and papers are often regarded with suspicion and scepticism as they are “subjective” documents as historical sources. There are a great numbers of diaries which were written in and about Jerusalem. In methodological terms this source is precarious as it is difficult to handle, nonetheless diaries and memoirs can shed light on several aspects of an historical investigation, on the other hand, without a proper contextualisation and knowledge of the authors these sources can also become useless. A good example is represented by British soldiers during the Palestine campaign as they recorded their arrival in the “Holy City.” Besides their impressionist readings of what surrounded them, they seem to have been influenced by the place occupied by the city in Christian devotion. Without previous contextualisation these works can be perceived to be of no particular value. Among the large amount of memoirs and diaries published, three have proven to be interesting; one was kept until the early days of the war and two

recorded the events in the city during the war until its conclusion.¹⁷ In the development of this work I have therefore taken these three sources, contextualised them and investigated with details of the personal lives of the authors.

The personal memoirs of Estelle Blyth, *When We lived in Jerusalem* published in 1927, the daughter of the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem George Blyth, sheds light not only on the life of the Anglican Church as an international entity but above all on the daily life of British citizens.¹⁸ Estelle Blyth as the other British subjects living in Jerusalem left the city when the war broke out in 1914. However her memoirs contain useful information on the late Ottoman period. The second diary is entitled *Our Jerusalem* written by Bertha Vester Spafford, daughter of Horatio Spafford who in 1881 founded the American Colony in Jerusalem. This diary illustrates the activities of the American Colony which provided services to the population during the war. Bertha Spafford who was married to a German subject, Frederick Vester, lived throughout the war in Jerusalem.¹⁹ Despite her American citizenship, the Ottoman administration allowed the Vesters and the other members of the Colony to live in the city where they provided services such as distribution of food and medical care to the residents in need.

The third diary under review is quite complex and more politically loaded than the previous two. The diary of the Spanish consul in Jerusalem from 1914 to 1919, Conde de Ballobar; this is somewhat of a unique and unexplored

¹⁷ Besides the diaries discussed in this Chapter, other diaries and memoirs will be discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

¹⁸ E. Blyth, *When We Lived in Jerusalem*, (London: John Murray, 1927).

¹⁹ B. Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem*, (New York: Arno Press, 1977).

document.²⁰ The Spanish consulate was the only official establishment which remained opened during the war, as Spain remained neutral in the conflict. The Spanish consulate took care firstly of the interests of the members of the Entente (France, Britain, Italy and USA). Quite paradoxically, when the German and Austrian troops and diplomats left the city, Ballobar also took care of their interests becoming a sort of “universal consul”. As such the Spanish consulate became the centre of great activity. Antonio de la Cierva Lewita Conde de Ballobar was a young diplomat, who was appointed consul of Jerusalem in 1914. This diary besides reflecting his personal experience and opinions provides a political perspective in view of the conflict as experienced by a member of a “neutral” power. He handled the affairs of different Christian groups, and above all he functioned as an intermediary between the Catholic groups in the city, mainly the Latin Patriarchate and the Custody of Terra Santa. He also mediated between members of the belligerent parts during the conflict residing in Jerusalem, and this diary also offers some insights on the international situation.²¹ Unfortunately, after a visit in the archives of the Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (the Spanish Foreign Office), I have to conclude that we cannot rely on any consistent documentation from these archives. Few materials have remained in order to support the information provided by the diary with the view from the Spanish government.

Among the private papers, are those of Ronald Storrs, governor of Jerusalem from 1917 to 1926, stand out. These papers are held at the Pembroke College in Cambridge and cover different periods of the life of the British official

²⁰ Conde De Ballobar, *Diario de Jerusalén 1914-1919*, (Madrid: Nerea, 1996).

²¹ See for instance *Ibid*, 65.

from 1904 to 1950. Most of the material is personal correspondence. The papers are integrated with the published *The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs*.²²

Another relevant collection of letters and papers is that of Chaim Weizmann, one of the most important Zionists in the interwar period and president of the British Zionists. These letters and papers are held in the Zionist Archives in Israel and they were published in 1977.²³ These documents shed light on Weizmann's thought in relation to Jerusalem. He acknowledged the symbolic value of the city and that any Zionist project over *Eeretz Israel* should include Jerusalem as capital.

1.2.4 Foreign Consulates in Jerusalem

Foreign consulates started to be established in the middle of the 19th century. Because of its religious status the city on one hand lived the life of an Ottoman provincial town however on the other hand any issue involving religious institutions, mainly Christians, projected Jerusalem in a larger context. In this connection it is important to understand the impact of the war for the internationalisation of the Jerusalem question; that is the control of the Holy Places. There were about a dozen consulates in the city before the war, and, as explained in the previous section only the Spanish remained opened throughout the whole period of the war. I have chosen to study only some of them, according to criteria of relevance and availability of materials: American, German, and Italian consulates. British archival sources will be discussed separately as in fact after 1917 the main bulk of sources available are from the British archives.

²² R. Storrs, *The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1937).

The first material under review is from the American Consulate. This institution as well as other consulates remained opened for some time after the beginning of the war, and American sources have been so far neglected, primarily because before the end of the First World War the United States were not considered to be a major player in the conflict. American documents seem to provide good information about work and labour conditions in Palestine as in fact several reports were available for American firms willing to invest in Palestine. These documents shed light on important aspects of the economic and social life of the city. Besides primary sources also the book by Ruth Kark *American Consuls in the Holy Land, 1832-1914* is a good source discussing the relationship between America and Palestine.²⁴ The American Consulate in Jerusalem opened in 1857 and closed in April 1917 following the rupture of diplomatic relations between the American and Ottoman governments following the American declaration of war against Germany. The consulate reopened in May 1919.²⁵ The consular correspondence, available at NARA (National Archives & Records Administration) is composed of more than a hundred bounds. The records of the correspondence with the Department of State are also quite extensive.²⁶ The records dealing with the war period are related to the protection of Allied interests and to the distribution of funds sent to Jerusalem's Jewish residents by Jewish-Zionist philanthropic organisations. They also include letters from enterprises looking for business opportunities in Palestine.²⁷ To an

²³ M. Weisgal, W, ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, (Jerusalem: Transaction Books, 1977).

²⁴ R. Kark, *American Consuls in the Holy Land 1832-1914*, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1994).

²⁵ H.D. Mayer, "Records of the United States Consulate and Consulate General at Jerusalem, Palestine, 1857-1935" (unpublished 1976).

²⁶ See for instance Consular Post Vol. 69 to 91; Record Group 59 Department of State.

²⁷ See Chapter 4 for examples.

extent the distribution of relief and business correspondence seems to have been the main concern of the American consul while from the correspondence with the Department of State it transpires that the American Government did not have a clear policy vis-à-vis Palestine and Jerusalem in the war period.

Other relatively overlooked material comes from the *Ministero degli Affari Esteri* (the Italian Foreign Office). Although these archives have been extensively used by Sergio Minerbi in his study of the economic and political relations between Italy and Palestine from 1914 to 1920, they have never been used for the study of Jerusalem. Other Italian scholars studied the political relations between Italy and Palestine in the war and intra-wars periods; however these works focused mainly on the politics of the Italian government towards Palestine.²⁸ Italy joined the war on 24 May 1915 when the Italian Government declared war against the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Yet only in August 1915 Italy entered hostilities against the Ottomans. In Jerusalem, when Italy joined the war, everything was ready for the departure of the Italian consular mission.²⁹ Yet the archival material from the consulate has never been ordered therefore only a partial section is available.³⁰ The material available is mainly composed of correspondence from the Italian Consulate in Jerusalem with the Italian Embassy in Istanbul and with the Italian Government, moreover a large portion of the material deals with Italian policy vis-à-vis Palestine, Jerusalem and the Holy

²⁸ See for instance: A. Gabellini, *L'Italia e l'Aspetto della Palestina 1916-1924*, (Florence: SeSaMo, 2000); A. Giovannelli, *La Santa Sede e la Palestina*, (Rome: Edizioni Studium, 2000).

²⁹ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 73, Morgenthau to Glazebrook, 9 June 1915: "As in the event of a rupture in the relations between Italy and Turkey, the United States of America will be entrusted with Italian and Russian interests, it will be well for you to arrange all preliminaries with your Italian Colleague in order that the transfer may be effected as expeditiously as possible."

³⁰ See for instance: Serie Politica P, Busta 498; Archivio di Gabinetto Pacco 163; Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 185; Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 186; Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Busta 122, Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Busta 239.

Places. It appears that, like the United States, the Italian government did not possess any clear-cut policy towards Palestine. From the sources it transpires that the Italian government was desperately looking to gain some access to Palestine in order to establish their influence over the religious institutions.

1.2.5 The British and Jerusalem

British official sources deserve a special place in this discussion. The British consulate in Jerusalem was opened in 1838. Records from this consulate are one of the main sources for investigating the history of the city before the war and in the immediate aftermath of the British occupation in 1917. The British consulate was one of the most important consulates in the city and in this respect it rivalled the German consulate. Great Britain had extensive interest in the Eastern Mediterranean region in the late 19th century and though Jerusalem did not possess any military or economic value for the British, the city was the seat of the most important shrines of Christianity.³¹ British consular officials in Ottoman Jerusalem dealt with a great number of issues; the involvement with the city administration and public life was, sometimes, very substantial.³²

The consulate was closed at the beginning of the war by the late consul William Hough, who burnt the consular archives under special instructions from the British Embassy in Istanbul.³³ As a result the material from the British consulate is incomplete but it has nonetheless proven to be crucial in studying the late Ottoman history of the city. From the British conquest of Jerusalem the

³¹ Most of the documents of the British consulate have been published in collections such as: M. Eliav, *Britain in the Holy Land*, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1997); A. Hyamson, *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*, vol. 2, (London: E. Goldstone, 1941).

³² British consular activity will be discussed with great detail in Chapter 4.

documents on Jerusalem, conserved at the Public Record Office in London, became the main, and in some cases the only, sources available to study the British military administration of the city.³⁴

British sources dealing with the period from 1917 to 1920 have been explored with a different purpose. Only a small fraction of the material available deals with urban administration, most of the material related to Jerusalem is of political and propagandistic nature. The inevitable dual nature of Jerusalem as city and propaganda element of great value has been confirmed by the British sources.³⁵ Any research on Jerusalem after 1917 cannot be carried out without an extensive knowledge of the British documents held at the Public Record Office.

1.3 Methodology and literature review

History and time are generally considered to be in a strong relationship. If we believe that time is composed of the past, the present and the future, and their relation as a continuum we can see history mainly as the expression of the past. However it would be reductive not to consider history also as the explication of the present and to an extent of the future. Although we cannot predict the future, we, to some degree, can make some generalisations. Time and history walk alongside and they interact every single moment of the continuum. Marc Bloch argues that the objects of history are men and societies in which men live, but he also adds that history is the science of men in time.³⁶ In this connection time is

³³ TNA: PRO, FO 369/776 W. Hough to Sir E. Grey, Cairo 21 November 1914.

³⁴ See for instance: CAB 21/58; CAB 27/1; CAB 27/7; FO 369/628; FO 141; FO 368/872; FO 368/875; FO 369/776; FO 371; FO 373/7; FO 383/95; FO 395/51; FO 608; FO 882/14; WO 106/718; WO 106/722; WO 158/986.

³⁵ See Chapter 3 for examples.

³⁶ M. Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, (Manchester: Manchester: University Press, 2002), 23.

something that to an extent, can be shaped by historians that want to tell us about the past.

1.3.1 A methodological approach to the study of Jerusalem: the questions of periodisation and microhistory

Defining the concept of periodization is to follow a debate among scholars, philosophers and historians; a debate which has engaged Europeans and more generally Western scholars. I shall outline the terms of this debate in order to provide a critique to a certain idea of historicism, which looks at the different periods in history as a monolithic construction.³⁷ I shall also discuss some arguments of postmodernism, and principally a particular hyper relativism rooted in the idea of postmodernism itself.³⁸ History, necessarily, needs to be periodized, but the rationale needs to be explained. One of the main risks of this historical operation is to fall into an imperialistic vision of history which is evident in some studies of the extra European world in the age of empire. This vision tends to focus on western behaviour instead of contextualising historical change within trajectories of indigenous development. In the particular case under discussion of Jerusalem in the late Ottoman period, that is the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I shall consider the history of the city in the context of western and indigenous influence.

³⁷ Historicism dates back to the 19th century mainly in the German academic tradition. Historicism claims that history is a process to link past and present; history is seen as an organic succession of developments. See J. Black and D.M. MacRaild, eds., *Studying History*, (New York: Palgrave, 1997), 38-42; M. Bentley, *Modern Historiography*, (London: Routledge, 1999), 36-42.

³⁸ One of the main postulates of postmodernism is the idea of separation between the subject and the object; historians can separate themselves from the object of their research. Postmodernism is closely linked to the study of the text or of a discourse which should be study according to a plural reading and interpretation; it is argued that facts are meaningless on their own. See Black and MacRaild, eds., *Studying History*, 161-162; Bentley, *Modern Historiography*, 140.

This general methodological framework will be applied to the object of my research, in order to show the importance of the concept of periodization and how changing subdivisions in history are crucial to the study of Jerusalem. I will review some historical studies on the city and discuss how a change in periodization can provide new perspectives. Moreover I will provide a brief summary of some of the debates about periodization. One of the most important examples of the significance of periodization is represented by the case of the 17th century German scholar named Cellarius who defined the Middle Ages as the historical time which separated the great civilizations as Greece and Rome from the new civilised Europe of the Renaissance.³⁹ This subdivision of historical time led to the idea that the Middle Ages were a backward period; therefore much of the earlier literature dealing with the period defines it as a Dark Age. Even today the very adjective medieval is by some considered synonymous with bigotry and equated to the “uncivilised” world. In 19th century the Romantics mainly of German background revived the Middle Ages providing a different perspective on the assessment of this particular era. Historians today tend to consider this idea of the Middle Ages as a concept which takes as a reference European history alone, therefore this kind of periodization has often been considered artificial and western centric.

Establishing categories and subdividing time and therefore history has always been one of the main concerns for historians. Choosing to divide history implies that the historian will apply values and judgements to his research. According to post-modern ideas it may be argued that applying values to

³⁹ The story of Cellarius is briefly quoted in G. Barraclough, *History in a Changing World*, (Oxford: 1956), 54-55.

structures is like applying meta-narrative to history. I do not think this is the case. The problem of attributing values to a subdivision of history can be overridden knowing the historian and the context he or she works and writes. Textual analysis is therefore important in order to understand the context in which history has been written and to understand the historian himself but it does not explain the periodization chosen *per se*. Division in history is not a fact but more likely, as E.H. Carr argues, a necessary hypothesis whose validity depends on interpretation.⁴⁰ Fernand Braudel, quite interestingly, points out that past and present illuminate each other, therefore the different time spans an historian chooses are nonetheless part of the whole historical time.⁴¹ This means that beyond the simple task of dividing history on paper, what really matters is giving some meanings to the subdivision.

Historians like Marc Bloch and Eric Hobsbawm do not make clear statements about the issue of periodization; nevertheless their own ideas are related to the point under discussion. Bloch, talking about history, men and time argues that, there is too much stress on the search for the origins in the historical field.⁴² As time is a continuum, the boundaries between different periods could be only set by hypothesis rather than fixed as used by historicist tradition. Searching for origins has obviously a political meaning as it created discourses of legitimacy and power. This is indeed a point stressed by postmodernists, who quote the narrative used in this context in order to explain the imperialist, orientalist or other “ist” discourses. Eric Hobsbawm suggests that every society

⁴⁰ Carr, *What Is History?*, 60.

⁴¹ Quoted in J. Tosh, ed., *Historians on History*, (London: Longman, 2000), 247-253.

⁴² Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, 24-29.

or civilisation tends to create a genealogy and chronology of their own history.⁴³ These two structures, genealogy and chronology, are crucial to the issue of legitimacy. There are many examples of this kind of operations, such as in the history of Turkey written after the establishment of the Republic in 1923 whose purpose was to legitimise Mustafa Kemal's revolution which brought the new regime to power. Historians in this particular case have rewritten history stressing the Turkish, rather than the Ottoman, past trying to inculcate a sense of national unity based on the common cultural past of the Turkish-speaking people.⁴⁴

In this debate it is also quite interesting to consider the master of empirical history, Leopold von Ranke. He states that "every epoch is immediate to God"⁴⁵, suggesting that because God is the master of time it is not possible to subdivide it. Because of his empiricism and the idea that history could be studied only in the context of the past, Ranke also introduced the study of the text. According to him, any type of historical source, including literature as well as official documents, could help to explain the context in which historical events took place. The main problem with Ranke's approach is that it relies mostly on the Divine Providence and it is clearly outmoded. Carr rightly remarks: "Ranke piously believed that divine providence would take care of the meaning of history, if he took care of the facts."⁴⁶ In the debate about periodization I believe that there are no substantial differences between the position of Ranke and the postmodernist one: they differ in the attribution of values and therefore meanings

⁴³ E. Hobsbawm, *On History*, (London: Abacus, 2002), 28-31.

⁴⁴ A. Evin, "Communitarian Structures and Social Change," in *Modern Turkey*, ed. A. Evin, 11 (Opladen: Leske Verlag, 1984).

⁴⁵ Quoted in R. Evans, *In Defence of History*, (London: Granta Books, 2000), 17.

to the periodization itself, whether they subdivide history or not. For Ranke subdivision was not possible because time is a creation of God. To postmodernists subdividing history is a derivative process from the discourse applied to history itself. Therefore periodization is a narrative discourse too, which means that subdivision of history is only a meta-process located outside history.

As a school of thought Marxism has also something to say about periodization. Marxism takes as a starting point the beginning of capitalism following the economic development of the 19th and 20th centuries, but it is weak about the periodization of history of earlier ages. Nevertheless Marxism is also to an extent, the father of a new historical approach: microhistory. Microhistory developed in the 1970s among Italian scholars such as Carlo Ginzburg and Giovanni Levi.⁴⁷ It was with Carlo Ginzburg whose famous work *The Cheese and the Worms: the Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller*, revealed large patterns of cultural production through the thorough study of individual experiences.⁴⁸ Ginzburg recognized the fundamental influence on his works of the British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm who relied on the concept of "subaltern class" in the choice and hypothesis of study.⁴⁹ Historical research is not considered an aesthetic and rhetorical activity; microhistory discusses the plurality of possible interpretations available in a historical inquiry.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Carr, *What Is History?*, 19.

⁴⁷ See C. Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: the Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980); J. Revel and G. Levi, eds., *Political Uses of the Past*, (London: Frank Cass).

⁴⁸ N. Stieber, "Microhistory of the Modern City," *The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 58, no. 3, (September 1999): 383.

⁴⁹ H. Espada Lima, "Historical Microanalysis and Social History," Conference Paper, Edge Hill College of Higher Education, (26-28 June 2002): p. 3.

⁵⁰ G. Levi, "On Microhistory," in *New Perspective on Historical Writing*, ed. P. Burke, 98-99 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).

Microhistory studies the past on a very small scale. Historians, who belong to this school, focus on the social history of small villages or towns and generally view the roots of major events as grounded in the actions of their inhabitants, or of other agents who are in a relationship with the object of the study. There are however examples of microhistory that not necessarily focus on social history. In fact this approach has become useful in the study and investigation of topics such as the history of tobacco and cuisine or military history.⁵¹ Indeed themes of social history are investigated in these works as will also be so to an extent in this thesis, nevertheless this literature shows how microhistory is evolving towards the inclusion of more subjects and themes to investigate. Microhistory should not be confused with the common practice of amateur historians who look at the history of their village or church. These studies generally lack method besides being more open to bias.

Giovanni Levi argues that microhistory is a sort of an experiment. It is based on the reduction of the scale of observation and an intensive study of the material available.⁵² Therefore periodization in microhistory is one of the most important criteria to consider. Jacques Revel summarizes quite precisely the main purpose of microhistory, that is, to enrich social analyses by introducing new variables.⁵³ Indeed this approach shows some limitations because commonly we look for general rules governing social structures, therefore the results of microhistorical research could be misleading. Yet Levi argues that one of the

⁵¹ See I. Gateley, *Tobacco: the Story of How Tobacco Seduced the World* (New York: Grove Press, 2002); P.P. Bober, *Art, Culture and Cuisine: Ancient and Medieval Gastronomy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); C.R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Collins, 1998).

⁵² Levi, "On Microhistory," 99.

⁵³ J. Revel, "Microanalyses and the Construction of the Social," in *Histories: French Construction of the Past*, eds. J. Revel and L. Hunt, 492-502 (New York: The New Press, 1996).

purposes of microhistory through the reduction of the scale of observation is to reveal factors previously unobserved.⁵⁴ Looking at a local scale however does not mean constructing only a local history. In fact as Revel suggests microhistory works towards a multiple contextualization of the actors, this is partly what I did with some of the most relevant actors discussed in this work.⁵⁵ This is the connection between microhistory and history as we normally define it. In this work I propose to revisit the concept of microhistory. The question is, what microhistory is actually in relation to the study of Jerusalem. Through the investigation of specific institutions and key figures I aim to reduce the scale of observation, to gather data and information which will be then translated into a narrative aiming to show the functioning of certain dynamics in the city of Jerusalem in the period under discussion and to illustrate general concepts from specific points in the real life. In the tradition of the micro historical approach I will also try to make my point of views and also the limitations of documentary evidence part of the narrative, in order to avoid hiding these features from the reader.⁵⁶ This is the context in which I would present this research in order to explain the importance of periodization and eventually suggest a fresh micro study of the case under review.

1.3.2 Jerusalem in academic and divulgative literature

In this section I shall review three types of literature. Considering the large amount of literature available on the history of Jerusalem of both academic and non academic nature, the following discussion will consider works on the

⁵⁴ Levi, "On Microhistory," 101.

⁵⁵ Revel, "Microanalyses."

city from the perspective of periodization with particular reference to the late Ottoman and War Period. Furthermore it will highlight the attention received by the First World War and the transition from the Ottoman to British rule. The first kind of literature deals with Jerusalem following a specific periodization and theme mainly on the late Ottoman period. The second type approaches the history of the city in the long duree; this particular literature that may be defined as divulgative is often aimed at non-academic audiences. The third kind of literature under review discusses specific aspects of the history of the city with a well defined periodisation that is the closest to the idea of microhistory. This literary genre is similar to the first one; however, as I will show below, these historians did not use historical research for pure rhetorical and aesthetic activity, besides they selected a specific point of real life from which to exemplify general concepts.⁵⁷

As defined earlier in the Chapter the micro-historical approach is a combination of focus on a specific unit of study (in this case Jerusalem), and a clearly defined periodization which allows us to address coherently a number of thematic priorities through appropriate primary sources. In the literature available there is not a full micro historical study of the city of Jerusalem though it may be argued that works focussing specifically on demography or economics, as will be presented below, can be already a micro study in the sense of the intensive study of data available. Nevertheless microhistory is interested with the quantitative study of history only if the data analysed can be contextualised and eventually the macro (the data collected and processed) can relate with the micro (the

⁵⁶ Levi, "On Microhistory," 110.

⁵⁷ For these criteria defining microhistory see Ibid, 98-100.

narrative that aims to contextualise the data collected).⁵⁸ One of the main assumptions of microhistory is the reduction of the scale of observation which implies a clear periodization, in other words the scale of observation is not only related to the object under scrutiny. The setting of a clear periodization is necessary in order to research a clear and small temporal unit. In some cases the periodization chosen by the author were misleading, as some works claimed to discuss a particular period but eventually discussed it with limitations as the examples below will show.⁵⁹ Despite the importance of the dramatic transition between the Ottoman and the British administration, there are no comprehensive studies on the period of the First World War to date.⁶⁰

The first study under review is the book by Haim Gerber *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem 1890-1914* published in 1985.⁶¹ This work is a thorough analysis of the late Ottoman period in Jerusalem, focussing on the demographic, economic and administrative structure of the city. Despite the comprehensive discussion of the topics suggested, this work cannot be defined as a micro historical account, in fact Gerber is interested in the structure of the institutions under scrutiny but not in the enquiry of the individuals who belonged to those institutions. In the discussion of the demographic aspects he fails to bring the micro into the macro, in other words Gerber provides a thorough discussion of the demography of the Jerusalem region at the end of the Ottoman rule but he does not link the

⁵⁸ See M. Peltonen, "Clues, Margins, and Monads: The Micro-Link in Historical Research," *History and Theory* 40, no. 3 (October 2001): 359.

⁵⁹ In some cases the periodization had been chosen according to great events but then not all the period under discussion had been developed.

⁶⁰ The only recent work is the PhD thesis of Abigail Jacobson, "From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem in the Transition Between Ottoman and British Rule 1912-1920" (PhD thesis, The University of Chicago, Chicago, 2006). Recently it has also been published a book by Amy Dockser Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2007), however this work cannot be considered as a fully academic work as the writer, a journalist, does not provide a discussion of sources and does not explain her methodological approach.

demographic aspects discussed to the real people living in the area. Gerber's main purpose is to show the modernizing effects of state intervention. He concludes that: "Jerusalem in the late Ottoman period underwent an impressive process of modernization".⁶² Gerber tends to equate modernisation with westernisation and takes the western model of state-led urban development as the frame of reference for his discussion by investigating the long term impact of the Tanzimat reforms upon the administration, the judicial system and the provision of services to the population.⁶³

Crucially Gerber does not deal directly with the Tanzimat but with the Hamidian era. He discusses the deeds of the Tanzimat reforms in the Hamidian era following the broad framework of the "modernisationist" approach. A second problem with Gerber's work from the perspective of microhistory is about sources. Gerber relies mainly on material from the archive of the Ottoman administration of the province of Jerusalem but he does not use materials from the central Ottoman archives in Istanbul complemented by British consular sources and secondary materials.⁶⁴ Nevertheless this work is indeed a thorough investigation of the sources available in Jerusalem, nonetheless it represents only half of the picture that could have been drawn with the examination of the material available in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul.

Belonging to the same category of literature dealing with the late Ottoman era and the transition to the British is the edited book by Kamil J. Asali entitled, *Jerusalem in History*. This work is a collection of articles dealing with specific

⁶¹ H. Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem 1890-1914*, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985).

⁶² Ibid, 250.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 1.

periods.⁶⁵ In the chapter written by Alexander Schölch, *Jerusalem in the 19th Century (1831-1917 AD)*, there is a good account of the economic and social structures of the city until the beginning of the war, and interesting tables showing demographic changes.⁶⁶ However, the periodization suggested in the title is misleading; in fact there is little mention of the history of the city during the war period.⁶⁷ The chapter written by Michael C. Hudson, *The Transformation of Jerusalem (1917-1987 AD)*, is also less informative in relation to the war period.⁶⁸ Hudson provides an overview of the transformation of the city in the twentieth century, but he focuses mainly on the Arab-Jewish conflict suggesting that also in this case the title is misleading. As in the case of Schölch the war period has been almost entirely discarded. Asali's aim to show the transformation of the city since its very foundation is quite interesting; however the articles under review do not seem to respect the periodization chosen particularly with reference to the First World War.

The second category under review is what has been defined as divulgative literature which is composed mainly of non academic works which are representative of how the history of Jerusalem can be reconstructed for public consumption and with more or less explicit political aims in mind. In the book *Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century* Martin Gilbert describes the history of the city from the beginning of the twentieth century up until 1996, the date of the publication of the book.⁶⁹ Gilbert chooses a large periodization that does not

⁶⁵ K.J. Asali, ed., *Jerusalem in History* (Essex: Scorpion Publishing, 1989).

⁶⁶ A. Schölch, "Jerusalem in 19th Century 1831-1917 AD," in *Jerusalem in History*, ed. K.J. Asali, 228-148 (Essex: Scorpion Publishing, 1989).

⁶⁷ Of the war is reported only "the entry of Allenby into Jerusalem (11 December 1917)" Ibid, 245.

⁶⁸ M.C. Hudson, "The Transformation of Jerusalem 1917-1984 AD", in *Jerusalem in History*, ed. K.J. Asali, 249-278 (Essex: Scorpion Publishing, 1989).

⁶⁹ M. Gilbert, *Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century*.

follow any particular great event, in order to show how Jerusalem was transformed from a small provincial town of the Ottoman Empire to the capital of the state of Israel. Gilbert's work focuses mainly on the history of the Jewish and Christian communities, with a strong emphasis on Zionist colonisation from the beginning of the twentieth century. Though the focus is on a quite specific topic, the periodization suggested and indeed the clear rhetorical style does not allow us to consider this work in the category of microhistory. In fact Gilbert does not reduce the scale of observation and indeed fails to study intensively the material available. Despite the complete absence of references it is possible to trace some of the sources used, diaries, memoirs, which are most likely British and Zionist sources. It is possible to claim that Gilbert aims to use history in the construction of power and legitimacy of both the British in taking Palestine and of the Zionists in developing their projects. When discussing the British conquest of Jerusalem in 1917, Gilbert states: "The first Christmas under British rule marked the first return of a Christian power to Jerusalem since the Crusades, more than 600 years earlier."⁷⁰ It can be argued that ultimately Gilbert's book falls into the category of those works defined as Orientalist. As shown earlier, Gilbert aims to justify and legitimise British rule and he believes Ottoman rule was not efficient.

Another work written largely for public consumption, which takes a broad approach in relation to periodization, is Karen Armstrong's *Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths* published in 1996.⁷¹ Armstrong's book reconstructs the relationship between the different religious communities of Jerusalem since the very foundation of the city; nevertheless she does not follow any particular

⁷⁰ Ibid, 61.

⁷¹ K. Armstrong, *Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths*, (London: Harper Collins, 1996).

methodological approach. The four centuries of Ottoman rule in the city are dealt with only one chapter. Armstrong discusses the meaning of "Holy City" in relation to the Jewish, Christian and Muslim traditions; and despite the commendable idea to look at this topic the time span chosen is too broad and the result is quite generic. In the chapter entitled "Rebirth" Armstrong gives us an account of the history of the city in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. She does not discuss the First World War and simply states: "Jerusalem became the headquarters of the Turkish VIII Army Corps".⁷² A few paragraphs later she also defines the British conquest of the city as the end of the "work of the Crusaders."⁷³ This book first suffers from the lack of a balanced periodization; secondly Armstrong attempts to be objective in relation to the very sensitive topic of the coexistence of the different religious communities in Jerusalem without a proper investigation of the sources available. If on one hand this work has proved to be a best seller on the other hand this kind of work does not contribute academically to the improvement of the knowledge of the subject. Ultimately Armstrong, like Martin, tries to legitimise British, Christian and to an extent Zionist rule of Jerusalem.

Moving to the third literary genre under review, I will discuss works that are closer to the definition of microhistory discussed earlier in the chapter and in this section. A new historical approach is proposed by the book of Ruth Kark and Michal Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs*. This work considers particular aspects of urban life and development in the period before the establishment of the state of Israel as suggested by its subtitle "Quarters

⁷² Ibid, 369.

⁷³ Ibid, 370.

Neighbourhoods, Villages 1800-1948".⁷⁴ This is mainly an attempt to link the urban development of Jerusalem to that of its rural hinterland from the beginning of the 19th century to the end of the mandate period. In many respects this work falls into the remit of both urban studies and social geography as it focuses on the urban environment, the spatial socio-political structure of the quarters and districts and their demography. In terms of periodization this work falls clearly under the rubric of microhistory as it offers a fairly comprehensive investigation of the city in the period under discussion in the appropriate context. A similar study in approach, is that of Michael Dumper, who in his *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967* shows how politics was turned into effective policy making in relation to Jerusalem after 1967. Jerusalem from 1948 was divided in two sections (one under Israeli control and the other one under Jordanian rule). In 1967 following the Six-Day war, Jerusalem was eventually reunited under Israeli rule.⁷⁵ This particular work is not in strict relation with the periodization of the current research, however it bears a clear micro-historical value which lies in the focus on urban structure, organisation, services and the relationship between social-geography and politics. Dumper's work is a thorough analysis of the demography, housing policies, economic development, services, and religious communities of Jerusalem since 1967. Dumper follows carefully both the periodization and the thematic priorities. He contextualises the period before 1967 by providing an overview of the late Ottoman administration of the city, the war period and the British mandate. In this work the macro that is the context and the themes suggested is clearly related with the micro represented by the

⁷⁴ R. Kark and M. Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and Its Environs*, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2001).

particular use of the narrative aimed at the demonstration of aspects of politics which would be distorted by simple generalisation from the sources available.

The review of Jerusalem in the academic and non academic literature reveals that there are many different positions around the argument of periodization and therefore in the methodological approach to the subject. Some scholars have used periodization as a tool in order to construct their narrative around a specific event; to others periodization represent a simple temporal place into which they organise their research; sometimes the chosen periodization has fully explained and worked, however on other occasions it represents a mere boundary in order to fix the parameters of research.

1.4 Jerusalem: a definition

Besides the discussion of periodization, sources and the war context which is the subject of the following section, it is important to highlight the meaning of Jerusalem as a sacred space and the problem of the interpretation of this definition from the perspective of the urban population and the international actors involved. Jerusalem was considered for centuries a Holy Place, a site where the divine became manifest.⁷⁶ A general definition is necessary in order to contextualise the city in the larger context of the First World War in the Middle East.

One of the main bonds between Judaism, Christianity and Islam is indeed the city of Jerusalem; all of the three religions possess different connections with the city, nevertheless all of them considered Jerusalem sacred. To summarise

⁷⁵ M. Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, (New York, Columbia Press University, 1997).

briefly, Jerusalem for the Muslim is a sacred place as suggested by the name *al-Quds* (the Holy) given to the city. Jerusalem was the first *qibla* (direction of prayer), and the Qur'an claims that the Prophet ascended to heaven from here. The Islamic sacrality of the city stemmed from the sanctity attributed to the city by the Christians in the centuries which preceded the birth of Islam. Christian definition of Jerusalem is quite complex however as in Christian theology there exists a differentiation between the earthly Jerusalem and the heavenly one.⁷⁷ Werblowsky quotes the example of St. Gregory of Nyssa, who in the 4th century advised that the real pilgrimage was to undertake from the body to God rather than from a place to Palestine.⁷⁸ This is to suggest that Jerusalem became for Christianity an archetype, a model in opposition to the vision of the Jewish community. For the Jews, Jerusalem represented the land of Israel (Jerusalem and Zion can be used as synonyms); Jerusalem was also the place of the temple that represented the direct channel of communication between the people of Israel and God.⁷⁹

On the eve of the First World War Jerusalem was also a city of intrigues, discussion, fighting and compromise: Muslims and Christians were defending their sacred space while the Jews were trying to restore themselves in the land of Israel (*Eretz Yisrael*). Competition over the sacred space became part of the discourses of war and Jerusalem became a battleground not only for the opposing British, Ottoman and German armies but also for the redefinition of the city itself. In Britain the pious Prime Minister David Lloyd George defined Jerusalem

⁷⁶ R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, "The Meaning of Jerusalem to Jews, Christian and Muslims," in *Jerusalem in the Mind of the Western World*, eds. Y. Ben-Arieh and M. Davis, 7 (Westport CT: Praeger, 1997).

⁷⁷ Ibid, 11-12.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

as a "Christmas present for the nation" for the Christian community, implying that the heavenly Jerusalem was to be reunited with the earthly one.⁸⁰ The war redefined Jerusalem also for the Muslims in so far as Ottomans rule was relinquished and a "Christian" power replaced it. For the Jews these political developments meant the redefinition of the idea of "being Jew", since the war ushered in the process which led to the restoration of the land of Israel in 1947-48.

1.5 The First World War in the Middle East and the question of Jerusalem

In November 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in the First World War, Jerusalem became an important player in the Middle East front of the war operations. This section will investigate the causes which brought the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers. Then it will discuss more specifically the military operations on the Eastern front, as the Middle East campaign was called and how the British army came to occupy Jerusalem. Prior to 1914 Britain acted as an ally of the Ottoman Empire with the purpose to defend the Dardanelles from Russia and to protect the imperial route to India.⁸¹ Following the outbreak of the war, British policies towards the Ottoman Empire radically changed. Before the war Ottoman Empire was challenged in many places. In 1908, the Young Turks overthrew the Sultan Abdülhamid II and re-instated the constitution which was suspended in 1876. The Empire was then attacked by the Italians in 1911 and lost Libya. The

⁷⁹ G. Greenberg, "Heavenly and Earthly Jerusalem: Pedagogical Perspectives", in *Jerusalem in the Mind of the Western World*, eds. Y. Ben-Arieh and M. Davis, 252 (Westport CT: Praeger, 1997).

⁸⁰ D. Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, (New York: Henry Holt & C., 2001), 313.

⁸¹ J. Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East*, (London: The Athlone Press, 1969), 2.

following year, the outbreak of the Balkan wars additionally weakened the position of the Ottoman government.⁸² Eventually in 1913 the leadership of the Empire changed when a *coup d'etat* staged by the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) installed a military dictatorship.⁸³

In the months preceding the outbreak of the war in 1914 the Ottoman Empire was diplomatically isolated. Most of the European governments considered the Porte to be on the brink of the collapse. It is not that surprising that Great Britain, France and Russia planned the partition of the Ottoman territories before the war ended envisaging the downfall of what throughout the 19th century had become known as the “Sick man of Europe”. The British government believed that as a result of the war, the Ottoman Empire would be dismembered. In 1915 Britain agreed to the Russian occupation of Istanbul and the straits whilst the French government claimed Syria.⁸⁴ Hebert Samuel, the President of the Local Government Board,⁸⁵ submitted a proposal to the Foreign Office in order to create a Jewish national home in Palestine. In London British officials wondered whether acquisition of new territories in the Middle East would strength or weaken the global position of their Empire.⁸⁶ Other agreements for the partition of the Middle East followed.

The first important document related to British War aims in the Middle East is the De Bunsen Committee or “British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia”.⁸⁷ The De Bunsen committee was established in April 1915 with the purpose of

⁸² A. Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, (London: John Murray, 2002), 6.

⁸³ B. Lewis, *The Middle East*, (London: Phoenix, 2003), 338.

⁸⁴ M. Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East 1917-1919*, (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 1.

⁸⁵ The Local Government Board was a ministerial post with responsibilities over the Local Government. In 1919 it had been abolished and its functions came under the responsibilities of the ministry of health.

⁸⁶ Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East*, 13-16.

⁸⁷ TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, 1915.

considering the nature of British interests in the Middle East in the event of a successful conclusion of the war. The origin of this committee is to be found in the confusion and conflicting analyses of the different governmental departments. The deadlock was resolved when Prime Minister Asquith, appointed an interdepartmental committee chaired by Maurice de Bunsen.⁸⁸ The report, published on 30 June 1915, opened with a general statement and preliminary considerations, it was divided into nine sections; the ninth and last was related to the question of Palestine and the Christian holy places. Overall the committee discussed the issue of the future of the Ottoman Empire proposing four solutions, the division of the Empire in spheres of influence, partition, status quo or large decentralisation. It is clear that in any case the existence of the Ottoman Empire was still seen as desirable.⁸⁹ As for Palestine the committee included this region in the British sphere of influence, directly challenging French claims. Recognising the complexities in relation to this particular region, the committee concluded that "Palestine must be recognized as a country whose destiny must be the subject of special negotiations, in which both belligerents and neutrals are alike interested."⁹⁰ The De Bunsen Committee de facto recommended that the Holy Places should be internationalised, whilst also postponing the discussion according to the outcome of the conflict.⁹¹ Although Jerusalem as such was for the first time mentioned in the Sykes-Picot agreement

⁸⁸ A. Klieman, "Britain's War Aims in the Middle East in 1915", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 3, no. 3, (July 1968): 241-242.

⁸⁹ TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, 28-29.

⁹⁰ TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, 28.

⁹¹ Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East*, 19.

of 1916, the position of the city in the future arrangement of the Arab Middle East remained vague.⁹²

Before joining the Central Powers, the Ottoman Empire was left in a state of ambivalent neutrality towards the warring parties. On the one hand, the Ottoman government commissioned two war ships from the British naval docks. On the other hand, as Perry and Yapp argue, both Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks had relied on German military missions in order to retain power and defend the Empire from outside aggressions.⁹³ This ambivalent neutrality was not meant to last as, in fact, the CUP was desperately looking for an ally in Europe. As stated by Zürcher: "they were prepared to accept any alliance rather than continued isolation".⁹⁴ Isolation was not an option for the CUP government as the Ottoman leaders were seeking an opportunity to regain full sovereignty over the Empire through the ending of the capitulatory regime and were also looking for protection in order to save the Empire from partition.⁹⁵ A neutral stance was equally unacceptable for the Entente and for the Central Powers as territories under Ottoman control were strategic for both the alignments.⁹⁶ In the two years preceding the war German-Ottoman relations were cold. Both the Young Turks and members of the CUP disliked Germany's support of the Hamidian regime.⁹⁷ However, things were to change. When the war began the British government

⁹² M.E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923*, (London: Longman, 1987), 277-286. The position of Jerusalem in the Sykes-Picot agreement remained vague. Palestine (a part from Haifa and Acre which were to be placed under British administration) was to be placed under international administration with no indication of how this administration should work. In the Husayn-McMahon correspondence the question of Palestine and of Jerusalem were not discussed.

⁹³ M.E. Yapp and V.J. Parry, eds., *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 367.

⁹⁴ E.J. Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*, (London: Tauris, 1993), 116.

⁹⁵ D. Fromkin, David, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 47-48.

⁹⁶ F. Ahmad, "The Late Ottoman Empire," in *The Great Powers and the end of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. M. Kent, 18 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

refused to deliver the two war ships commissioned by the Ottomans, which had been financed through a popular subscription. Although this caused a great deal of popular resentment which was echoed in official circles, Great Britain was still considered the natural ally of the Ottoman Empire by many politicians such as Cavid, the CUP Minister of Finance.⁹⁸ On 28 July 1914 Enver Paşa, Minister of War, met the German ambassador Wangenheim in secret to discuss a defensive alliance with Germany while Cemal Paşa, Minister of the Marine, continued to favour contacts with France being of very well known French sympathies.⁹⁹ In August, ideological, economic and geopolitical factors, and the personal pressure of the Kaiser Wilhelm II himself brought together the Ottoman and German Empires with a secret agreement signed by the CUP triumvirate in power and the German representatives.¹⁰⁰

When Russia entered the war alongside the Entente, the *casus foederis* arose. The CUP, however, delayed the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the conflict for a number of reasons. According to Zürcher and Nicolle the government was in no condition to fight a war. Logistics was the main problem as the government could not easily deploy the army throughout the vast domains of the Empire. Moreover the Ottoman involvement in the war operations was dependent on supplies from their German and Austrian allies.¹⁰¹ On 9 September 1914 unilaterally the Ottoman Empire declared the abolition of the capitulations

⁹⁷ U. Trumpener, "Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Great Powers and the end of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. M. Kent, 123 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

⁹⁸ D. Fromkin, David, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 49; Ahmad, "The Late Ottoman Empire," 13.

⁹⁹ D. Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 48; U. Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Caravan Books, 1989), 15. The Ottoman Government proposed to the Germans a closer relationship between the two countries on 22 July, but the German Ambassador turned down this proposal.

¹⁰⁰ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 116. Ahmad, "The Late Ottoman Empire," 11.

¹⁰¹ D. Nicolle, *The Ottoman Army 1914-18*, (London: Osprey, 1994), 20; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 117.

regaining full sovereignty over its subjects. While the European powers involved in the war did not intervene, neutral countries forwarded their complaints to the Turkish government. The announcement of the abolition of the Capitulations had a terrific impact on the population and boosted the morale of all Ottoman subjects who had not been under the capitulatory regime.¹⁰²

At the end of October 1914 Turkish warships opened fire against a Russian naval base in the Black Sea but it was only in November that the Ottoman officially entered the war. The Ottoman army was mobilised in August and it was composed of 4 army Corps whose effectiveness had to be tested. Turkish officials hoped to increase military performance during the war thanks to the German support. Palestine came under the military district of Syria which included 2 army corps including 2 or 3 infantry divisions each, one cavalry brigade, 3 howitzer batteries, a battalion of engineers and a company of telegraphers.¹⁰³ As soon as the 4th army was established in Damascus it was sent to the Palestinian front under the direct command of Cemal Paşa.

For their part the British government since the outbreak of the war in 1914, had focused on Egypt which had been under British control since 1882. Although the war cabinet advocated the direct annexation of the country, it was eventually declared a British protectorate in December 1914. British officials were concerned with a possible attack launched against the Suez Canal, which was vital for British interests in the region and beyond. However in the early stages of the war, Palestine was a secondary issue on the agenda of the British War Office, the main concerns were indeed Europe and as for the Eastern Front

¹⁰² Ahmad, "The Late Ottoman Empire," 17.

the main issue were the Dardanelles and Istanbul. It is only with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 that British policies emerged with more clarity. The following year Jerusalem was included in the British military as it became clear that the Ottoman authorities were not in a position to retain control of the city. The Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, declared that Jerusalem should be a Christmas gift to the nation.

While Britain, France and Russia were discussing the future of Middle East, on the Turkish front Cemal Paşa was appointed governor and commander in chief of Syria and Palestine. He was assisted by the German chief of staff General Friederich Kress von Kressenstein who played a key role on the Palestinian front. According to Bruce the Germanisation of the Turkish army led to tensions between the officers of both armies.¹⁰⁴ These tensions were confirmed in the following years by many observers inside Jerusalem.¹⁰⁵ A surprise offensive against the Suez Canal was launched from Syria in early 1915 but failed with heavy losses on the Turkish-German side. Turkish victories in Mesopotamia and at Çannakale (Gallipoli) and the hope that a further attack on the canal would raise an anti-British rebellion in Egypt in the name of Islam, led the German and Turkish commands to plan a second strike. By the beginning of the summer of 1916 the troops were ready, but the British soon discovered the advance through air reconnaissance. By mid August the British outnumbered the German-Turkish troops *de facto* ending their Palestinian campaign.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ M. Roubiçek, *Modern Ottoman Troops 1790-1915*, (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1978), 20-21.

¹⁰⁴ Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 8.

¹⁰⁵ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*. In the diary, kept from 1914 to 1919 there are several entries enlightening us on the tensions between German and Ottoman officials.

¹⁰⁶ Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 43.

Palestine and Syria had remained virtually unscathed but in 1917 the British army led by General Archibald Murray, who was appointed commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in January 1916, moved from a defensive strategy to an offensive one. He attempted twice to take Gaza in the spring of 1917 but both campaigns failed. In London the Military High Command and the new Prime Minister David Lloyd George viewed the inability to take Gaza as unacceptable. In June 1917, General Edmund Allenby assumed command of EEF with instructions to prepare for an offensive campaign during the autumn and winter.¹⁰⁷ He soon adopted new and more hazardous military strategies which allowed the British army to occupy Gaza through Beersheba. Jerusalem was eventually taken from Gaza before Christmas in fulfillment of the order of Lloyd George.¹⁰⁸

The British army, after the defeat at Gallipoli in 1916, regained the initiative throughout the region as in southern Iraq that was a key passage to India through the Persian Gulf. From British occupation in 1914 Basra in southern Iraq was transformed into a modern port that served as base for British troops. In 1916 a new commander was appointed in the region, General Stanley Frederick Maude. Eventually Maude conquered Baghdad on 11 March 1917 creating the possibility for the British advance towards Anatolia and the very centre of the Ottoman Empire.

While the British army was advancing, the Turkish and German commands established a new army group called Yıldırım (storm) under the

¹⁰⁷ J. Priestland, ed., *Records of Jerusalem*, vol. 1, (Oxford: Archive Editions, 2002), 89.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in D.L. Bullock, *Allenby's War*, (London: Blandford Press, 1988), 66.

command of General Erich von Falkenhayn.¹⁰⁹ The purpose was to launch a strike against the British forces in Southern Iraq with guerrilla tactics. Although this new corps was meant to be offensive, it turned out to be a defensive force. In view of the British advance towards Palestine, Von Falkenhayn in 1917 suggested that the Yıldırım was to be sent to Palestine in order to defend the Gaza-Beersheba line rather than defending an indefensible Baghdad. It was however too late.¹¹⁰ By 7 November 1917 the Turco-German troops were retreating from the Palestinian front, and the path for the British advance towards Jerusalem was opened.

¹⁰⁹ A debate on the Yıldırım army group is to be found in E.J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 2001).

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 171.

2 Administration and Population from Egyptian rule to the War

“...and ere his term
Of warfare, hence permitted he is come,
From Egypt to Jerusalem, to see.”
(Dante, *Paradiso*, XXV, 55)

This chapter studies the administrative structure of Jerusalem in the late 18th, 19th and early twentieth centuries focussing on Ottoman governance, with particular reference to the role of local notables, this in order to understand how the process of modernisation that was taking place in the empire influenced the city. The second part of the chapter deals with the demographic structure of the city in the first decades of the twentieth century in order to assess the impact of the war on the demographic composition of Jerusalem and its dynamics and to discuss the demographic changes in light of the new political framework established after the British occupation of the city in December 1917.

The Ottoman history of Jerusalem began with the occupation of the city by the Sultan Selim I who, in 1517 defeated the Mamluks who had ruled Palestine from Egypt since 1260. It was not until the rule of his son, Kanuni Süleyman (the Law-giver, known as the Süleyman the Magnificent, 1494-1566), that Jerusalem regained its importance after centuries of oblivion. He rebuilt the walls that still stand in the city today, improved the water system and established the foundations of the *millet* system which regulated relations between the different religious communities.¹ The *beylerbeylik* (region) of Damascus, which included Palestine, was assimilated into the administrative structure of the Empire soon after the conquest of *Bilad al-Sham* (Greater Syria); however the

¹ The structure and purposes of the Millet System will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

Ottomans established a form of indirect rule relying on local notables whose importance continued until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.² The *beylerbeylik* of Damascus was composed of fifteen *sancaks*, a smaller administrative unit.³ The *Sancak-i Kudüs-i Şerif* (Province of Jerusalem) was divided into a number of *nahiyes* (sub-districts) whose boundaries changed during the Ottoman times.⁴ The two most important were Hebron and Jerusalem, each centring upon the two towns.⁵



Illustration 1: View of Jerusalem⁶

2.1 In preparation for change: the historical context of the 19th century

The Ottomans considered Jerusalem to be of great religious significance as the city was regarded as the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina.

² A. Singer, *Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4.

³ Ibid, 7.

⁴ Kudüs was the name of Jerusalem in Ottoman Turkish, meaning the Sacred City. In Arabic the name of the city is al-Quds.

⁵ Singer, *Palestinian Peasants*, 7; A. Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1973), 169.

⁶ NARA, View of Jerusalem, free Copyright.

However, both strategically and economically it was not of paramount importance to the Ottomans as Jerusalem was not at the centre of any important trading routes and did not possess any military or strategic value.⁷ The return of Palestine in general and of Jerusalem in particular on the stage of international politics was triggered to an extent by the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 which revived the question of the Holy Land and of the Holy Places. The invasion of 1798 was carefully prepared by Bonaparte himself; he gathered troops, engineers, scientists, artists, economists, pharmacists, physicians, writers, interpreters and publishers. This was not meant to be a simple conquest of Egypt, but the transfer of the French civilization to Egypt.⁸ The question of the legacy of the Napoleonic invasion, although studied intensively, has been only recently considered from the perspective of its legacy in a longer period. The influence of the Napoleonic invasion on Palestine should not be overestimated as in fact the French adventure was short and eventually ended in failure. However as Beshara Doumani argues, the local response to French invasion revealed the awakening of cultural and military mobilisation.⁹ Idinopulos also underlines how the French had little influence on the modernisation of Palestine, however he stresses how the exploration of Palestine began the very year Napoleon returned to Europe in 1799 following the opening of easier travel routes in the region.¹⁰

The legacy of Napoleon was picked up by Muhammad 'Ali who eventually became the viceroy of Egypt in 1805.¹¹ Muhammad 'Ali, who was of Albanian origins, came to Egypt with the Ottoman forces sent to fight against the

⁷ Y. Ben-Arieh, *Jerusalem in the 19th Century. The Old City*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 104.

⁸ S. Noja, *Storia dei Popoli dell'Islam. L'Islam Moderno*, vol. 5, (Milan: Oscar Mondadori, 1990), 5.

⁹ B. Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*, (London: University of California Press, 1995), 16.

¹⁰ T.A. Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998), 28.

¹¹ Noja, *Storia dei Popoli dell'Islam*, 11-13.

French army in 1799. Eventually he seized power in Cairo in 1805 after the withdrawal of the French army in 1801 and became virtually independent from Ottoman control.¹² In 1831, Muhammad 'Ali and his son Ibrahim invaded the region known as *Bilad al-Sham* which included present day Palestine and Syria and which became part of Egypt, an event which was a turning point in the history of modern Jerusalem. When the Egyptian army entered Jerusalem the population was surprised and to an extent fearful of what appeared to be a new European army.¹³ Muhammad 'Ali had in the previous decades carried out expensive reforms of the army and had introduced a new style of discipline and military techniques, new weapons and uniforms; Muhammad 'Ali also planned to produce armaments directly in Egypt in order to avoid relying on European countries.¹⁴

In the 19th century Jerusalem experienced two periods of administrative, political, social, economical and military reforms. The first being under the rule of Ibrahim 'Ali the second from 1839 till 1876, the so called *Tanzimat* era, which will be discussed later in the chapter. Following the administrative reforms imposed by the new rulers the status of Jerusalem began to rise. Ibrahim 'Ali abolished the Ottoman administrative division of Syria and Palestine which constituted two separate provinces. Instead he appointed a general governor over the entire region of Greater Syria who resided in Damascus. This process of administrative centralisation was nevertheless balanced with the establishment of

¹² Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, 41; A. Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), 273.

¹³ M. Abir, "Local Leadership and Early Reforms in Palestine 1800-1834," in *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period*, ed. M. Ma'oz, 303 (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1975).

¹⁴ J. Dunn, "Egypt's Nineteenth Century Armaments Industry," *The Journal of Military History* 61, no. 2, (April 1997): 232.

city councils, *maclis*, which included representatives of the elite families.¹⁵ On a local level the Egyptians relied on a civil governor who was a local notable. Donna Robinson Divine notes how far the Egyptians adapted according to the local circumstances their idea of centralisation of the state.¹⁶ Furthermore the Egyptians did not prove able to eradicate corruption and they had limited success in curbing the power of the local notables.¹⁷ Nevertheless a number of changes positively improved the status of the non-Muslim population, as Ibrahim hoped that favouring Christians would earn some European support for the occupation of Palestine against the Ottomans.¹⁸ As a consequence of the ameliorated status of the Christian communities, the number of European visitors to the Holy Land and Jerusalem increased.¹⁹ The Egyptians, also, in order to extend trade with European countries promoted a strong religious tolerance and new rights were granted to the *dhimmis*.²⁰ Under Egyptian rule the first European consuls were allowed to station in Jerusalem as a symbol of a new approach towards Europeans and non-Muslims.²¹ Particularly relevant for the city of Jerusalem was the removal of the centuries old prohibition to build and repair churches and synagogues and the abolishment of other restrictions on non-Muslims.²²

Besides administrative reforms the Egyptians brought some economic developments which were welcomed by local notables and entrepreneurs.²³

¹⁵ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 108. The councils will be discussed in detail in several sections of this chapter.

¹⁶ D.R. Divine, *Politics and Society in Ottoman Palestine*, (Boulder: Lynner Rennie, 1994), 67-69.

¹⁷ Ibid, 68.

¹⁸ Ibid, 65.

¹⁹ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 109.

²⁰ Divine, *Politics and Society*, 66; S. Shamir, "Egyptian Rule (1832-1840) and the Beginning of the Modern Period in the History of Palestine," in *Egypt and Palestine: a Millenium of Association*, eds. G. Baer and A. Cohen, 221 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

²¹ Divine, *Politics and Society*, 66.

²² Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, 45-46; Divine, *Politics and Society*, 65.

²³ Shamir, "Egyptian Rule," 228.

Ibrahim 'Ali who ruled both Syria and Palestine promoted the introduction of new crops and of new industries: cotton and soap proved to be the most successful.²⁴ Furthermore the Egyptian authorities supported the idea of free trade, leaving access therefore to foreign merchants.²⁵ Nevertheless the increased import of European goods threatened local handicrafts therefore Egyptians encountered some opposition from local notables and inhabitants as they perceived these reforms as hostile and against their interest.²⁶ Besides Ibrahim 'Ali in order to face the increased military expenses introduced a progressive income tax, which eventually heavily hit the Palestinian elite families.²⁷

The new administration was also meant to deal with corruption and public security as bribes, bandits and other similar problems were rife in the period preceding the occupation. The relative efficiency of the new system and the introduction of income tax as mentioned earlier led to the outbreak of a revolt in 1834 directed by the Muslim notables of Jerusalem which had the strong support of the peasants.²⁸ The Husaynis, one of the most important families of Jerusalem, played a crucial role in the uprising. At the same time they were planning the revolt, the Husaynis showed their support for the Egyptian rulers; furthermore they were trying to avoid loosing the good relationships with the Ottomans who eventually returned in 1840: a masterpiece of politics.²⁹ Something similar happened when the British took Jerusalem in 1917 and the burden of the deliverance of the city was placed on the Mayor of Jerusalem Husayni Salim

²⁴ Ibid, 228.

²⁵ Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*, 106.

²⁶ Divine, *Politics and Society*, 72-73; Shamir, "Egyptian Rule," 228.

²⁷ Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, 46.

²⁸ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 107-110; Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, 46.

²⁹ I. Pappé, "The Rise and Fall of the Husaynis, 1840-1922," *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, Issue 10, (2000).

Effendi al-Husayini.³⁰ After the conclusion of the revolt of 1834, two members of the family were included in the *maclis* and Tahir al-Husayini was named *Mufti* of Jerusalem.³¹

Egyptian rule in Jerusalem lasted only a decade (1831-1840), but its legacies reverberated throughout the administrative organisation of the city once it was re-occupied by the Ottomans. Under Egyptian rule the local governors fell under the check of a council, the *meclis*, composed mainly of the Muslim elite but also including some of the most influential Christian and Jewish members of the community. The Egyptians therefore introduced both elements of representation and of balances and checks.


Following the opening of the British Consulate in 1838, other European Powers followed including France, Prussia, Austria and Spain whilst the Russian government sent a diplomatic agent. These European Powers promoted business, protected travellers and supported the construction of hospitals and hospices for visitor and locals alike. The French opened three hospices between 1851 and 1889.³² The activism of the European Powers reinvigorated pilgrimage and tourism. Moreover Jerusalem's increased importance on the international stage coincided with the Crimean War (1854-1856) which brought the issue of the control of the Holy Places to the forefront of intra-European politics. Jerusalem became the pretext for war between France allied with the Ottomans against Russia. Despite the fact that the war was fought far from Jerusalem, the conflict impoverished Palestine, in fact food, fuel and other resources were redirected to the war front. Jerusalem had to rely on aid coming from European countries

³⁰ See Chapter 3.

³¹ Pappe, "The Rise and Fall of the Husaynis."

³² R. Brunelli, *Storia di Gerusalemme*, (Milan: Oscar Mondadori, 1990), 258.

particularly Great Britain, France and Germany. The Crimean War marked the emergence of new tensions between Muslims and Christians in the city as the Orthodox were accused of supporting Russia.³³ Nevertheless the presence of a strong governor and the Ottoman alliance with Britain and France helped the situation not to escalate to open violence against the Christians.³⁴



PALESTINE AND SYRIA IN 1915

(Based on map printed in Cmd. 5957, and reproduced by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office)

Map 1: Palestine and Syria in 1915

³³ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 115.

³⁴ D. Kushner, "Intercommunal Strife in Palestine During the Late Ottoman Period," *Asia and African Studies*, no. 18, (1984): 191.

2.2 From the Tanzimat to the Young Turks through the Hamidian era: patterns of governance and administration

This section opens the discussion of the patterns of governance and administration in different periods, from the Tanzimat to the Hamidian and Young Turks era with a general overview of the Tanzimat era, which proved to be a crucial period, in the Ottoman Empire and some references to Palestine and Jerusalem. The sub sections will deal with the development and evolution of the Ottoman administrative units in relation to Jerusalem.

The reform movement known as *Tanzimat* initiated in the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the 19th century was linked to Muhammad 'Ali's rise to power in Egypt and his conquest of the *Bilad al-Sham*. The *Tanzimat-ı Hayriye* (Auspicious Reordering) era began on 3 November 1839 when Sultan Abdülmecit promulgated the *Gülhane Hattı Şerifi* (The Edict of the Rose Garden). Tax-farming was abolished, Ottoman subjects were granted security of life and property and a new system of conscription for the army was established. The edict also promoted the principle of equality before the law of all persons and of all religions, which eventually meant the Ottoman subjects became equal.³⁵ Although this was a genuine attempt to promote reforms in the Empire given the advanced process of decentralisation which had occurred in the eighteenth century, it was also part of a clear strategy adopted by the Ottomans in order to gain European support in their struggle against Muhammad 'Ali, who as explained in the previous section had invaded Syria and Palestine threatening the core of the Ottoman Empire.

³⁵ Literature on the Tanzimat is vast. See for instance these contributions: Zürcher, *Turkey*, 53. B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford Press University, 2002), 107; R.H. Davison, *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reforms and Diplomacy*, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1999).

On 24 June 1839 the Ottoman forces were defeated by the Egyptians at Nizip, in the southeast of Turkey. Only the intervention of the European powers stopped the advance of the Egyptian army towards the Ottoman capital. In the winter of 1840-41 British naval forces threatened the Egyptians, who eventually withdrew from the occupied territories of Syria and Palestine. In 1841 Muhammad 'Ali acknowledged the loss of the region and accepted the hereditary governorship of Egypt in exchange, although he had been independent from Ottoman control. Thus Egypt remained nominally part of the Ottoman Empire until the beginning of First World War when the British declared a formal protectorate over the country.

The Tanzimat reforms aimed to strengthen the Empire by implementing political and administrative centralisation. The deep essence of the Tanzimat was to change the very idea of the Ottoman state which included the restoration of old institutions no longer working and the establishment of new ones.³⁶ This was done through general strategies such as administrative reforms, development of infrastructures and economical improvements. The government was reorganised into ministries and a Council of Ministers met in order to advise the Sultan; the government was presided by the Grand Vizier.³⁷ In the area of education which was crucial for the modernisation of the Empire, schools were opened and new subjects taught by the mid 1850s.³⁸ Economic reforms proved to be hard to enforce. Despite the good will, the Capitulatory System was a foremost impediment to Ottoman economic reorganisation. In the mind of the Ottoman

³⁶ J. McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks*, (London: Longman, 1997); S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, eds., *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 55.

³⁷ McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks*, 298.

³⁸ Ibid, 299.

reformers it was paramount the idea that a more efficient and honest government would create a stronger Empire composed of a highly committed population to the cause of the survival and development of the State itself. The Tanzimat reforms were eventually carried out throughout the Ottoman Empire until 1876 when Abdülhamid ascended the throne; despite his conservatism and the official halt to the reforms, it has been argued that the Hamidian period was the continuation of the Tanzimat era; he aimed to save the Empire with different means.³⁹

The *Vilayet* law of 1864 reorganised the provinces of the Empire and remained the basis for the local administrations until the end of the Empire after World War One.⁴⁰ The law aimed to define clear relations between the administrative units. Each *vilayet* was divided into *sancaks* or *livas* (interchangeable), then each *sancak* had several *kaza*, mainly villages.⁴¹ The law also introduced a system of councils, which will be discussed below, to counterbalance the power of the governors. With the reform of the provincial administration the ideas of the Tanzimat reached all regions of the Empire.

With the Ottoman restoration after 1841, the *sancak* of Jerusalem regained some stability after the turbulent end of Egyptian rule. The *sancak* of Jerusalem was then composed of Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron and eventually Beersheba.⁴² Following the establishment of a municipality in Istanbul in the late 1850s,

³⁹ Divine, *Politics and Society*, 107; McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks*, 297; S. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 11 and 175-176.

⁴⁰ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 89.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 93; P. Schoenberg, "Palestine in the Year 1914" (PhD Thesis, New York University, New York 1978), 470. According to Gerber attached to the *sancak* of Jerusalem there was the sub district of Majdal that was eventually abolished in 1909 and replaced by the sub district of Beersheba. Gerber, following British sources argues that the sub district of Nazareth was detached from the province of Nablus and attached to Jerusalem, but because of logistic problems in 1909 it was abrogated.

Jerusalem followed suit as we will see in following sub sections. Municipal government was a new institution across the Empire as in fact the idea of an urban administration on a territorial basis separate from the provincial administration was alien to the Ottomans and not part of the Islamic tradition. Eventually, in the case of Jerusalem the municipality became the most important local administrative body of the city.⁴³ Ruth Kark claims that, despite some limitations, the Jerusalem municipality contributed largely to the development of the city and of the living conditions in the late nineteenth century.⁴⁴

The following discussion of the administrative units of Jerusalem in the Tanzimat period necessitates a preliminary discussion of modernisation and historiographical debate. On one hand, Haim Gerber states that the Tanzimat reforms ignited a fast and lasting process of westernisation of Jerusalem that was already underway as a result of the Egyptian rule in the 1830s, but also as a result of the strong impact of the West in the region since the early nineteenth century.⁴⁵ On the other hand, Nora Libertun de Duren has claimed that the real process of modernisation began with the arrival of the British.⁴⁶ De Duren claims in fact that the period preceding the arrival of the British was not marked by the full imposition of the national state logic and state control, suggesting a different arrangement of people, institutions and territory, denying de facto an Ottoman process of state transformation.⁴⁷ For the purposes of this work modernisation is intended firstly as a process of change, which entailed the transformation of the traditional Ottoman administrative machine through the adoption of new legal

⁴³ Divine, *Politics and Society*, 115.

⁴⁴ Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality," 141.

⁴⁵ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 7.

⁴⁶ N. Libertun de Duren, "Jerusalem at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century," 1.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 1-3.

and administrative tools. In this respect, modernisation is not viewed as a mere imitation of Western models but as the fruitful encounter between old and new form of urban administration. Though western administrative influence and cultural penetration in the Ottoman Empire was an undeniable development of the period, to equate modernisation to westernisation is perhaps too far fetched. At the same time it would be reductive not to consider the Tanzimat as a modernising process inspired by Western ideals.

2.2.1 *The Sancak and the Mutasarrif*

After the end of the Egyptian rule in 1841 the Jerusalem *sancak* started to enjoy a particular status amongst the other Palestinian *sancaks* as a consequence of the foreign interest in the city.⁴⁸ In the summer of 1872 the *sancak* of Jerusalem was detached from the *Vilayet* (Province) of Syria and made independent under the direct control of Istanbul.⁴⁹ The *sancak* or *mutasarrıflık* of Jerusalem was ruled by a *Mutasarrıf* (governor). The *Mutasarrıf* of Jerusalem, after the *sancak* was detached from the *vilayet* of Syria, became quite unique amongst the other governors throughout the Ottoman Empire, as he was directly appointed and therefore responsible to the central administration in Istanbul and not to the *Vali* of Syria.⁵⁰ Nevertheless the Jerusalem *sancak*, though highly independent as argued earlier, was subordinate to the *Vilayet* of Beirut in the judicial sphere, remaining so until 1910 when a court of appeal was established in Jerusalem. Despite the fact that troops were stationed in Jerusalem, the *sancak*

⁴⁸ B. Abu Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late Nineteenth Century," in *The Palestinians and the Conflict*, ed. G. Ben Dor, 24 (Haifa: Haifa University, 1982).

⁴⁹ Ibid, 23.

⁵⁰ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 96.

was also dependent on the authority of the Fifth *Ordu* (army) quartered in Damascus in relation to military matters.⁵¹

The quality of the performance of the governors was dependent on the personal skills but also on the authority given to them by the central government in Istanbul. *Mutasarrıfs* who served in Jerusalem in the late nineteenth century, according to Gerber, were not particularly experienced, or from a homogeneous background. None of these governors rose to a high position in the central administration in Istanbul.⁵² These governors were required, as part of their duties, to send the money collected from the taxpayers to Istanbul, furthermore they had no full control over other officials in the district.⁵³

In the late nineteenth century during the reign of Abdülhamid II, governors were appointed among the palace secretaries of the Sultan and later at the beginning of the twentieth century by the Young Turks among Turkish officials.⁵⁴ According to Kushner there were no marked changes in the character and performance of the nominated governors between the Tanzimat, Hamidian and Young Turks periods.⁵⁵ Kushner notes that during the last decades of Ottoman rule in Jerusalem, one or two governors could be labelled failures, like Faik Bey in 1876 who was accused of being heavily corrupted.⁵⁶ Gerber, however, sees that the process of modernisation that was taking place in the Empire brought advancement in the quality of the governors of Jerusalem, in fact he notes that from the Tanzimat era it is possible to observe an embryonic modern pattern of public services which followed the principle of standardisation.

⁵¹ Ibid, 97.

⁵² Ibid, 100.

⁵³ D. Kushner, "The Ottoman Governors of Palestine," *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, (July 1987): 280.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 276.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 278.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 277.

What Gerber says is that governors became more loyal to the duties of their position than to personal loyalties.⁵⁷

2.2.2 The municipality (*Belediye*) of Jerusalem

The *Mutassarıflık* was the largest and most important administrative unit of Ottoman Jerusalem. In order to study and understand the social fabric of the city and the relationships between its different religious and foreigner communities, it is necessary to analyse the municipality which became the most influential and relevant institution of the city after the late 1860s. As explained above the idea to establish local municipalities in the Ottoman Empire was revolutionary. In fact according to the Sunni Muslim tradition any legal entity other than the individual was unlawful.⁵⁸ The creation of this body illustrates how the Tanzimat reforms were successful in the adoption of European ideas; eventually the legal status to the municipality was granted using state law rather than religious one. Indeed, the establishment of the municipality in Jerusalem is indicative of a trend towards modernisation in the social and administrative fields in so far as it provided a degree of communal representation.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the establishment of the municipalities across the Empire addressed the issue of the establishment and provision of public services, an indication of the centralisation and the modernisation of the management of the city.⁶⁰ The Jerusalem *Belediye*

⁵⁷ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 100.

⁵⁸ H. Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 113. The Encyclopaedia of Islam defines the term *Baladiyya* (Arabic for the Turkish *Belediye*) as a modern institution of European style as against earlier Islamic forms of urban organisation.

⁵⁹ H. Gerber, "A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period*, ed. D. Kushner, 39 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986); Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 115-116.

⁶⁰ Gerber, "The Case of the Province of Jerusalem," 42.

(municipality) was one of the first to be established in the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹

Gerber and Kark suggest that the municipality was possibly established in 1863 but that it only started to work later.⁶² According to a letter sent by the Ottoman governor Nazif Paşa to the Prussian consul in Jerusalem it seems that the municipality of Jerusalem began to work only after 1867.⁶³ Although, as explained above, the municipality was established around 1863, the law governing this institution was only passed in 1877 as part of the legislation issued by Istanbul which regulated the reforms of the Local Councils across the empire.⁶⁴ The provincial administration was restructured several times before the issue of the *Vilayet Belediye Kanunu* (Provincial Municipal Ordinance) of October 1877 which defined the authorities, competences, the budget and the legal boundaries of the municipality.⁶⁵

The activities of the *Belediye* were related to the cleanliness of the town and the streets, maintaining roads and water system, supervision on public health, cafés and restaurants, commercial activities and so forth.⁶⁶ The municipality also controlled a local police force which supervised urban communities and the sanitation of the city. The visit of the German Emperor in 1898 resulted in some improvement in the sanitary conditions of the city as for this purpose extensive cleaning operations were carried out inside and outside the walls. Linked to the sanitation of the city was street maintenance which since the 1880s began to

⁶¹ Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality," 119.

⁶² Ibid, 120; Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 114.

⁶³ Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality," 120. Kark quotes a letter addressed by the Governor of Jerusalem Nazif Paşa to the Prussian consul in Jerusalem in November 1867 about the constitution of the Municipal Council and its composition. The letter is conserved at the Israeli State Archives (ISA)

⁶⁴ For a thorough discussion of the administrative reforms of the late eighteenth century affecting Jerusalem see Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, Chapter 4.

⁶⁵ Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality," 118-119.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 125; Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 123.

improve thanks to the pavement of the main roads. In the period preceding the beginning of the First World War many roads were paved and widened for military purposes.⁶⁷ The municipality improved the sanitary conditions of the city mainly with the support of taxation collected from foreigners.⁶⁸ Later in 1911, when a cholera epidemic struck the city, the municipality intensified its efforts to clean streets and other public amenities.⁶⁹ Although Jerusalem had several hospitals, in 1891 the municipality established a Municipal Hospital opened to all the inhabitants without distinction of religion or nationality. In 1915, when the war had already broken out, a local body was appointed for the distribution of provisions to the Muslim community, and informed by the municipality to save a portion of the provisions for the Municipal Hospital, managed directly by the *Belediye*.⁷⁰ The municipality was also active in guaranteeing water supplies; foreign companies were called upon in order to try and improve the water supply for the city.⁷¹ In January 1914 the French Perier Company was awarded three concessions in order to develop and manage electric tramway, electric light and water supply services for the municipality of Jerusalem.⁷²

The municipality was responsible for the establishment in 1886 of the first professional police force in Palestine. This police force was generally held in high esteem by local and foreign residents. Reputed as honest, it was often

⁶⁷ Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality," 131-132.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 128.

⁶⁹ NARA, RG 84, Vol. 57, 154, Governor of Jerusalem Cevdet Paşa to American Consul, 26 October 1911.

⁷⁰ NARA, RG 84, Vol. 72, File 310, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, 5 August 1915.

⁷¹ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69/A, Vice Consul to Department of State, Jerusalem, 24 January 1914.

⁷² NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69/A, Vice Consul to Department of State, Jerusalem, 24 January 1914: "From a political point of view the award of concessions of such importance to French interests is in line with the French policy of political domination in Syria and Palestine. [...] From a municipal point of view, there is no doubt that these concessions will be of great benefit to the city. An adequate water supply is one of the most urgent needs of Jerusalem, as the lack of rain for seven months of the year, causes a great deal of suffering in the city. The tramways will be no doubt open up the suburban sections and relieve the overcrowding and unsanitary conditions prevailing in within the walled part of the city. [...]."

compared favourably to the detachments of the Ottoman army camped outside the city particularly because municipal policemen were recruited from the urban population.⁷³ Eventually some engineers, physicians and veterinarians became advisors of the *Belediye*; there was also a specific municipal office in charge of registering street names and house numbers as well as births and deaths.

At the head of the municipality there was the mayor under the supervision of the *Mutasarrıf*. The office of Mayor, although without a salary, was considered very influential and therefore the most important families of Jerusalem regarded it as a source of power and competed in order to be appointed to this office. Until 1908 the municipal council was composed of only Muslim and Christian Arab members;⁷⁴ later on in 1908 Jews also took part in the elections and eventually the first Jewish councillor was elected.⁷⁵ Following the Provincial Municipality Law of 1877, members of the municipality were nominated through an electoral process.⁷⁶ According to this law the number or elected members ranged from six to twelve, on the basis of the size of the city in terms of inhabitants. Only Ottoman subjects could participate in the elections. According to David Yellin a Zionist of the "first hour" and a teacher at the Alliance Israelite Universelle, male citizens and residents over twenty-five years of age, paying a property tax of over 50 Turkish piastres, were eligible to vote.⁷⁷

The municipal council in Jerusalem was composed of ten members; candidates

⁷³ Schoenberg, "Palestine in the Year 1914," 499. He also states that according to American sources one Jew and one Christian along with ten Muslims composed this police force. According to Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 124, the police force was composed of fourteen men, one of them Jewish.

⁷⁴ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 125: "At the end of the 19th century, elections were held for Jerusalem Municipality [...] about 700 Muslims and 300 Christians too part in the voting."

⁷⁵ Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality," 124: "In the municipal elections of 1908, for example, votes were cast by 700 Moslems, 300 Christians and 200 Jews."

⁷⁶ Ibid, 122; a law governing the elections of the Municipal Councils was promulgated in 1875, then redefined in 1877, accorded the taxpayers the right to elect council members.

⁷⁷ D. Yellin, *Jerusalem of Yesterday*, (Hebrew), vol. 1, (Jerusalem 1972), 192-223. Quoted also in Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality," 123; Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 116.

could be any Ottoman subject aged over thirty, paying at least 150 Turkish piastres annually.⁷⁸ Members were elected for four years; however five of them were replaced every two years. Eventually the municipality was a dependent body on the municipal council as well as on the governor of Jerusalem, on the central government in Istanbul eventually the municipality of Jerusalem was also dependent on the attitude of the foreign consuls.⁷⁹

2.2.3 The Councils (*Meclis*) ruling Jerusalem

From the 1870s there were three councils based in Jerusalem. The *Meclis-i Belediye* (Municipal Council), that has already been discussed; the *Meclis-i Umumi*, the General Council of the *Vilayet*; the *Meclis-i Idare*, the administrative council of the *sancak*. The *Vilayet* Law of 1864 created a clearer hierarchy in the provincial offices; as a result of this law the *Meclis-i Umumi* and the *Meclis-i Idare* were set up.⁸⁰ Nevertheless the functions and the structure of these bodies were clearly defined with the issue of the Vilayet law of 1871 which introduced a number of regulations for city administration. The General Council of the *Vilayet* of Jerusalem, the *Meclis-i Umumi* however became fully operational only after the issue of the Vilayet law of 1913 which was passed by the Young Turks.⁸¹

The *Meclis-i Umumi* was meant to meet once a year for a period of no more than forty days. Originally the members of the General Council should have been elected on the basis of proportional representation, one representative for every 12,500 males, but the system was dropped after its inception in 1913

⁷⁸ D. Yellin, *The Jerusalem of Yesterday*, 192-193; also in Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 116.

⁷⁹ The information related to the Jerusalem municipality is mainly gathered through the two main works on the subject: Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality"; Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*.

⁸⁰ M.J. Reimer, "Becoming Urban: Town Administration in Transjordan," *Int. J. Middle East. Stud.*, no. 37, (2005): 191.

⁸¹ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 136.

and the council was eventually composed of representatives from the various *kazas* (sub districts). The original law had stated that membership in the council was to be shared on a religious basis between Muslims and non-Muslims according to the population in the *kazas* since Muslims were not the majority in every village.⁸² The Council was responsible for some important functions. The General Council had the power to review the draft budget for the province as well as to check and supervise projects.

Besides the *Meclis-i Umumi* the law of 1913 established a provincial committee (*Encümen-i Vilayet*) with the purpose of working whilst the General Council was not in session; its function was to check the annual budget and expenditure.⁸³ This assembly rather than passing laws was meant to give approval to the governor's actions; it has been claimed that this institution was a rubber stamp.⁸⁴ The report of the American Consul in Jerusalem to the Department of State for the year 1914, suggests that this body was properly functioning. Unfortunately with the sources available we cannot state the real influence of the Governor upon the council; nevertheless the council was vital and clearly proactive:

⁸² C.V. Findley, "The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed from the Center," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period*, ed. D. Kushner, 21 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986); Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 137. Interesting is a document from the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul that gives us some hints on the structure of the General Council for the *Vilayet*. OA, DH.UMUM 62/34, 25 Safer 1333 (11 January 1915), *Mutasarrıf* to Interior Ministry, Jerusalem: "Because of new elections here, members of the General Assembly were convoked on 15 December 1331. Since the Mayor of Jaffa is also a member of the assembly and he is under investigation by the assembly. It has been asked from the Jaffa administration (*kaimmakamlık*) whether the mayors should be excluded from assembly membership, counting them as government employees. Although the causes for dismemberment for general assembly are defined in the article 109 of the law of administration of the Vilayet, the situation of the mayors who are later assigned as government employees is not clear and since the mayor of Jaffa has been locally taken from his post, we await for instructions about other mayors who are also members of the general assembly of Jerusalem."

⁸³ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 138.

⁸⁴ Schoenberg, "Palestine in the Year 1914," 484.

"I have the honor to report that in accordance with the new provisions of the Vilayet Law, the general Council for the Province of Palestine has just completed its 40 days session; besides approving the Concessions for tramways, electric light and water works, several important allowances from the general budget were made as follows: An appropriation of \$1,826.00 to establish a breeding farm for horses and donkeys. For the establishment of an agricultural school, \$13,200.00 and the transfer of the model farm from Arteef to Sajed and from Jaffa to Hebron. For the purchase of agricultural instruments \$2,640.00. Small sums were appropriated for the repairing of the roads between Hebron and Beth Jibrin, Jaffa and Gaza, Jaffa and Sabil Abu Nabbott and Hebron and the Valley of El Kort. The work of the Council produced general satisfaction as it gave the central authorities an idea of the general needs of the Province and appropriations were made to that effect."⁸⁵

The *Meclis-i Umumi*, as mentioned earlier, began to work only towards the very end of the Ottoman administration. The General Council for the *Vilayet* was involved in financial and budget supervision but no decision making was involved. Nevertheless its power was considerably strong as in fact through the approval or rejection of the budget the council could have strongly affected the implementation of the administrative decisions of the other governmental bodies.

The *Meclis-i Idare*, the administrative council of the Jerusalem district was set up as a result of the issue of the *Vilayet* Law of 1864. The *Meclis-i Idare* included *ex-officio* and elected members. Among the *ex-officio* members were the *Mutassarif*, the *Kadi* (the judge), and the *Mufti* (the religious leader), the representative of the Christian Churches and of the Jewish communities. There were four elected members, generally one or two of them were Christian and the

⁸⁵ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69/A, Vice Consul to Department of State, Jerusalem, 9 February 1914.

others Muslims; on the whole there were seven Muslim members and five non Muslims.⁸⁶ The access to vote was based on the ability to pay at least 150 Turkish piastres in taxation; possibly this means that only 5% to 10% of the population was involved in this process.⁸⁷ According to Gerber the members of *Meclis-i Idare* were the leaders of the local communities. However the notables represented wealthy constituencies as the electoral franchise allowed only a small number of Jerusalemites rather than the whole of the population considering that only 1,000 individuals took part in the electoral process at the end of the nineteenth century out of at least 40,000 inhabitants.⁸⁸ The *Meclis-i Idare* in this context became a sort of balancing institution between the *Mutasarrif* and the local elite. The main purpose of the council was to deliberate on public works, police, land registry, agriculture, finance and tax collection. The Council had the authority to appoint officials in charge of the city, but only to a limited extent; in fact the *Meclis-i Idare* could appoint municipal policemen and gendarmes, but not other officials.⁸⁹

The members of the *Meclis-i Idare* spent most of their time in discussions related to financial matters like their colleagues in the *Meclis-i Umumi*, however they had control over the financial resources collected through taxation, and they also had, to an extent, the power to impose taxes. Although the Municipal budgets were quite limited, the *Meclis-i Idare* could deliberate on and approve

⁸⁶ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 130-131; Gerber, "The Administration of the Sanjaq of Jerusalem," 59; Findley, "The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed from the Center," 10-11.

⁸⁷ Schoenberg, "Palestine in the Year 1914," 485.

⁸⁸ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 132.

⁸⁹ Gerber, "The Administration of the Sanjaq of Jerusalem," 55.

those budgets. The Council also had considerable powers in matters of land holding, and it had the final word in issuing cadastral certificates (*tapu*).⁹⁰

The Establishment of the Italian hospital in Jerusalem offers us the chance to look at the powers and mechanisms of the *Meclis-i Idare*. In 1911 the Italian Government together with the Associazione Nazionale per Soccorrere i Missionari Italiani (National Association for the Assistance to Italian Missionaries) planned to build a hospital in Jerusalem. The first step taken by the Italian authorities was to change the status of the land which was the property of the consulate from *mulk* to *mukataa*; from private land exempt from state control (the land was a property of the Consulate) to a tax farm which could be developed.⁹¹ Although the works began, the completion of the hospital was delayed as a result of the Italian-Libyan war (1911-1912) and due to financial constrain.

In 1914 the National Association for the Assistance to Italian Missionaries intervened offering financial help for the hospital.⁹² The following year the members of the *Meclis-i Idare* visited the hospital whilst it was still under construction, fixing at 3,050 francs the tax on the value of the building estimated in 305,080 francs. The Italian Consul Senni immediately wrote to the *Mutasarrif* complaining that the Hospital was not yet ready; therefore it was unlawful to tax it.⁹³ After some time the *Meclis-i Idare* again intimated the Italians to pay, but in the meantime Italy joined the war against the Turks, therefore conditions

⁹⁰ Ibid, 55-56.

⁹¹ ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Italian Foreign Office to Baron Mayor des Planches (Italian Ambassador in Istanbul), Rome, 22 April 1911.

⁹² ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Italian Consul (Senni) to Italian Foreign Office, Jerusalem, 25 April 1914.

⁹³ ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 6 April 1915.

changed, but still the Turkish authorities sought the money. In July 1915, Conte Senni reports that the Turkish authorities claimed the payment of 16,364 piastres as taxation on the land and the hospital.⁹⁴ Not surprisingly the Italian Foreign Office ordered the Consul not to pay the tax on the hospital building, as it was closed and sealed, yet quite surprisingly on the other hand, the Italian authorities authorized the Consul to pay tax on the land.⁹⁵ The Hospital remained closed until the end of the war.

As most of the material available for the *Meclis-i Idare* concerns minutes of a trivial nature this does not necessarily mean that the council dealt only with issues like the amendment of entries in the Population Register on the issue of "good behaviour" certificates.⁹⁶ Its members were often employed as intermediaries in some matters, or served on *ad hoc* committees like in the case of the Italian hospital where the tax committee visited the Italian building first hand in order to determine the amount of taxation to impose.⁹⁷ We can best define this council not as executive, but in fact as Gerber states the *Meclis-i Idare* functioned mainly in a passive way, meaning that it usually reacted to problems submitted by other actors, such as the municipality, the *Mutasarrıf*, or Consular agents or even private citizens.⁹⁸

The Council, as mentioned earlier, was responsible also for the control of the population, mainly the immigrants. Jewish immigration was of course particularly under scrutiny as in fact at the turn of the century the majority of Jewish immigrants were from Russia, the strongest enemy of the Ottoman

⁹⁴ ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Senni to Italian Foreign Office, Jerusalem, 9 July 1915.

⁹⁵ ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Italian Foreign Office to Senni, Rome, 28 July 1915.

⁹⁶ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 123.

⁹⁷ ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 6 April 1915.

⁹⁸ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 127-128.

Empire.⁹⁹ On the eve of the First World War the *Mutasarrıf* of Jerusalem Macid Bey wrote to the Ministry of the Interior that the Jewish immigrants were under surveillance, as well as the Jews who were Ottoman subjects in order to verify their loyalty to the Ottoman state. However the governor also highlighted that he would not tolerate whoever was to make any exaggeration about the Jews as malicious people in order to raise a Jewish question.¹⁰⁰



JERUSALEM - Street inside Jaffa Gate

Illustration 2: Street inside Jaffa Gate¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ D. Farhi, "Documents on the Attitude of the Ottoman Government Towards the Jewish Settlement in Palestine After the Revolution of the Young Turks," in *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period*, ed. M. Ma'oz, 190-191 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975).

¹⁰⁰ OA, DH. EUM. 4 ŞB 23/5, Mutasarrıf to Ministry of Interior, Jerusalem, 24 Ramazan 1332 (16 August 1914).

¹⁰¹ Copyright by M. Stg. Ismailia, circa 1917.

2.3 *The Notables of Jerusalem in the late Ottoman era*

If on one hand Jerusalem was ruled by Ottoman officials, on the other hand their power was balanced by the presence of local groups possessing, to different degrees social and political influence.¹⁰² These groups, who formed the backbone of local elites, were a class of notables which functioned as intermediaries between the population and the Ottoman administration. These notables, whose political profile was rather complex, derived their power from economic sources and from their religious legitimacy. The scholar who has developed the concept of notables in the Arab Middle East was Albert Hourani who coined the usage of the term "politics of notables" (in Arabic *a'yan*) to explain the political configuration of Arab cities under Ottoman control. According to Hourani, the "politics of notables" firstly arose in a social milieu which was ordered around patronage; secondly when urban society was dominated by members of influential families who were able to control the rural hinterland; thirdly when these local notables could act politically freely.¹⁰³ The notables, therefore, were an informal elite composed of the richest, most powerful and prestigious families of the Arab cities.¹⁰⁴ Local notables were thus the intermediaries between the urban population and the Ottoman government; they mediated between the society that they represented and the state authority that often appointed them. As intermediaries, they had to possess both the political qualities to represent their constituencies and they had to be able to bargain with their counterparts.

¹⁰² P.P. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 10.

¹⁰³ A. Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in *The Modern Middle East*, eds. A. Hourani, P. Khoury and M.C. Wilson, 87 (London: Tauris, 1993).

¹⁰⁴ G. Baer, "Jerusalem's Families of Notables and the Wakf in the Early 19th Century," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period*, ed. D. Kushner, 109 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).

The socio-political elite of Jerusalem was composed of three groups: the Muslim religious leadership (*ulama*) who provided voice for popular grievances and demands mainly through the Friday prayer but also Christian leaders; the secular notables (*a'yan*, *amirs*) families or individuals whose power was rooted in the genealogic memory of the ancestors (the *asabiyyah* of the family) who, were in control of the available wealth and commodities such as land and commercial activities; and the commanders of the local military garrisons (*aghwat*) who based their power on military strength.¹⁰⁵ The notables of Jerusalem were both Muslim and Christian. These groups were not officially organised and worked on an informal basis. These were open groups where mobility within and between them was not only allowed but was also promoted (the only boundaries not crossed were of religious nature, intermarriage between persons of different religious background was not allowed); therefore mobility was taking place through groups belonging to the same religion.

The Ottomans relied constantly on these families in the provinces but after the Tanzimat during the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II the state claimed back its authority. The very meaning of the Tanzimat reforms was a process of centralisation that was indeed in direct opposition to the power of the local notables. In the initial phases of these reforms, Ottoman governors relied on the local notables but once they were able to establish direct control over the population they relied less on this class. It is from this period that the notables particularly in areas like Syria and Palestine began to fight back against Ottoman control. Furthermore after the mid-1850s, the expansion of European commerce

¹⁰⁵ Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," 89-90; A. Manna, "Continuity and Change in the Socio-Political Elite in Palestine During the Late Ottoman Period," in *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century*, ed. T. Philipp, 11 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992); Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 11.

throughout the empire strengthened the non-Muslim commercial classes. As a consequence of this, the economic order was redefined. Christian and Jewish merchants began to enjoy a period of economic prosperity provoking dissatisfaction among the Muslim leadership.¹⁰⁶ Eventually in 1860 the dissatisfaction turned into a wave of violence in the Christian areas of Damascus but Jerusalem was the theatre of only a few episodes of random attacks on individuals.¹⁰⁷

In the case of Jerusalem, the question of the local notables fits into the framework presented by Hourani with some specific exceptions. The notables of Jerusalem were part of the three main families: the Husaynis, the Khalidis and the Nashashibis. As Jerusalem was far from important commercial routes, these notables did not base their power on wealth coming from trade but on land ownership in the rural hinterland of the city. It was the control of the key administrative, political and religious posts that conferred their authority over the population and consolidated their position as intermediaries with the Ottoman administration from the end of Egyptian occupation in 1841.¹⁰⁸

As the military command for the region was based in Damascus there were no military notables in Jerusalem and the local notables could not build their power on military strength. Jerusalem was not of any particular military or strategic value and therefore Ottoman troops were camped in other towns and cities leaving Jerusalem practically un-garrisoned. Ottoman officials held the main administrative positions such as that of governor of the province and of

¹⁰⁶ I. Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 22-23; "In Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine, however, it (violence) never went beyond random infrequent attacks on individuals."

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 23.

¹⁰⁸ Divine, *Politics and Society*, 77.

kaimmakams (district governor-senior officials).¹⁰⁹ However Jerusalemite Arabs, mainly Muslims, were allowed to be part of the lower ranks of the administration like *müdür* (director of school).¹¹⁰ The Turkish governors always tried to balance the power of the different families like the Khalidis, the Nashashibis or the Husaynis against one another, they guarded against any single family getting too powerful assigning these notables with key positions within the province and rotating them periodically in order to avoid that a single family could monopolise certain positions.¹¹¹

The Arab notables were largely present in the spheres of law and of the traditional education as they used to preside over the religious courts as well as the religious and state schools; as during the Tanzimat era education was secularised and brought under the control of the central government the Arab notables found a way to adapt to the new system.¹¹² Eventually the Khalidis and the Husaynis supported the reforms of Ali and Fuad Paşas.¹¹³ With the end of the Tanzimat era in 1876, Sultan Abdülhamid II turned against the supporter of the previous regime, and eventually the Khalidis suffered the most as they lost their primacy amongst the notables of Jerusalem.¹¹⁴ The Hamidian regime re-shaped the image and career patterns of the notables in the Arab lands.¹¹⁵

The notables of Jerusalem proved to be the cornerstone of Jerusalem's fragmented social framework. Both under Ottoman and British rule, the notables

¹⁰⁹ Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, 106.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 109.

¹¹¹ B. Zimmerling and J.S. Migdal, *Palestinians*, (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 71; Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 19.

¹¹² R. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 39.

¹¹³ B. Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period: The New Ottoman Administration and the Notables," *Die Welt des Islams* 30, (1990): 40-41.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 42-43.

¹¹⁵ Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 65.

of Jerusalem struggled to keep their pre-eminence as the demographic realities of the city were changing as a result of Jewish immigration. To this effect the speech of Ruhi al-Khalidi is quite instructive. He was elected to the Ottoman Parliament in 1908 following the CUP revolution. Ruhi Bey warned that Palestine was in danger because of Zionism and the number of settlers coming to Palestine.¹¹⁶ Though the majority of the inhabitants, towards the end of the nineteenth century, were not Arab Muslim, the notables managed to keep control of the Administrative Council with six Muslim members and only two Christians and two Jewish.¹¹⁷

With the advent of the Young Turks in 1908 the status of Jerusalem's notability underwent some radical changes. The first phase of the rule of the Young Turk was welcomed at the end of the Hamidian police regime.¹¹⁸ However from 1909, after the failed attempt of a counter revolution inspired by Abdülhamid in Istanbul, the Young Turks started to promote the turkification of the Ottoman and provincial society, a process which undermined the power of Jerusalem notables. Arab subjects began to feel as if they were second class citizens in relation to the Turkish subjects. Following the prohibition to establish political associations issued in 1909, as a result of a rising opposition to the Young Turks, some local notables became Arab activists in secret societies promoting early Arab national ideals in Jerusalem.¹¹⁹ These societies promoted Arab autonomy or independence and were composed of the notables as well as

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 80-81.

¹¹⁷ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 71.

¹¹⁸ I. Pappé, "The Husayni Family Faces New Challenges," *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, Issue 11-12, (2001); Divine, *Politics and Society*, 146.

¹¹⁹ Pappé, "The Husayni Family."

of teachers, students and Arab army officers.¹²⁰ A report by the British Arab Bureau in Cairo, gathering enquiries made through natives of Jerusalem living in Cairo after the autumn of 1914, describes the notable families as not being pro Turk, but compelled to keep in with the Turks.¹²¹ Some less prominent members of the Husayni family were arrested, in the last days of Ottoman rule, because they were accused of being pro British; they hoped that a British victory would end Turkish rule.¹²²

2.4 The People of Jerusalem (1905-1922): some definitions

In the cities of Palestine there was a strong tradition of urban local patriotism thus the idea of being a Jerusalemite was deeply rooted among the local population.¹²³ However, considering the particular character and nature of Jerusalem the question who the Jerusalemites were is a complex one. Under the Ottoman government the local population, following the general rule of the *millet* system, was divided along religious lines. According to cultural patterns we can consider the population of Jerusalem as portioned alongside two axes: the first representing a religious cleavage; the second representing ethnic origins and linguistic cleavages. The first subdivision corresponded with the official one enforced by Ottoman religious law as exemplified by the *millet* system; the second represents the divisions which reflect ethnicity, nationality and language, besides which, self representation also played a major role in the definition of the various communities residing in Jerusalem. An additional element was the

¹²⁰ Pappe, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 56-57.

¹²¹ TNA: PRO FO 882/14, The Politics of Jerusalem, Cairo, 29 December 1916.

¹²² Spafford Vester, *Our Jerusalem*, 252.

¹²³ Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 153.

presence of foreigner communities which complicated further Jerusalem's demographic landscape.

The following paragraph presents a collection of data on the demography of Jerusalem from the late nineteenth century until 1922, including the data provided by the first official census carried out by the British authorities. The presentation of data is then analysed in order to show demographic changes which occurred during the war. Of particular interest is the analyses of the data in relation to the Jewish population in Jerusalem in the transitional period as Jews represented the majority of the inhabitants in the city.

2.4.1 The population of Jerusalem

The main issue about the demographic history of Jerusalem is that up until 1922, the date of the first British official census, there are no official statistics available. Most of the information available comes from western travellers, consuls or residents. On the Ottoman side a register was held for the urban population called *nüfus*. The General Administration of Population Registration (*Sicill-i Nüfus Idare-i Umumiyesi*) was established during Hamidian time in the late nineteenth century as part of the system of control created for the Empire, however only Ottoman subjects were recorded.¹²⁴ In 1905 there was an attempt to update the *nüfus* adopting the European census style. Every individual Ottoman subject was recorded according to sex, year of birth and marital status:

¹²⁴ C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 253-254.

Jews and Christians coming from foreign countries but considered as permanent residents were not recorded.¹²⁵

The work of Schmelz is one of the most important for the demographic history of Jerusalem from the Ottoman source perspective. He has worked thoroughly on the sources available from the *nüfus* updated with the census of 1905 and he offers us statistics regarding the population of the region (*kaza*) of Jerusalem. The main problem with Schmelz's work, as far as Jerusalem is concerned, is that the statistics available do not detail figures for the urban population but only for the Jerusalem region (*kaza*).¹²⁶

Table 1 reports the figures of all the sources available from 1905 to 1919. Table 2 presents Schmelz's figures for the Jerusalem region. Table 3 will show the figures from the British census of 1922. Table 4 presents the breakdown of the figures of the census of 1922 within the walls and table 5 presents the breakdown of the population outside the walls. The main division of the population is based on religious lines but where other criteria have been taken into consideration, notes will be provided.¹²⁷

Table 1: The Population of Jerusalem city from the late Ottoman period until the British Census of 1922.

Source	Year	Muslims	Christians	Jews	Others	Total
Robinson P. ¹²⁸	1905	n.a.	n.a.	45,000	n.a.	66,000
Schölch A. ¹²⁹	1910	12,000	13,000	45,000	n.a.	70,000

¹²⁵ U.O. Schmelz, "Population Characteristics of Jerusalem and Hebron Regions According to Ottoman Census of 1905," in *Ottoman Palestine 1800-1914*, ed. G.G. Gilbar, 18 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990).

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ The first distinction in the construction of a credible and consistent table representing the population of Jerusalem for the period from 1912 to 1922 is between sources. There are available primary sources as well as secondary sources in terms of reconstructions attempted by scholars and I will combine and analyse these different materials.

¹²⁸ ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari, Africa, Asia, Oceania*, Pos. 102, Fasc. 69, Robinson P. on the situation in Palestine, 1 February 1921.

¹²⁹ Schölch, "Jerusalem in the 19th Century," 231.

British Consul ¹³⁰	1911	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	350* ¹³¹	80,000
Luncz ¹³²	1913	10,050	16,750	48,400	n.a.	75,200
Biger G. ¹³³	1914	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	80,000
Bish. Blyth ¹³⁴	1914	n.a.	n.a.	60,000	n.a.	75,000
Matson O.G. ¹³⁵	1914	10,000	15,000	50,000	n.a.	80,000
Arab Bureau ¹³⁶	1914	20,000	25,000	45,000	n.a.	90,000
War Office ¹³⁷	1914	9,000	14,000	57,000	n.a.	80,000
Bentwich N. ¹³⁸	1914	n.a.	n.a.	60,000	n.a.	100,000
American Consulate ¹³⁹	1914	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	90,000
American Consulate ¹⁴⁰	1915	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	85,000
Ruppin A. ¹⁴¹	1915	n.a.	n.a.	45,000	n.a.	80,000
Storrs R. ¹⁴²	1917	11,000		30,000		
Zionist Org. ¹⁴³	1917	10,600	11,663	31,147	n.a.	54,410
Segev ¹⁴⁴	1917	n.a.	n.a.	27,000	n.a.	55,000
Biger G. ¹⁴⁵	1917	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	55,000
Andrews F.F. ¹⁴⁶	1918	n.a.	n.a.	40,000	* ¹⁴⁷	60,000
Bentwich N. ¹⁴⁸	1919	n.a.	n.a.	30,000	n.a.	60,000

¹³⁰ ISA, RG 123.1, File 790/12, Report on Trade of the Consular District, Jerusalem 1911.

¹³¹ British Consul Satow states that in 1911 there were 350 British citizens living in Jerusalem.

¹³² Luncz, *Eretz Israel Almanac* 19, (1912/1913), 34; see also Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and Its Environs*, 29.

¹³³ G. Biger, *An Empire in the Holy Land*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 29.

¹³⁴ LP, Davidson 396, Bishop Blyth to Archbishop, London, 20/08/1914.

¹³⁵ O.G. Matson, *The American Colony Palestine Guide*, (Jerusalem: The American Colony, 1913), 8-10.

¹³⁶ TNA: PRO FO 882, The Politics of Jerusalem, Arab Bureau, Cairo, 29 December 1916. The report is of 1916 however the figures reported are in relation to the year 1914.

¹³⁷ TNA: PRO WO 158/986, 1917. The figures reported are for the year 1914.

¹³⁸ N. Bentwich, *Palestine of the Jews*, (London: Kegan Paul, 1919), 106.

¹³⁹ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69 A, Consular Sanitary Report, Jerusalem, 7 February 1914.

¹⁴⁰ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69 A, Consular Sanitary Report, Jerusalem, 6 January 1915.

¹⁴¹ A. Ruppin, *Syria: An Economic Survey*, (New York: Provisional Zionist Committee, 1918), 7-8; see also Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and Its Environs*, 29.

¹⁴² Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 278-282.

¹⁴³ Palestine Office of the Zionist Organisation quoted in Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and Its Environs*, 29.

¹⁴⁴ T. Segev, *One Palestine Complete*, (New York: Henry Holt, 2001), 59.

¹⁴⁵ Biger, *An Empire in the Holy Land*, 29.

¹⁴⁶ F.F. Andrews, *The Holy Land Under Mandate*, vol. 2, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), 29.

¹⁴⁷ Andrews Fanni states that in 1918 there were 300 Bokharans among the Jews and 300 Persians. Ibid, 29.

¹⁴⁸ N. & H. Bentwich, *Mandate Memoirs 1918-1948*, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1965), 48-49.

Table 2: Schmelz's figures for the Jerusalem *kaza*.

Schmelz U.O. ¹⁴⁹	1914	79,000	42,000	45,000	n.a.	165,000
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Table 3: British Census 1922.

Muslims	Christians	Jews	Total
13,413 (24,45%)	14,699 (23,50%)	33,971 (54,30)	62,578

Table 4: Breakdown of the figures of the British Census of 1922 within the walls.¹⁵⁰

	Muslims	Christians	Jews	Others	Total
Male	5,159	3,809	2,673	1 ¹⁵¹	11,642
Female	4,186	3,453	2,966	n.a.	10,605
Total	9,345	7,262	5,639	1	22,247

Table 5: Breakdown of the figures of the British Census of 1922 outside the walls.¹⁵²

	Muslims	Christians	Jews	Others	Total
Male	2,645	3,792	14,040	489	20,969
Female	1,423	3,645	14,292	5	19,362
Total	4,068	7,437	28,332	494 ¹⁵³	40,331

These tables show figures over a relative long period of time but the data from 1914 and 1917 show the changes in the pattern of the population during the transition from Ottoman to British rule. It is reasonable to argue that the urban population of Jerusalem in 1914 was approximately 80,000 people. The exceptions are represented by the estimates provided by Norman Bentwich, a senior British official in the British administration of Palestine and a Zionist

¹⁴⁹ Schmelz, "Population Characteristics of Jerusalem," 26. The figures are for the Jerusalem region (*kaza*).

¹⁵⁰ These figure are quoted by Ronald Storrs; PC, Reel 8, Box III, Jerusalem 1922.

¹⁵¹ It was a Druze; there were no Hindus living within the walls.

¹⁵² These figure are quoted by Ronald Storrs; PC, Reel 8, Box III, Jerusalem 1922.

¹⁵³ There were 5 Druses (1 male, 4 females); 489 Hindus (488 males, 1 female).

activist, who places the population of Jerusalem at approximately 100,000 units. Unless one is considering the inhabitants of the city's immediate hinterland as part of Jerusalem, the figure provided by Bentwich is unreliable; it is furthermore not clear where Bentwich gathered this data from.¹⁵⁴ The American Consulate and the Arab Bureau present an estimated population of 90,000 people living in Jerusalem. It seems that the Arab Bureau relied on the information provided by the American Consul which was reported in the monthly Consular Sanitary Report reported on contagious diseases and deaths. The Americans included some villages lying around Jerusalem in the report, therefore it is not an exaggeration in the estimation but rather an excess.¹⁵⁵ The figure of 80,000 people living in Jerusalem by 1914 becomes reliable once some clear miscalculations are discarded. Furthermore it is necessary to consider the slow but constant increase in the population of Jerusalem due, mainly, to Jewish immigration. Fr Robinson, a clergyman of the Custody of the Holy Land, estimated 66,000 people living in Jerusalem in 1905.¹⁵⁶ By 1910 according to Schölch we notice an increase of 5,000 units.¹⁵⁷ According to Luncz and Bishop Blyth 75,000 inhabitants lived in Jerusalem by 1913, therefore another increase of 5,000 in less than three years thus my estimation of 80,000 inhabitants in 1914 appears after all to be the closest to the real number of people living in the city.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ Bentwich, *Palestine of the Jews*, 106.

¹⁵⁵ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69 A, Consular Sanitary Report, Jerusalem, 6 January 1915; TNA: PRO FO 882, The Politics of Jerusalem, Arab Bureau, Cairo, 29 December 1916.

¹⁵⁶ ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari, Africa, Asia, Oceania*, Pos. 102, Fasc. 69, Robinson P. on the situation in Palestine, 1 February 1921.

¹⁵⁷ Schölch, "Jerusalem in the 19th Century," 231.

¹⁵⁸ Luncz, *Eretz Israel Almanac 19*, (1912/1913), 34; LP, Davidson 396, Bishop Blyth to Archbishop, London, 20/08/1914.

Between 1905 and 1914 the Jewish population of Jerusalem was between 45,000 to 50,000, representing the majority.¹⁵⁹ In 1914 the figures of Jewish inhabitants in the city are quite conflicting: they ranged from 45,000 to 60,000 individuals. According to the sources available I would suggest a figure of around 50,000 Jews would be a fair assessment. As in 1914 the Ottoman government enforced laws against Jewish immigration, the number of Jews moving to Jerusalem decreased although restrictions did not always work. Figures of 60,000 Jews living in Jerusalem, therefore, appear to be unrealistic. Supporting this idea is Schmelz, who states that the 45,000 Jews living in the *kaza* of Jerusalem were concentrated in the city of Jerusalem in 1914.¹⁶⁰ Christians and Muslims were more or less equally divided. Figures available for 1914 are, again, conflicting. However relying on previous and later figures it appears that, with a total population of 80,000 people of which 50,000 were Jews, there were approximately 15,000 Muslims and 15,000 Christians. Considering that the majority of the Christian population of Jerusalem was Arab, it is consistent to think that mistakes could have been common confusing Arabs with Muslims.

The statistics available for 1917 and 1918 suggest that a sudden decrease of the population took place. The figure of 55,000-60,000 inhabitants in Jerusalem after the British conquest appears to be reliable and consistent with the inevitable reduction of the population caused by the war. Deportation of Jews and other subjects alongside the military mobilisation of Ottoman subjects may

¹⁵⁹ See Table 1.

¹⁶⁰ U.O. Schmelz, "Population Characteristics of Jerusalem," 25.

have also led to a plausible decrease of 20,000-25,000 units.¹⁶¹ The British, therefore, at their arrival found a city that had lost almost a third of its inhabitants. Particularly impressive is the diminution in the number of Jews which halted by 1918 although they still formed the largest community in Jerusalem. According to the figures provided by the British census of 1922, we can see that the population of Jerusalem increased very slowly due to difficulties recovery in the aftermath of the war. The 62,000 inhabitants registered in 1922, are not far from the 55-60,000 registered in 1917, but they are considerably fewer than the 80,000 inhabitants of 1914.

2.4.2 The people of Jerusalem

The figures of the inhabitants of Jerusalem suggest that it is necessary to find some general guidelines and cleavages that can lead us to the definition of the social, ethnic and religious identities of the Jerusalemites. Looking at three main religious affiliations I will start looking at the Muslim community. Despite the presence of a very small minority of North Africans and Indians, the great majority of the Sunni Muslims of Jerusalem were of Arab origin. Among the Muslim community there was also a small community of Turkish officials who shared religious affiliation with the local population. No Shi'a Muslims have ever been reported as resident in the city.¹⁶² If on one hand the Muslims of Jerusalem appeared as a solid monolith, on the other hand they were divided in terms of loyalties towards their notables and religious leaders. Ronald Storrs, the first British governor of Jerusalem, noted in his diary that the Muslim

¹⁶¹ For more details see the discussion on deportation during the war in Chapter 3.

¹⁶² Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 131.

community in Jerusalem was unlike the Jewish and the Christian communities; Muslims were not subdivided into rites and denominations but into two partisanships loyal to the Husayni and the Nashashibi families.¹⁶³

The Jewish community was the largest in the city. Nevertheless the Jews were not a monolithic community as they were divided by their ethnic origins and their degree of piety and involvement in religious activities. In terms of origins the Jewish community was divided between Ashkenazim and the Sephardim and in other groups which were smaller such as the Yemenites and Bukharians (both of Sephardi tradition).

The Ashkenazi Jews of Jerusalem were of central-eastern European origins. The name Ashkenaz was applied in the Middle Ages to the Jews living in Northern France and Western Germany. Eventually by eleventh century these Jews had moved to Poland, Lithuania and Russia. The Ashkenazim spoke Yiddish, a combination of German and Hebrew. Generally speaking, the term Ashkenazim was intended for the Jews of European, mainly German, origins.¹⁶⁴ The history of the Sephardim Jews is quite different. Some Jews after the Diaspora of 70 AD settled on the coast of North Africa, Spain and Portugal. After the Christian reconquista of 1492, some moved to Venice or London, where it was easier for them to settle, others remained under Muslim, and then Ottoman, rule in North Africa and other Middle Eastern areas like Palestine or

¹⁶³ R. Storrs, *Orientations*, (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1943), 401.

¹⁶⁴ L. Jacobs, *The Jewish Religion*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 36; "The name Ashkenaz in the Bible (Genesis 10:3) was identified in the Middle Ages with Germany, hence Ashkenazim, "Germans"."

Persia. Sephardim spoke a combination of Spanish and Hebrew known as Ladino.

Most of the Jews living in the Middle East spoke Arabic.¹⁶⁵

According to Ronald Storrs in 1917, in Jerusalem there were 16,000 Ashkenazim and 14,000 Sephardim while the Israeli scholar Ben-Arieh for the year 1916 states that there were 13,446 Sephardim and 13,125 Ashkenazi Jews in Jerusalem.¹⁶⁶ The Sephardim community was the largest in Jerusalem at the beginning of the twentieth century, but following the Jewish immigration from central Europe the Ashkenazim Jews increasingly became the majority.¹⁶⁷ The first wave of Jewish immigration ('*Aliyah*') started in 1882 driven by Zionist ideals which brought around 25,000 Ashkenazi Jews to Palestine. The second '*Aliyah*' took place between 1904 and 1914; some 40,000 Jews moved to Palestine mainly from Russia following the outbreak of pogroms and anti-Semitism.¹⁶⁸

The Yemenite and Bukharian were two small Jewish communities the first from Yemen and the second from Bukhara in Central Asia.¹⁶⁹ The Yemenites arrived in Jerusalem in the 1880s whilst the Bukharians made their appearance in the city in the late 1860s and established a small quarter.¹⁷⁰ The Sephardim Jews of Jerusalem were mainly organised into independent communities based on the place of origin. Besides the Bukharian and Yemenite

¹⁶⁵ I. Kolatt, "The Organization of the Jewish Population of Palestine and the Development of its Political Consciousness before World War I," in *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period*, ed. M. Ma'oz, 211-214 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975). See also E. Benbassa and A. Rodrigue, eds., *Sephardi Jewry: a History of the Judeo-Spanish Community 15th to 20th Centuries*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

¹⁶⁶ Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 280-282; Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 357.

¹⁶⁷ Jacobson, "From Empire to Empire," 127-130.

¹⁶⁸ Jacobson, "From Empire to Empire," 137-130; D. Friedlander and C. Goldscheider, *The Population of Israel*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 15-18; D. Willner, *Nation-Building and Community in Israel*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 30-38.

¹⁶⁹ Bukhara is a city of nowadays Uzbekistan; most of the Bukharians moved at the beginning of the 20th century to United States and some to Palestine.

¹⁷⁰ The Bukharian quarter is today populated by Ultra Orthodox Jews. Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 278 and 363.

communities among the Sephardim, there were the Jews from Kurdistan, Damascus, Georgia, Persia and Morocco. Among the Sephardim Jews of Jerusalem, it seems that subdivisions were conceived along geographical origin but the general Sephardim identity united them when necessary as in the case of the distribution of the *halukka* (organised collection of funds in Europe and America for the indigent Jews of Palestine). The money sent from the Jewish communities outside Palestine to the Sephardi leadership was divided in three parts according to different needs like municipal expenses or support to religious scholars.¹⁷¹

With a few exceptions, all the Jews of Jerusalem belonged to one of these communities or *kollelim* (Jewish community defined according to the particular religious rite followed). However Ashkenazi were also organised according to country of origin like the Sephardim and sources of financial support.¹⁷² It was among the Ashkenazim that a full range of orthodox, ultra-orthodox, Hasidism and Agudists, who refused to use Hebrew for any purpose except prayer, and eventually secular Jews, were to be found.¹⁷³ The Jewish community of Jerusalem was therefore atomised into a countless number of groups and sects. Membership to these groups ranged from several thousands to several families like the Karaites Jews, an ancient sect composed of around fifty people at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁷⁴

Christianity as well, in Jerusalem was largely affected by the same atomisation that affected the Jewish communities. Some of the Christian

¹⁷¹ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 283.

¹⁷² Kolatt, "The Organisation of the Jewish Population," 214-215.

¹⁷³ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 292-294.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 351-363.

denominations were defined according to geographical provenance, others according to the religious tradition. The three main Christian communities of Jerusalem were the Armenians, the Greek Orthodox Church and the Latins.¹⁷⁵ The question of the Christian Churches during the war time will be discussed separately. Nevertheless in the context of the current analysis of the population of Jerusalem it is important to stress who these Christians were. The Armenian community was composed mainly of clergy up until the years of the war; in fact lay Armenians were not allowed to settle permanently in the Armenian convent area.¹⁷⁶ Armenians were among the first pilgrims to visit Jerusalem after the fourth century.¹⁷⁷ The Armenian quarter located in the old city was used therefore as shelter for pilgrims and visitors. After the British conquest of Jerusalem there was a consistent flux of the survivors of the massacres of 1915 in Eastern Anatolia, 20,000 Armenians reached Palestine as refugees.¹⁷⁸

If the Armenian Church represented a solid and monolithic institution, the cases of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Latins were quite different. The Greek Orthodox Church represented the majority of Christians in Jerusalem. In 1914 out of 15,000 Christians, there were approximately 7,000 Greek Orthodox.¹⁷⁹ The large majority of the Greek Orthodox laity and the lower clergy were of Arab origins, whilst the hierarchy was ethnically Greek. The Arabs were not involved in the administration of the Church at a higher level; therefore a

¹⁷⁵ A. O'Mahony, "The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land: A Historical and Political Survey," in *The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land*, ed. A. O'Mahony, 4 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003).

¹⁷⁶ A. Sanjian, "The Armenian Church," in *The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land*, ed. A. O'Mahony, 58 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003).

¹⁷⁷ See Chapter 4 for more details. See also K. Hintlian, *History of the Armenians in the Holy Land*, (Jerusalem: St. James Press, 1976).

¹⁷⁸ H. Hagopian, "The Armenians of Jerusalem and the Armenian Quarter," in *Christians in the Holy Land*, eds. M. Prior and W. Taylor, 125 (London: The World of Islam festival Trust, 1994).

¹⁷⁹ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, p. 193.

conflict between the two groups developed in the middle of the nineteenth century and continued to exacerbate relations between the two.¹⁸⁰ Another interesting feature of the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem was that in the nineteenth century, Russia had assumed the role of protector of the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸¹ This was indeed a political manoeuvre which allowed Russia to exert more influence over Istanbul. With the end of both the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the Greek Orthodox community of Jerusalem went through a period of great uncertainty, exacerbated further by serious financial difficulties.

The Catholic community was not the largest in Jerusalem, but it was regarded, as the most powerful. Before the war there were approximately 4,000 Roman Catholics and 500 Uniate Catholics.¹⁸² Among the Catholics there were Arabs, although not in the same number as those belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church; other members of the church included clergy and laity from many different countries. The majority of the Catholics in Jerusalem were of Latin rite, however a good number of Catholics belonged to Uniate Churches of Oriental rite, like the Armenian Catholics, the Greek Catholics, and the Maronites. A second split in the Catholic Church is represented by the place of origins.

The European countries through the protection of their subjects in Palestine attempted to influence both Ottoman and Church politics in the region. France was by tradition the protector of Catholic interests in the Holy Land. However, the other governments did not refrain from intervene in local issues on

¹⁸⁰ O'Mahony, "The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land," 17.

¹⁸¹ Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, 86-87.

¹⁸² Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 193.

an *ad hoc* basis to protect their own interests. The majority of the Catholics were Italian, French, Spanish, and Austrian but there were clergy and laity virtually from all over the world. Indeed the very meaning of Catholic as “universal” is a term perfectly fitting for Jerusalem.

Other Christian communities were living in Jerusalem, some of them very small like the Ethiopians and the Copts; however relative newcomers such as the Protestants and Anglicans were both numerically and socially relevant. The German Protestants and the English Anglicans started to establish their presence in Jerusalem in 1841, with the establishment of a Bishopric, but after its dissolution in 1887, both Anglicans and Protestants established their own institutions. In 1914 there were about 1,500 Anglican/Protestants in the city.¹⁸³ They were mainly concerned with missionary and social activities directed towards the population of Jerusalem. Though there were some conversions amongst the Arab population, the Anglican-Protestant communities were mainly composed of German, English and American citizens who had moved to Jerusalem animated by religious sentiments.

A second group of residents were members of the Ottoman administration. Though there are no official statistics regarding the members of the Ottoman establishment living in the city it may be assumed that before the war there were 1,000-1,500 individuals.¹⁸⁴ Apart from the different religious authorities residing in the city, there was a tiny, but powerful community representing foreign countries. Not only were there Consuls, or Consular Agents, who will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, but also members of the Ottoman

¹⁸³ Ibid, 193.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 135.

Debt Administration, the institution which had since 1881 managed the Ottoman finances. There were also members of the Zionist Organisation who were investigating the possibility of Jewish immigration in Palestine. The majority of these individuals, though not settled on a permanent basis invested money and resources whilst in Jerusalem as in the case of the early British consul J. Finn, others established businesses. Businessmen of French, British, German, Italian and American nationality were also part of the Jerusalem environment; if Jaffa was the main commercial centre, it was in Jerusalem where the political game was played; therefore traders had to have offices and representatives in order to lobby the Turkish and then the British governments.¹⁸⁵

The analysis of the population of Jerusalem from 1905 to 1920s has highlighted a complex and rapidly changing picture with a clear pattern which points towards the growth of the Jewish population. The early modern history of Jerusalem was first marked by its re-establishment on the world map as a primary religious and political centre in the early nineteenth century as a result of the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, the rule of Muhammad 'Ali and then by the emergence of the Jewish question on the international stage which had profound reverberations on Palestine. The changing structure of the population of Jerusalem brought on the one hand new opportunities of economic development and of modernisation; however on the other hand the emerging new social composition of the city was responsible for newer and stronger endeavours among the different communities living in Jerusalem.

¹⁸⁵ A discussion of the foreign presence in Jerusalem will be presented in Chapter 5.



Illustration 3: The Wailing Wall¹⁸⁶

2.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to show how modernity was brought to Jerusalem through the means of administrative reforms in the late Ottoman period, both under Egyptian and Ottoman rules. The reforms promoted first by Muhammad 'Ali and Ibrahim 'Ali and by the Tanzimat reformers aimed mainly to centralise and reorganise the empire. Eventually it was up to the local governors to implement these reforms becoming agents of modernisation. Besides governors, local notables also became agents for change in Jerusalem as they played the role of intermediaries between the Ottoman establishment, foreigners and the local population. Last but not least, the most powerful agents of modernisation were European consuls and individuals, a point which will be discussed further in Chapter Five. It was the rise of European interest in the

¹⁸⁶ Copyright The Matson Photo Service, Jerusalem.

region that brought dramatic changes as European presence meant direct influence over the Ottoman administration but also economic integration in the world market. It would be, however, reductive not to stress the significance of the Ottoman reforms and simply to attribute the modernisation process to European agents. Although Europeans played a crucial role, this chapter has shown the important role played by administrative reforms in the transformation of Palestine, and Jerusalem in particular, from a remote province of the empire to the centre of Ottoman relations with European governments. The creation of new urban institutions as a result of centralisation brought the elites and the educated population of Jerusalem much closer to the political centre of the Ottoman state. The late Ottoman period also marked the emergence of a local intelligentsia and Jerusalem became very much the centre of cultural and intellectual ferment due to the large presence of foreigners.¹⁸⁷

The second part of the chapter was concerned with demographic change in the late Ottoman Empire, throughout the war period and the period of British military rule. Modernisation and centralisation had a stabilising effect on Jerusalem's demography as this meant relative stability and security for its inhabitants. From this perspective we can appreciate the demographic growth which began with the Tanzimat era. Yet, Jerusalem also experienced a growth of the population due to Jewish immigration and increasing western presence. As for the First World War and in its aftermath the analysis of statistics is more complex partly as a result of inconsistencies in source materials. Demography also, to an extent, has proved to be an agent of modernisation. In fact from the late Ottoman period to the British occupation the very presence of newcomers

¹⁸⁷ Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 59.

such settlers, scholars, tourists, pilgrims and businessmen helped the city to turn into a modern urban space.¹⁸⁸ These newcomers or foreign residents will be very much the focus of Chapters Four and Five and the statistics presented in this chapter will substantiate the discussion about these historical actors as agents of modernisation and change in Jerusalem.

¹⁸⁸ Pappe, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 32-33.

3 The War and the British conquest of Jerusalem

“The sacred armies, and the godly knight,
That the great sepulchre of Christ did free,
I sing; much wrought his valor and foresight,
And in that glorious war much suffered he;
In vain 'gainst him did Hell oppose her might,
In vain the Turks and Morians armed be:
His soldiers wild, to brawls and mutinies prest,
Reduced he to peace, so Heaven him blest.”

Torquato Tasso

(Jerusalem Delivered, Canto I, St. 1)

The very last phase of Ottoman rule in Jerusalem corresponds with the establishment of a military administration upon the city, following the opening of the hostilities between the Central Powers and the Entente in 1914. The Ottoman Empire in the summer of 1914 was not ready for the conflict. Since the country was not mobilised for the war effort, the CUP therefore declared armed neutrality. This chapter will show how the transition from Ottoman to British rules occurred and it will discuss the various reactions to this historical event which inaugurated a new phase in the history of Jerusalem. The opening section of this chapter studies how the mobilisation process, enforced by the joint Turkish and German commands, worked and affected the human, material and ideological infrastructures of Jerusalem. At the beginning of the war, the British did not consider the Eastern front of the military operations of any value. The Palestine campaign and the following conquest of Jerusalem, in the early days of the war, were not planned in advance by the British policy makers. What then led the British army to occupy Jerusalem? How did they prepare the military and propaganda campaign for the city? What was the value of Jerusalem in British

eyes but also those of the Allies? What kind of reactions developed after the British conquest of Jerusalem by the local population; as well as those by the British and other international actors? The chapter then shifts its focus from the war mobilisation to that of some aspects of the social and political life in the city during the war in relation to religious and local political institutions.

I will then review a theme that became popular among the British public after the occupation of Jerusalem: the conquest of Jerusalem as the final chapter in the crusades. The British press began to portray the conquest of the Holy City as the fulfilment of the crusades; Allenby had eventually entered the city that had been precluded to the English hero Richard Coeur de Lion. The explosion of the “Crusading mania” came as a logical conclusion to a carefully staged campaign an artificial product of the war propaganda.¹

3.1 Preparation for war, mobilisation of human, material and ideological resources

War is a condition of belligerency between actors that begins usually some time before with the process of mobilisation, except in cases of pre-emptive strikes. In modern times, this process entails not only the mobilisation of the army, but also that of material and ideological resources. As part of the mobilisation process every country involved in the Great War created agencies to control the flow of information and to monitor public opinion.² The Ottoman Empire, from the establishment of a constitutional regime by the Young Turks in July 1908, had to face many military challenges coming from outside and within

¹ Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda,” 87-88.

² J.M. Winter, “Propaganda and the Mobilization of Consent,” in *First World War*, ed. H. Strachan, 216 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

the Empire. For almost the entirety of the decade of the Young Turks and CUP rule, the Empire was under military mobilisation. As a result of the war with Italy in 1911-1912 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the Ottoman government lost a great portion of its territories. Yet it survived, and eventually, in order to avoid isolation, the Ottomans sought allies in Europe. When the First World War broke out, Istanbul remained neutral, but by November the Empire was forced to enter the war alongside their German ally.³ One of the main problems of the Ottoman Empire was its heavy military and economic dependence on the European powers. As soon as the war broke out the economy of the Empire was completely paralysed; as the Ottoman Bank ran short of cash, the main cities of the Empire experienced a shortage of commodities, soaring prices and a general increase in the cost of living.⁴

Though the Ottoman Empire did not possess a proper institution dealing with intelligence and propaganda, symbolism was exploited in the process of mobilisation, mainly with the purpose to justify the war. Sacred images and words were going to be exploited by all European countries; the British for instance appealed to the image of the crusade against the evil German enemy and her allies; so too did the Ottoman Empire when it declared openly a *Jihad* (holy war) on 11 November 1914. The German General Liman von Sanders, responsible for improving the efficiency of the Turkish army, was ordered to stay in Istanbul by the German Headquarters in Berlin and to promote feelings against Britain. Furthermore, a special team was formed under the command of Max von Oppenheim, a German intelligence officer, in order to organise rebellions in

³ F. Ahmad, "War and Society Under the Young Turks," in *The Modern Middle East*, eds. Hourani, Khoury and Wilson, 126 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993).

⁴ Ibid, 133.

Muslim countries, loyal to the British, working in alliance with German Zionists.⁵ With the CUP coup of 1913 the Ottoman Empire underwent a process of Turkification of the administration and the educational system although in the previous years Abdülhamid II had attempted to integrate the Arab subjects of the Empire. Despite antagonistic policies against the Arabs, such as the compulsive use of Turkish language for official messages sent throughout the Empire, the general resentment towards the foreign powers felt by the Arab local population before the breakout of the war was stronger than the disregard for the Turkish officials and was exploited to gather momentum. On 9 September 1914, the CUP unilaterally abolished the capitulations, the very symbol of Ottoman submission to European powers. At last, the Empire had become a sovereign state.⁶ If on one hand the Arabs disliked foreign presence they were also suspicious of the *Jihad* called by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet V in November 1914. Eventually, the population of Jerusalem, scared by the effectiveness of Turkish policies, showed support for the CUP government. The complexity of the positions can be traced through an intelligence report written by a resident of Jerusalem, Anis El-Gamal, who left the city for Egypt in the first weeks of mobilisation; El-Gamal said that the inhabitants of Jerusalem had a strong desire for British occupation.⁷ If it was not tempting enough to fight alongside the Turks, many locals conscripted in the Ottoman army viewed this war as an occasion to disrupt the plans of the Zionists, who had started to ensure the establishment of Jewish colonies and settlements in

⁵ R. Ovendale, *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars*, (London: Longman, 1992), 17. See also L. Von Sanders, *Cinq Ans de Turquie*, (Paris: Payot, 1923).

⁶ Ahmad, "War and Society Under the Young Turks," 134.

⁷ TNA: PRO FO 882/14, Intelligence News, Cairo, 20 September 1914. Though this report is of great interest, it should be read with suspicion as it was written very early and any suggestion of occupation was quite premature; on the other hand it shows how the British exploited this report to underline the attitudes of the locals towards the British. It is not clear whether Anis el-Gamal was working for the British.

Palestine. This new type of Jew began to settle in Palestine at the end of the 19th century. They were different from the Jewish population of Jerusalem; they were *halutzim* (pioneers).⁸ Arab opposition to these new Jews grew in strength at the beginning of the war.⁹ In August 1914 the *Mutasarrıf*, aware of the local feelings towards the Zionists, insisted with the Ministry of Interior on: "the necessity of the strict application of the rules on the Jewish immigrants and watch all their moves carefully."¹⁰

Palestine was far from the core of the Empire, but it became strategically important because of the border with Egypt, which, as it had been under British control since 1882, was regarded by the Turco-Germans as enemy territory. A few days after the beginning of the hostilities in Europe, in August 1914, the process of mobilisation, which had started throughout the Empire, began to affect Palestine. Movements of supplies and military equipment started as early as May 1914. Since the internal communications were very difficult and slow, the Ottomans moved most of their resources through the coastal line while still a neutral power. This advantage, however, lasted a very short time. In fact as soon as the Turks became one of the warring parties, the British naval fleet prevented the Ottoman navy from operating alongside the coast. In May 1914, the American consular agent in Jaffa, Glazebrook, was requested by the consul in Jerusalem to investigate a shipment of munitions from Istanbul, apparently delivered to the city.¹¹ The American official replied that there were rumours that munitions were delivered to the port of Jaffa and then moved to Ramleh or

⁸ B. Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 5.

⁹ Ibid, 6.

¹⁰ OA, DH.EUM. 4 ŞB 23/5, Macid Şevket to Minister of the Interior, Jerusalem, 15 August 1914.

¹¹ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Glazebrook to American Consular Agent, Jerusalem, 4 May 1914.

Jerusalem.¹² The Consular agent gathered some information from the customs of Jaffa and reported that: "cases were found containing altogether about 4,000 empty cartridges for three different kinds of rifles, Martini, Mauser and so called Montenegro rifles. The cartridges were seized by the custom authorities and the matter reported to Constantinople by wire."¹³ It is clear that the Ottomans were trying to cover up the movement of military equipment towards Egypt which had become an extremely sensitive imperial border.

From August 1914 the mobilisation of material and ideological resources started to affect Jerusalem involving all the civilian population. Officially, the Empire was still neutral in the conflict, but the CUP government knew that this condition would not remain. The first step the Ottomans took in order to establish the framework for the mobilisation for war, was to declare martial law. On 3 August 1914 the Governor of Jerusalem Macid Şevket issued the following document:

- "1. Martial law has been declared in the district of Jerusalem, owing to the proposed mobilisation of troops.
2. The military authorities have undertaken to preserve peace from now on.
3. Whoever disobeys the orders of the Government or disturbs the peace will be court martialed.
4. Carriage of arms and firing inside the town is forbidden.
5. Whoever hides in his house deserters or animals or does not give information of their whereabouts, if it is known, will be court martialed.
6. Those who wish to go away must apply to the military bureaus where they are registered and obtained a permit. Whoever attempts to travel away without permit

¹² NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Consular Agent to Glazebrook, Jaffa, 6 May 1914.

¹³ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Consular Agent to Glazebrook, Jaffa, 6 May 1914.

will be conducted to the court martial, even if he is not subject to military service.”¹⁴

The enforcement of public security was obviously paramount but it is also clear that the imposition of the martial law was conceived as a first measure to enforce conscription. On 8 August 1914 the Governor of Jerusalem made a general call to arms for all men born between 1872 and 1893, including Ottoman subjects employed by foreign consulates. Besides the Muslim subjects of the Empire, Jews and Christians, who were Ottoman citizens, were called to arms too. By the order of the Minister of War, Jews and Christians up to forty five years of age were called for military service. In theory they could pay an exemption tax (*bedel-i askeri*) of thirty Turkish Liras and an extra tax of ten Turkish Liras for munitions. In practice, the sum requested was high and almost impossible to pay considering the economic conditions of urban population.¹⁵ It seems, however, that Christians were making strenuous efforts in order to pay the exemption tax.¹⁶ The enrolment of the troops was carried out by the local gendarmerie under the control of the municipality. In the first stages of the conscription process recruits were sent to Damascus, where the Headquarters of the 4th Army Corps was stationed.¹⁷ Ottoman authorities also did whatever they could in order to find those who avoided military service; military police searched for deserters in public and private premises. Some people managed to hide throughout the war

¹⁴ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Governor of Jerusalem, 3 August 1914; ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Conte Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, 7 August 1914.

¹⁵ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, Jerusalem, 12 August 1914.

¹⁶ LP, DAVIDSON 398, p. 38, Mr. Renwick to Lord Bryce, 25 September 1914.

¹⁷ ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 7 August 1914.

and they reappeared only once the war had ended. The punishment for those who were caught was flogging.¹⁸

The mobilisation process meant not only the conscription of men but also the imposition of strict measures to control the local civilian population and foreign citizens. In late August 1914 it seems that the military authorities were relatively successful in their efforts while the process of conscription was gathering momentum. Apparently 16,000 new recruits were gathered at Nablus.¹⁹ In the beginning, the Islamic appeal to fight alongside the Caliph's army elicited positive responses from the Muslim population. However it seems that other factors played a role: fear of punishment and as stated above, a reaction to the incoming Jewish immigration.

The finances of the Empire were in poor shape. The outbreak of the war in Europe brought serious disruptions to trade, causing state revenue to fall sharply. Eventually the army faced a shortage of funds and provisions.²⁰ In this respect, a parallel concern of the military authorities of Jerusalem was the requisition of food for the war effort. Food was rationed; in the prisons, for instance, inmates received only three small loaves of bread daily and water.²¹ It can also be argued that, as the majority of the population in 1914 was not Muslim, the Ottoman authorities tried to capitalise on non-Muslim Ottoman subjects through taxation and confiscation of any kind of commodities.²² To an extent the Ottoman authorities showed a measure of leniency towards some subjects as suggested by the sixth point of the declaration of martial law. Yet this apparent good will

¹⁸ Jacobson, "From Empire to Empire," 47.

¹⁹ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Glazebrook to American Agent in Beirut, 18 August 1914.

²⁰ F.A.K., Yasamee, "Ottoman Empire," in *Decisions for War 1914*, ed. K. Wilson, 250 (London: UCL Press, 1995).

²¹ A. Forder, *In Brigand's Hands & Turkish Prison 1914-1918*, (London: Marshall Brothers, 1919), 18.

²² LB, Davidson 398, Memorandum Archbishop, 7 October 1914.

concealed an order to cash in as much money as possible coming from the exemption tax from non Muslim subjects.

In August 1914 the Governor of Jerusalem addressed the foreign consuls informing them that according to orders received from the Ministry of War, military equipment, such as weapons and gunpowder, would be confiscated from foreign subjects. The governor stressed that these orders also applied to animals which were crucial as a means of transport and in case of need could have provided additional food supplies.²³ The Italian consul Senni reported that the *Mutasarrif* asked for assistance from the consulates of the neutral countries in order to carry out the orders, but this invitation was disregarded by the foreign consulates.²⁴ Indeed the consulates were concerned with the protection of their interests and those of their subjects. A few days after the proclamation of the martial law, the Italian consul noted that the economic crisis was worsening by the day. Furthermore, he reported that commerce had completely halted and at the same time the cost of living was increasing to a very fast rate as noted earlier.²⁵ The prices of all commodities, then, began to rise. Basic foods like rice and beans increased by 40 % and 50% and coal for domestic use increased by 50%.

²³ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69, File 824, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 8 August 1914.

²⁴ ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 29 August 1914.

²⁵ ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 7 August 1914.

Table 6: Increase of the cost of living 1914.

Articles	Prices before War	Prices in November 1914	Increase
Meat	0.74	0.96	30%
Rice	0.177	0.247	40%
Sugar	0.247	0.389	57%
Beans	0.265	0.43	50%
Petroleum 10 Gallons	1.52	2.23	46%
Coffee	1.16	2.05	84%
Potatoes	0.124	0.212	70%
Italian Pasta	0.398	0.637	60%
Alcohol	0.627	1.06	66%
Coal per Ton	15.44	23.015	50%

(The prices are given in U.S. currency)²⁶

The indigenous traders, who were mainly Christians and Jews and specialised in the sale of soap, oil and tourist souvenirs, were suffering a great deal of distress. Muslim traders, mainly involved in the sale of agricultural products and general foodstuffs, experienced the worst. In fact many had not only been dispossessed of their goods, but they were also conscripted.²⁷

The military authorities also seized buildings and open spaces, mainly for military purposes. As troops needed accommodation, hospitals, schools and guesthouses for pilgrims were converted into barracks or into military infirmaries. The Franciscans of the Custody of the Holy Land reported in September 1914 that local authorities had seized convents and hospices. Furthermore they had ordered the closure of the Franciscan schools both in Jerusalem and generally in

²⁶ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, Jerusalem, 17 November 1914.

²⁷ ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 29 August 1914.

the Holy Land.²⁸ With the arrival of about forty cannons in the same month the urban landscape changed radically as war machinery required space for manoeuvres.²⁹ The seizure of buildings was also part of a policy adopted by Cemal Paşa, the military governor of Syria based in Damascus who was overall in charge for Palestine. Cemal indicated urban “refurbishment” as his third priority in Syria, after the supervision of the war operations and internal security.³⁰ A building belonging to the Greek-Catholic Church of St. Anne in the Old City of Jerusalem was turned into an Islamic school with the purpose to show a restored Ottoman authority over the city; also monuments were placed under renovation and restoration.³¹

Part of the process of mobilisation was the imposition of censorship in order to avoid the circulation of anti-Turkish propaganda. Local newspapers, such as the Arabic *al-Karmil* and the Hebrew *ha-Ahdut* were closed and their publisher arrested as they were accused of publishing anti-Ottoman articles.³² Besides that, Turkish authorities shut down the post offices ran by European countries such as France, Britain but also those of the allied countries of Austria and Germany who were serving both the local population and the foreign visitors.³³ The only postal service left was that ran by the Ottomans. German and Austrian services, as a consequence of the abolition of the capitulations and the assertion of full sovereignty, were closed too. The main Ottoman policy was to

²⁸ ASV, *Segr. Stato. Affari Eccl.*, Africa Asia Oceania, Pos. 13 Fasc. 5, Senni to Italian Foreign Minister, 11 December 1914.

²⁹ ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, 5 September 1914. According to the Italian consul 40 cannons were delivered to Jerusalem and others were expected.

³⁰ H. Kayalı, “Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration of Greater Syria during World War I,” in *The Syrian Land: Process of Integration and Fragmentation*, eds. T. Philipp and B. Schaebler, 301 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998).

³¹ Ibid, 303-304.

³² Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire,” 38.

³³ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Macid Şevket to Glazebrook, 22 September 1914. Also M.J. Lagrange, “A Jerusalem Pendant la Guerre,” *Le Correspondent*, February, 1915, 646.

centralise the service with the purpose of putting an effective control on it. In September 1914, Macid Şevket in writing to the Ministry of the Interior in Istanbul complained that the British were distributing, in closed envelopes, notices warning the population: "that Muslims in India and Egypt are satisfied with British rule and that they are Anglophiles."³⁴ Propaganda of this kind became common and censorship was tightened throughout the conflict. The military and civil authorities also required all foreigners to register their names in police stations with their families.³⁵

The Ottomans entered the war in November 1914 with a great degree of uncertainty regarding the future. After the great celebrations staged by the Ottoman regime both in Istanbul and Jerusalem, which followed the declaration of *Jihad* against the infidels of France and Great Britain, people went back to their daily activities with pessimism and anxiety.³⁶ The process of mobilisation was over as the war was in fact coming.

3.2 The real value of Jerusalem at the beginning of the war

There are at least two questions in relation to the political and strategic significance of Jerusalem in the context of the First World War. First we need to understand why Jerusalem became a crucial focus of the war in the last stages of the conflict. Secondly, it is necessary to discuss how Jerusalem was involved in the overall military effort which engaged British troops in the Middle East. Jerusalem was not strategically important, as the city lay on hills of no military

³⁴ OA, DH.KMS. 27/37, File 31, Macid Şevket to Minister of the Interior, Jerusalem, 22 September 1914.

³⁵ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69A, File 811.1, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, 16 November 1914.

³⁶ Cemal for instance allowed the cutting of forty percent of all kinds of trees, damaging some of the local industries. H. Kayalı, "Wartime Regional," 300.

value and it did not possess any key resource. We have to put aside the map of the Middle Eastern front and look somewhere else in order to understand the increasing importance of the city in British military thinking. The political and strategic significance of Jerusalem had its origins in the European front. Some major events took place during the war in Europe throughout 1917; the disastrous defeat of the Italians at Caporetto by the Austrians and the Germans, the Russian revolution (which forced the Russians to abandon the conflict) and the mutinies in the French army following the failure of plans by Robert Nivelle, the French military commander, to launch a new offensive on the Western front.³⁷

Despite the failed offensive proposed by Nivelle, the military potential of the Entente in 1917 was still intact. Yet according to John Keegan and Keith Robbins, these events brought doubts and uncertainty amongst the British, French and Italian commands regarding the outcome of the war.³⁸ Furthermore, on the British side there was a change in the leadership which was the outcome of some indecisive policies towards the war. In December 1916 David Lloyd George, who belonged to the Liberal Party, took over the seat of Prime Minister. Lloyd George sought a personal victory as a moral reward for his country so far involved in the conflict. The Prime Minister was a supporter of the Eastern Front. He believed as few others that a strong effort in Palestine and Mesopotamia would change the course of the war.³⁹ Like-minded individuals in the Cabinet believed it was possible to achieve a faster and decisive victory in Europe once the Middle East was tackled. Lloyd George was unable to set a comprehensive

³⁷ Robert Nivelle was nominated Commander in Chief of the French Army in December 1916, as officer of artillery he planned to use new artillery tactics in order to breakthrough the German lines; nevertheless his plans proved to be a failure and eventually Nivelle was replaced in April 1917. See J. Keegan, *The First World War*, (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2000), 322-329.

³⁸ See Ibid; K. Robbins, *The First World War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

³⁹ Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 234.

war strategy to this effect because of the struggle with William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), and with some of the senior members of the military establishment.⁴⁰ Once it was decided to proceed with the military campaign in the Middle East further disagreements rose in relation to the targets and tasks to achieve by the Expeditionary commander General Allenby.⁴¹ Lloyd George wanted Jerusalem to boost up the morale of a nation at war. Matthew Hughes without exaggerating notes that “in the space of a month [...] Allenby pushed forward over forty miles and took a biblical city that eluded the West for over seven hundred years; in almost four months of fighting [...] General Haig advanced five miles and captured an unknown, ruined Belgian village.”⁴² What Allenby achieved was less important in the great picture of the war against Germany, but indeed produced some tremendous effects in terms of propaganda and morale.

If we add the material cost of the operation, in terms of men and resources, we may better understand the significance of Jerusalem. The Middle Eastern front in early 1917, as well as other fronts, was in a situation of stalemate. On June 28th general Edmund Allenby assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force with instructions to prepare for an offensive campaign during the autumn and winter.⁴³ Lloyd George personally ordered the newly appointed chief of the Expeditionary Force to make Jerusalem a “Christmas present for the British nation.”⁴⁴ Jerusalem was to be taken no matter what the

⁴⁰ Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, 33.

⁴¹ General Allenby was appointed commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force early in 1917. Allenby will be discussed thoroughly in the following sections of this Chapter.

⁴² Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, 30.

⁴³ BL, Resume of Operation in Palestine and Arabia since 20th March 1917, in Priestland, *Records of Jerusalem*, vol. 1, 89.

⁴⁴ Bullock, *Allenby's War*, 66.

cost, this was clear as far as the Prime Minister was concerned. The ideological and symbolic values of the city are the main reasons why Jerusalem has to become the object of such intense military scrutiny. The conquest of Jerusalem was planned and staged in order to enhance the nation's morale.⁴⁵ How to conquer Jerusalem was left in the hands of Allenby, who eventually proved to be the man for the job. The British had strategic plans for the future by the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916), the Husayn-McMahon correspondence (1915-1916) and the Balfour declaration (1917).⁴⁶ These war time agreements proved to be generic as far as the set up of the future administration of the region and indeed contradicted each other. But it may be argued that in late 1917 the focus of British policy making in the Eastern front was Jerusalem.

The second step of the discussion is now to understand how Jerusalem was used as an ideological tool in order to fulfil the purpose of its conquest. Evidence suggests that the case for Jerusalem in the Foreign and War Offices was built as early as 1917. Although the Eastern Front was debated among British officials, Jerusalem had, however, become mainly a personal concern of the Prime Minister. It was only later in 1917 and early in 1918 that Jerusalem became a topic in the News Department of the War and Foreign Offices. Under the supervision of Mark Sykes since November 1917, this department advertised and capitalised on the conquest of Jerusalem as we will see later on. As early as the spring of 1917 the news that Jerusalem, sooner or later, was to be conquered by the British began to spread, thanks to propaganda campaign promoted by the Foreign Office, across Europe.

⁴⁵ Eitan, Bar-Yosef, "The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign 1917-18," *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, no. 1 (2001): 87-109.

⁴⁶ For war time agreements see: Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*.

The British government was creating so much expectation that the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem fell victim to this pressure. Genuinely convinced of fulfilling a sort of Christian “reconquista”, Rennie MacInnes in May 1917 wrote to the High Commissioner of Egypt asking for: “the desirability of taking official possession of every building erected originally as a Christian church, which is now used as a Mohammedan mosque.”⁴⁷ Although this was in part MacInnes’ personal opinion it reflected feelings shared by some representative of the Anglican Communion at that time.

The British, however, were much more concerned with another issue of religious and political character. In fact the Ottoman Sultan was also the spiritual leader (Caliph of Islam) of the Muslims inside and outside Ottoman lands. Early in the Middle East campaign there was great attention paid by the British not to displease the Muslim subjects of their Empire, particularly Indian Muslims, in any way. The British looked for Muslim support in the war against the Islamic Ottoman Empire; Britain also knew that the Muslims would never forgive any damage or disruption to the Holy Muslim shrines located in Ottoman territories.⁴⁸ A note issued a few weeks before the conquest of Jerusalem by the News Department of the Foreign Office, addressed to the press, clarifies how carefully the British intelligence moved in the Muslim world:

“The attention of the press is again drawn to the undesirability of publishing any article, paragraph or picture suggesting that military operations against Turkey are in any sense a Holy War, a modern Crusade, or have anything whatever to do with religious questions. The British Empire is said to contain a hundred million of Mohammedan

⁴⁷TNA: PRO FO 141/473 MacInnes to High Commissioner of Egypt, Cairo, 2 May 1917.

⁴⁸Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 100-101.

subjects of the King and it is obviously mischievous to suggest that our quarrel with

Turkey is one between Islam and Christianity.”⁴⁹

As clearly stated in the last line, the purpose of this note was to avoid in any way that Muslim subjects of the Empire could consider the war as a Christian-Muslim conflict.⁵⁰ Clearly British officials were well aware that Jerusalem as a symbolic and ideological tool was extremely hazardous and only if it was managed properly, would it bring about the desired outcomes. Retrospectively, it can be argued that Jerusalem in the short term proved to be a winning bet. The conquest of the Holy City helped gather momentum for the Allies and played a crucial role in boosting the morale of the troops employed on the other fronts of the war. However, looking at the long term, the occupation of the city created more complex disputes rather than solving existent ones.⁵¹ Once the British started to administer it, the inconsistency of the war-time agreements and promises made to Arabs and Jews came to the fore.

3.3 The British conquest of Jerusalem: 9 December 1917

Having defined the value and significance of Jerusalem in military and political terms, we shall see how Jerusalem was occupied and how the transition between the Ottomans to the British took place, literally when the city “changed hands”.⁵² The British attempted twice to take Gaza under the command of General Archibald Murray, however he failed to achieve the goal. At the end of April 1917 the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George offered the command

⁴⁹ TNA: PRO FO 395/152, Notice D. 607, 15 December 1917.

⁵⁰ Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda,” 89.

⁵¹ For a long term assessment of the British occupation of Palestine see: T. Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*.

⁵² I need to thank Abigail Jacobson for this image of the “changing hands”.

to General Edmund Allenby, nicknamed the "Bull".⁵³ The Palestine campaign therefore entered a new phase that eventually led to the capture of Jerusalem.

3.3.1 General Allenby, "the man for the job"

When the Prime Minister Lloyd George offered the command of the EEF to General Allenby, in the spring of 1917, he explicitly asked Jerusalem to be taken as soon as possible. Allenby, eventually, proved to be the man for the job. Edmund Allenby was born in 1861 in Nottinghamshire, after failing twice to enter the Indian Civil Service, he turned to a military career. Allenby served in South Africa during the Boer War (1899-1902), where he demonstrated his qualities as field commander.⁵⁴ Allenby was a religious man, so attached to the Bible that he chose the name Megiddo (the biblical place for the Armageddon) as part of his honorary titles when he was made Viscount in 1919. Allenby had a violent temper and a very strong character; not surprisingly he was therefore nicknamed "The Bull". At the outbreak of the First World War he was made commander of a cavalry division on the Western front. He took part in the second battle of Ypres and in October 1915 took over the British Third Army but at the battle of Arras in 1917 he failed and eventually he was replaced. As mentioned above in 1917 Allenby was appointed commander of the EEF; he made his name popular with the conquest of Jerusalem in 1917 and Damascus in 1918 and with the Battle of Megiddo (the traditionally acknowledged site where the Armageddon would take place), which was fought in September 1918. In the

⁵³ R.D. Adelson, "The Formation of British Policy Towards the Middle East 1914-1918" (PhD thesis, Washington University, 1972), 353; A. P. Wavell, *Allenby Soldier and Statesman*, (London: George G. Harrap, 1946), 14.

⁵⁴ Bullock, *Allenby's War*, 63.

eyes of his contemporaries, but also of posterity, he turned out to be the modern "crusader" par excellence.⁵⁵ He was an impressive and dramatic figure, who personally benefited from being the conqueror of the lands of the Bible.⁵⁶ After his return to England in 1925, he travelled the world extensively and in 1936 he was appointed Rector of Edinburgh University. Allenby remained in the Middle East as High Commissioner of Egypt and Sudan until 1925 when he retired. Edmund Allenby died in London in 1936.⁵⁷

What General Allenby brought to the Middle Eastern front was a new strategy. When Allenby reached Egypt from London it was still not clear how far he should go into Palestine but he prepared himself for the third strike on Gaza after General Murray had attempted to take the city twice.⁵⁸ Allenby was to change the strategy employed by his predecessor. Rather than a direct attack against the city of Gaza he was to strike the village of Beersheba first. The plan was to outflank Gaza, so that the British army could attack on two fronts and to secure water supplies.⁵⁹ Allenby's strategy was of mobile warfare. He relocated the headquarters from Cairo to the battlefield near Rafah, a border crossing between Egypt and Palestine, close to Gaza.⁶⁰ The Gaza breakthrough, which began on 30 October 1917, consisted of an elaborate plan employing cavalry, infantry and artillery. The original plan was that once Beersheba was taken, the British would then take Gaza on the flank. However because of a shortage in water supplies the attack was delayed giving room for the Turkish army to

⁵⁵ Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, 13.

⁵⁶ A similar, but more detailed opinion is expressed by Hughes, 13.

⁵⁷ For the biography of Allenby see: B. Gardner, *Allenby*, (London: Cassell, 1965); Wavell, *Allenby Soldier*; Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*.

⁵⁸ Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, 31.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 45; Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 115.

⁶⁰ Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 112.

escape.⁶¹ The Turkish soldiers were not able to cope with the new mobile warfare adopted by Allenby's army and did not deploy a flexible defence system as it has been suggested by the German military advisors. This proved disastrous for the Turkish forces.⁶² Allenby was very careful about supplies and logistics, particularly about water, a precious commodity in the Palestinian desert.

Transport was a second crucial factor. Allenby at first relied on the cavalry but eventually it proved not to be suitable as horses needed large water supplies and were unsuited to the uneven terrain of Palestine.⁶³ Hughes states that the cavalry was caught between Gaza and Beersheba unable to pursue the retreating Turks as they lacked waters for the horses.⁶⁴ Eventually the British turned to rail transport. Rather than building new rail tracks, the British exploited the existing Turkish railway lines.

In the meantime at home the Prime Minister pushed for a decisive advance towards Jerusalem. While on the ground Allenby wanted to ensure he could be in a position to support his army in the advance with water, weapons and other supplies.⁶⁵ By mid-November 1917 the British were moving towards Jerusalem. As Allenby was planning the capture of the city, he wished to avoid fighting in its proximity as he was fearful of damaging sacred buildings in Jerusalem and being labelled as the one who spoilt the Holy City.

⁶¹ Ibid, 115; Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, 56.

⁶² Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, 48-50.

⁶³ Ibid, 56-59.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 57.

⁶⁵ Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 154.

3.3.2 The battle for Jerusalem in London 1917

Parallel to Allenby's operations in Palestine, the Foreign and War Offices in London were discussing the future asset of Jerusalem. In this section we will follow the debate among the members of the different Governmental offices a few weeks before the occupation of the city. Most of the policies adopted in relation to Jerusalem were indeed a reflection of the war-time agreements mentioned earlier. Mark Sykes was the key policy maker who attempted to consistently connect policy making in relation to Jerusalem with policy making in relation to the wider Middle East. The debate in Government circles also shows that British policy makers were aware of and sensitive to the tensions between the different religious communities in the city. Their primary aim was therefore to avoid any clash between the Christians and Muslims, but also between the different Christian denominations. To this effect as early as July 1917 the Archbishop of Canterbury, under the suggestion of the Foreign Office, wrote to the Bishop in Jerusalem, Rennie MacInnes who was a resident in Cairo from 1914, about the desirability in the case of British conquest of Jerusalem, to send formal greetings to the other Christian denominations represented in the city.⁶⁶

A few days after Allenby's army took Gaza in early November 1917, the Prisoner of War Department in London wondered if any one of General Allenby's staff was aware and had knowledge of the religious complications surrounding the question of the Holy Places.⁶⁷ In November 1917 Mark Sykes, now advisor to the Cabinet on Middle Eastern affairs, acknowledged that

⁶⁶ TNA: PRO FO 141/773, Archbishop to Bishop MacInnes, London, 18 July 1917.

⁶⁷ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Prisoner of War Department to Lord Robert Cecil, London, 8 November 1917.

problems might have occurred, however he stated that: "I believe myself that rows about the Holy Places are usually of Turkish origin, and I do not apprehend people will desire to indulge in immediate fights."⁶⁸ In this important document Mark Sykes advocates some of the main policies which were to be enforced after Jerusalem surrendered. Two spheres, according to this report, were crucial to bear in mind: the local dimension and the international one. Sykes proposed that the Christian places were to be guarded by men accustomed to police work. Secondly, he proposed that a British political officer with executive military authority should supervise the maintenance of order in the city. As regards to the Muslim shrines, Sykes proposed that the Aqsa Mosque was to be handed to a representative of the King of Hejaz, Sharif Husayn, and a military cordon was to be established around the perimeter of the mosque. Furthermore, non-Muslims were not to be allowed to enter the area of the Temple without a proper pass released by the political officers and countersigned by the King's representatives.⁶⁹

Under the excuse that "agent provocateurs may be left behind" Sykes proposed to purge the city of any enemy influence, mainly represented by Christian clerics of German and Austrian citizenship, and to allow a degree of control over religious institutions on the part of French and Italian governments.⁷⁰ Sykes also proposed that the city was to be placed under military administration and martial law, so as to avoid Franco-Italian complaints. Under martial law, France and Italy would not have been able to compete for the control of religious and educational institutions. French and Italians were given the right

⁶⁸ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Mark Sykes Report, London, 13 November 1917.

⁶⁹ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Mark Sykes Report, London, 13 November 1917.

⁷⁰ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061 Report of Mark Sykes on 13 November 1917.

to take charge of those institutions where the majority of the clergy was French or Italian. Lastly, Sykes suggested that a register of clerics from countries on the opposite side of the war left in Jerusalem, was to be compiled for the purpose to expel Austrian and German priests, monks and friars belonging to religious institutions in Jerusalem.

Soon after, the Foreign Office sent Sykes' remarks to Reginald Wingate, the British High Commissioner of Egypt, making a further addition. In the doorway of the Holy Sepulchre there was a Muslim *waqf*, a small religious endowment, which housed the Muslim family of the Nuseibeh responsible for the key of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. In the event of the conquest of Jerusalem, the Foreign Office expressed the desire that the Muslim *waqf* was to be maintained in order to respect the status quo and not to upset the Muslim subjects of the Empire.⁷¹ Wingate, as requested, discussed with Allenby the whole document. The joint document produced by the two officials which was subsequently then sent to the Foreign Office a few days later, shows remarkable differences from the points made by Sykes.⁷² Wingate and Allenby noted that there would be no representatives of the King of Hejaz in Jerusalem. More importantly, the appointment of a representative of the King of Hejaz in an official position in Jerusalem, could give rise to aspirations which were in contrast with the provision of the Sykes-Picot agreement, according to which Jerusalem was to be placed under an international administration. Therefore, Allenby and Wingate proposed that the Mosque of Omar and the other Muslim Holy Places should be come under the control of Muslim troops, namely Indians.

⁷¹ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Foreign Office to Wingate, London, 17 November 1917.

⁷² TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Wingate to Foreign Office, Cairo, 19 November 1917.

Secondly, Allenby proposed the appointment of Colonel Borton Pasha, former Postmaster-General of the Egyptian Postal Service, as military governor of Jerusalem in charge of the administration.

This debate came to a close three weeks before the actual occupation of the city when the War Office formalised the main policies to be adopted for its administration.⁷³ This was announced in the form of a note prepared by the War Office as guidelines for the announcement to be made by the Prime Minister on the occasion of British entry in Jerusalem. In this note the suggestions made by Wingate and Allenby with regards to the Muslim Holy Places were taken into consideration. Non-Muslims would not be permitted to pass the cordon established around the Mosque of Omar without permission from the political officer and the Muslim official in charge of the Mosque. Internal security was to be the primary task of the newly occupant force. Whilst the question of the presence of one representative of the King of Hejaz was completely dropped, the policy makers in London felt that they had to go an extra length in order to strengthen their position in front of the Muslims as they could not afford to upset the many Indian Muslim subjects of the Empire. Therefore, the Tomb of the Patriarchs at Hebron, Rachael's tomb and other holy shrines were to be placed under Muslim control.⁷⁴

In mid-November 1917 in London the occupation of Jerusalem was considered only a question of time. Available sources have highlighted the

⁷³ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, War Office to Headquarters Cairo, London, 21 November 1917.

⁷⁴ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, War Office to Headquarters in Cairo, 21 November 1917. Only the points different from the first drafts are reported. "Prime Minister wishes to make first announcement of occupation of Jerusalem in House of Commons in following terms. (1) Manner in which you were received by the population. (2) That you entered Holy city on foot. (5) That Mosque of Omar and area around it has been placed under Moslem control. (7) That Tomb at Hebron has been placed under exclusive Moslem control and guards established at Bethlehem and on Rachel's tomb. [...] Please wire me in above terms as far as you may be able to comply with them."

divergences between the War Office and the Foreign Office. The former advocated military occupation of the city as at that time the future of Palestine and the war as a whole was unclear. In contrast the Foreign Office was already working towards the consolidation of a strong civilian rule. Moreover the commitments taken with the Balfour Declaration meant that a military occupation could have been only a transitional administration. The Foreign Office in early January 1918 pressed Wingate for more propaganda material to be sent in to London as it was necessary to create support for a lasting British presence in Palestine and Jerusalem⁷⁵

3.3.3 "*Gerusalemme Liberata*"

Between 1565 and 1575 the medieval Italian poet Torquato Tasso wrote the epic poem entitled "*Gerusalemme Liberata*" (Jerusalem Delivered). Tasso related the adventures of Godfrey of Bouillon and other crusader knights who fought the first crusade that ended with the capture of Jerusalem in July 1099. Godfrey of Bouillon became a popular hero, the protagonist of many *chansons de geste* written since the twelfth century.⁷⁶ Little more than eight hundred years later General Allenby was portrayed as the heir of Godfrey of Bouillon. The title of a short movie filmed during the official entry of Allenby in Jerusalem was highly symbolic: "With the Crusaders in the Holy Land. Allenby the Conqueror."⁷⁷ *The Times* defined the occupation of Jerusalem as the "most memorable event in the history of Christendom." Both Allenby and Godfrey de

⁷⁵ TNA: PRO FO 371/3383, Foreign Office to Wingate, London, 2 January 1918.

⁷⁶ See T.S. Asbridge, *The First Crusade: a New History*, (London: Free, 2004); M. Foss, *People of the First Crusade*, (London: M. O'Mara Books, 1997); A. Maalouf, *The Crusade Through Arab Eyes*, (London: Al Saqi, 1984).

⁷⁷ IWM, Film and Video Archive, IWM 145.

Bouillon entered popular imagery as the conquerors of Jerusalem, the heroes who had defeated “the infidels.”⁷⁸

Jerusalem was conquered by Godfrey de Bouillon after a siege with the help of a movable tower placed under the walls; Allenby also brought with him a new strategy of mobile warfare. Godfrey de Bouillon and Allenby also share a common fate as Christian conquerors of Jerusalem. Godfrey entered the city and immediately faced the internal divisions among the Christians. Similarly Allenby had to face rising tension among the different ethnic and religious communities of Jerusalem as we will see later.⁷⁹

Some scholars have depicted the conquest of Jerusalem as a personal enterprise of Allenby; others have pointed out that London pushed for a quick advance. Cyril Falls, in his recollection of the military operations in Egypt and Palestine, and the Marquess of Anglesey in his history of the British cavalry, gave the whole credit of the conquest of Jerusalem to Allenby, stressing Allenby’s determination.⁸⁰ Anthony Bruce suggests how political pressure played a crucial role in pursuing military operations on the Palestine front.⁸¹ As I have shown earlier, it was the political establishment of the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister himself who planned and pushed for the final advance which led to the capture of Jerusalem. Allenby’s troops halted their march towards Jerusalem after Gaza and Jaffa were secured. Troops were tired and fresh supplies were urgently needed; particularly water. However, Allenby saw the

⁷⁸ See for instance IWM, Film and Video Archive 45, “With the Crusaders in the Holy Land. Allenby: the Conqueror”, 1919; see also *The Times* (London), December 11, 1917. The debate over the “Crusade” theme will be discussed further down in this chapter and also in chapter 7.

⁷⁹ For Godfrey see T.S. Asbridge, *The First Crusade*, 316-319; for the ethnic/religious divisions of the city see Chapters 5 and 6.

⁸⁰ C. Falls, *Military Operations Egypt and Palestine*, vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1930); The Marquess of Anglesey, *A History of the British Cavalry*, vol. 5, (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).

⁸¹ Bruce, *The Last Crusade*.

apparent disorganisation of the enemy and decided to press to Jerusalem.⁸² As Allenby wished to avoid close fighting to the city, as opposed to his predecessor Godfrey de Bouillon, he planned an elaborate siege, which proved to be a more difficult tactic than a direct attack.⁸³ The XXI Corps was to advance through the main road from Jaffa to Jerusalem, while the 52nd Division and the Yeomanry Mounted Division advanced north of Jerusalem. The 75th Division was to join them as it approached Jerusalem in order to cut the Nablus-Jerusalem road. The operation started on 19 November but the following day it was delayed by a heavy rain storm that caused great distress to all the troops. These troops were equipped with summer uniforms and not prepared for the cold and wet weather. The winter clothing was yet to become available.⁸⁴ The Turkish troops were scattered across the Judean Hills which surrounded Jerusalem. The German General Erich von Falkenhayn, who replaced General Friederich Kress von Kressenstein on 5 November 1917, adopted a strategy of survival. He left few contingents as rear guards on the hills surrounding Jerusalem with the purpose of delaying British advance, giving time to the Ottoman Seventh Army to organise for a proper defence of the city.⁸⁵ On 24 November Allenby halted the operations as it was necessary to move supplies from Gaza to the first line and to give some respite to the troops whilst replacing the XXI Corps with the XX Corps which was stationed on the coast under the command of Lieutenant General Philip Chetwode. Von Falkenhayn seized this opportunity and organised a counter

⁸² Field Marshal Lord Carver, *The National Army Museum Book of the Turkish Front 1914-18*, (London: Pan Books, 2003), 212-222.

⁸³ A. Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 155. A direct order to the XXI Corps stated: "No operations are to undertaken within a six miles radius of Jerusalem". Quoted in The Marquess of Anglesey, *A History of British Cavalry*, 205.

⁸⁴ A. Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 156.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 157.

offensive based on a “shock tactic”. His troops began to strike the British forces on 27 November but by 3 December the Turco-German troops were forced to halt their offensive.⁸⁶

The deployment of the XX Corps became pivotal in the final battle for Jerusalem. On 3 December under the command of Chetwode the British high rank officials, met in the Judean Hills and planned the capture of Jerusalem. The plan was to cut the main roads which connected the cities of Hebron to Bethlehem and to Nablus, using the Jaffa road to deploy the artillery. The Turkish army was left with only one possibility to escape the city, from the South. Between 3 and 7 December the units involved in the attack took position while the Turkish Seventh Army was entrenched in the hills west of Jerusalem. Von Falkenheyn knew that the fate of Jerusalem was a matter of time and since 7 December had started to evacuate German and Turkish troops from the city where rumours of the British advance spread rapidly. Von Falkenhayn informed the Spanish Consul Ballobar that the Turks, at the beginning of December, were planning the expulsion of foreigners and Jews.⁸⁷

On 7 December everything was ready on the British side for the second assault on Jerusalem. Despite the cold and the heavy rain the British were able to surround Jerusalem. On 8 December the Turks began to withdraw from the city, more out of fear of the encroaching British troops, rather than as result of British military operations, alongside the German and Austrian officials. The Turkish Governor and the German and Austrian consuls also fled during the night.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Ibid, 159; Bullock, *Allenby's War*, 91; Falls, *Military Operations*, 235-236.

⁸⁷ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 230.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 234-235.


Nothing was left; the Turkish governor of the city, Izzet Paşa, was the last civil official to leave before dawn with the help of Mr. Vester of the American Colony.

In the meantime, the 60th and 74th Divisions were operating on the Jaffa-Jerusalem road; the 53rd Division was not far from Bethlehem, whilst the Worcestershire Yeomanry and the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment were expected to be the liaison of the 60th and the 53rd Divisions; the 179th Brigade of the 60th Division began the advance towards Jerusalem on the night of 7 December.⁸⁹ They were not aware of the Turkish retreat and they were possibly more concerned with the bad weather conditions and with the probability of a fight the day after.

No fighting took place inside Jerusalem, and by 9 December the city was free from Turkish and German troops. The last Turkish soldier is said to have left Jerusalem early in the morning through St. Stephens or Lion's Gate.⁹⁰ The battle for Jerusalem was over.

⁸⁹ Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 160; Bullock, *Allenby's War*, 92-93.

⁹⁰ TNA: PRO 395/237, "The Last Days of Jerusalem under the Turk", V. Jabotinsky, 4 February 1918; *The Palestine News* (Jerusalem), March 7, 1918.



Map 2: The battle for Jerusalem

3.3.4 "A dramatic incident of war"⁹¹: the surrender of Jerusalem

It took until late December for the British army to secure Jerusalem from Turkish counterattacks. As Jerusalem was occupied its surrender became an ideological tool in British hands and not surprisingly, this is reflected in the different accounts on the occupation of the city. The mayor Husayn Salim Effendi al-Husayni "delivered" the city to the British on 9 December but this

⁹¹ Falls, *Military Operations*, 252.

official occupation was staged two days later, by Allenby and the Foreign and War Offices. In this section I shall first provide a different perspective on the surrender of Jerusalem as a “dramatic incident of war” by concentrating on the dynamics of the surrender which preceded Allenby’s official entry. Secondly I will briefly compare and contrast the official narratives employed in the account of Allenby’s entry in Jerusalem.

The slow surrender of Jerusalem began on the morning of 9 December when before leaving the city alongside the withdrawing Turco-German troops, the Governor of Jerusalem Izzet Paşa met the mayor al-Husayini and handed him the decree of surrender addressed to the British commander which stated:

“To the English Command. Since two days howitzer shells are falling on some places in Jerusalem which (city) is sacred to all nations. (Therefore) The Ottoman Government, for the sole purpose of protecting the religious places, has withdrawn her soldiers from the city. And she installed officials to protect the Holy Place such as the Holy Sepulchre and the Aqsa Mosque with the hope that the same treatment (of the place) will also continue from your side. I am sending this letter to you by the acting Mayor.”⁹²

The mayor decided to keep the document and he simply read it to the British. Husayn al-Husayini, alongside the other notables of the city, fearing that if the Turkish army returned they would be branded as traitors.⁹³ For their part the Ottoman authorities saw to it that Holy Places were left guarded, a course of action which underlined the religious value of the city. Ottomans wanted to rescue their religious credentials as both Sultanate and Caliphate had not been yet abolished. Germany and Austria were Christian countries and had an international image to protect at home as well. German and Austrian troops left

⁹² T. Canaan, “Two Documents on the Surrender of Jerusalem,” *The Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society* 10, no. 1 (1930): 27-32.

⁹³ Ibid, 28.

the city quietly without unnecessary devastation. Real-politick and religious concerns played a major role in the undertaking of these decisions.

The events that led to the surrender of the city are clearly evident in the chaos which followed the collapse of Ottoman rule, but also are evidence of the crucial importance of the notables as the “local” intermediaries par excellence as explained in the previous chapter.

Early on 9 December the mayor of Jerusalem Husayn Salim Effendi al-Husayni, delegated by the governor to surrender the city, went to the American Colony, a Christian institution located outside the city walls to the East, and knocked at the door of the Spafford, the founder family and manager of the Colony. As the American Colony was active in the relief of the local population, the mayor became a close friend of the Spafford. He announced that he was going to deliver the letter of surrender, left to him by the Governor of Jerusalem, for the English troops. Lady Spafford, excited by the news received, warned him not to go without a white flag as a symbol of truce.⁹⁴ It is not clear whether this was a genuine suggestion in order to avoid incidents or simply Lady Spafford, in classical orientalist mode believing that the Mayor had no understanding of the rules of military surrender.

This was the first step of one of the several surrenders that took place on that day as the military and civilian authorities collapsed. Although public order was maintained by the municipal police, it was difficult to control the movements of the population. Civilians left Jerusalem looking for supplies and seeking help from the invading army as soon as residents realised that the city was abandoned by the German-Turkish troops. Wasif Jawhariyyeh, a local resident, reported that

⁹⁴ Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem*, 255.

some people were cutting down the Ottoman telephone lines and taking them home.⁹⁵ Jerusalemites were looking for food, water, clothes and animals as suggested by the Conde de Ballobar. Furthermore he noted that along Jaffa Road, outside the walls, pillage was the main activity of the Jerusalemites: “everything suitable to be taken was stolen.” The Spanish diplomat also reported that municipal police were rather helpless and did not intervene.⁹⁶ The police forces were aware that as soon as the British were to take over, pillaging would stop.

Whilst wandering around the city, it was one of these civilian groups who first met two British soldiers, Private Church and Andrews, who, as cooks were looking for “some hegggs for their hofficers”.⁹⁷ They were sent by their superiors to look for some fresh supplies like milk or eggs and apparently had lost their way.⁹⁸ The Mayor, accompanied by a small party, called by the crowd attempted to deliver the keys to the city to them but they refused and returned to their battalion. Apparently on their way back other civilians met the two privates and informed them that the city desired to surrender.⁹⁹

Of course this episode sounds quite amusing, and quite likely did not sound heroic or reasonably epic enough to be officially reported. The wanderings of the official surrendering party and the civilians around the city were almost bizarre. While the crowds of Jerusalem were busy looking for any suitable supplies left outside the walls, the Mayor with the decree of surrender in his hands was still looking for British troops, with the purpose of officially

⁹⁵ A. Amireh, “My Last Days as an Ottoman Subject,” *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, Issue 9, (Summer 2000): 31-32.

⁹⁶ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 236.

⁹⁷ V. Gilbert, *The Romance of the Last Crusade*, (London: Appleton & C., 1928), 166. Gilbert reported the name “Murch” rather than “Church”, however it seems plausible the correct spelling is “Church”, considering that all other sources used this last name.

⁹⁸ Falls, *Military Operations*, 252.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 252.

surrendering the city. Following the first unfortunate meeting with the two British soldiers, al-Husayni and his party met Sergeant Hurcomb and Sergeant Sedgewick of the 219th Battalion London Regiment on outpost duty, who refused to accept the surrender of the city. On one hand, the soldiers were not of the proper rank to accept the surrender and on the other hand, they were not sure of the identity of the Mayor. The third meeting between al-Husayni and British soldiers was with Major Barry and Major Beck.¹⁰⁰ Eventually, they contacted their superiors and the commander of the 303rd, Royal Field Artillery, Lieut.-Colonel Bayley who met the notable party. The meeting was somewhat of a bizarre as Bayley walked towards al-Husayni and "there he was with three chairs in a row on the road."¹⁰¹ Bayley sat down with the mayor on one side and the chief of the municipal police on the other as the mayor read for the first time the act of surrender. Lieut.-Colonel Bayley first telegraphed Major-General Shea and then arranged the occupation of some of the key buildings inside the city.

At the same time Brigadier General Watson, commander of the 180th Brigade, arrived on the spot and also accepted the surrender of Jerusalem from al-Husayni. However, this particular event, in the same way as the "other" surrenders, was cancelled from official reports. An order was issued to the effect that evidence should be destroyed including photographs and negatives of the Brigadier General Watson.¹⁰² Only evidence regarding General Allenby was to be recorded. Around noon Major-General Shea was ordered by General

¹⁰⁰ Ibid; Bertha Spafford Vester quoted also Major Cooke as being present to the meeting, however from the sources available it appears Major Cooke arrived later and was order to take over the post office.

¹⁰¹ IWM, Bayley Papers.

¹⁰² A zealous soldier saved some of these pictures for apparently no reason. The pictures mentioned are conserved at the Imperial War Museum, London, in the photographic collection. Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 54; argues that when Shea learned that pictures were taken of Watson he immediately ordered that the negatives be destroyed.

Chetwode commander of the XX Corps to take over the city. After a short surrender ceremony he did so in the name of General Allenby, commander of the EEF.¹⁰³ After four hundred years of Turkish rule, Jerusalem was delivered to British forces.

In comparison with the development of the events discussed earlier, the British government issued only one short official document on the circumstances of the surrender of the city which detailed the involvement of a *parlementaire* who was sent by the enemy on 9 December.¹⁰⁴ It is difficult to elaborate a particular official narrative, in fact apart from the bizarre events that will be discussed later, Jerusalem was won with no actual fight as the city was abandoned by the Turco-German troops. As discussed above the occupation of Jerusalem was a powerful political symbol to be exploited at home for public consumption. The fact that there are no official reports on the early attempts on the part of the mayor to deliver the city, clarifies the high symbolic value attached to the city by the British.

General Allenby made his formal entry into the city following plans which had been carefully staged by Sykes. He entered Jerusalem on foot, as opposed to the German Emperor Wilhelm II who in 1898 had entered the city riding a horse. The *Daily Mail* reported the event somewhat flamboyantly: "As a conqueror General Allenby entered Jerusalem on December 11 with more simplicity and true dignity than Kaiser Wilhelm did when he presented himself as a blend of Cook's tourist and *Envoy of Allah*."¹⁰⁵ Allenby was followed by a procession of British military officials, two small Italian and French contingents and

¹⁰³ Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 162-163; Falls, *Military Operations*, 254.

¹⁰⁴ TNA: PRO FO 141/473, Press Communiqué No. 137, Cairo, 12 December 1917.

¹⁰⁵ *Daily Mail* (London), December, 1917. Press cuttings from Allenby's Paper, 4/3.

representatives of the religious communities. He then read, in several languages including English, French, Italian, Arabic and Hebrew, the proclamation of martial law, stressing the British would confirm and maintain the existing customs in relation to the Holy Places.¹⁰⁶




Illustration 4: 1917 Christmas Postcard¹⁰⁷

3.4 Jerusalem conquered: local, British and international reactions

The occupation of Jerusalem had important local, regional and international repercussions and elicited responses across the world. Inside the city the inhabitants of Jerusalem endeavoured to come to terms with foreign occupation. Far from Palestine, the reactions of British policy makers were

¹⁰⁶ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, General Allenby Reports, Jerusalem, 11 December 1917.

¹⁰⁷ Free Copyright; the postcard was addressed to "Elena" as in the back but no more details are given.

consistent with the agenda they had put forward before the occupation, yet the British troops and public opinion in the United Kingdom eventually reacted in a variety of ways. The question of the reaction of the international community to the British occupation is also extremely important considering that in accordance with the agreement negotiated during the war, Jerusalem was to be placed under international administration.

3.4.1 Finally free from the Turks

Regardless of their background, the Jerusalemites generally welcomed the British Army, as ultimately the regime of the CUP was over. The process of Turkification which had started before the war, the mobilisation of resources for the military effort and war conditions exacerbated the relationship between local residents, both indigenous and foreigners, and their Turkish rulers.¹⁰⁸ The streets of the city became crowded, packed with joyful people; people who, at least in the first stages of the British occupation, genuinely and warmly welcomed the British troops.¹⁰⁹ According to a dramatic statement of Conde Ballobar: "The popular enthusiasm was spontaneous and terrific. Every British soldier was followed by an unbelievable crowd that touched them and their horses, they admired them as heroes."¹¹⁰ Major Vivian Gilbert, marching through the old city was impressed by the warm welcome of the locals: "The narrow streets were packed with towns-people, old men and women and children, all wild with

¹⁰⁸ TNA: PRO FO 882/14, "The Politics of Jerusalem", 29 December 1916; ACTS, "Cronaca di Terra Santa", Fr. E. Castellani.

¹⁰⁹ Conde Ballobar, *Diario*, 237.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

delight and dressed in their best to greet the victorious army.”¹¹¹ Although jubilant, the Arab population both Muslims and Christians were looking for a justification for supporting a new foreign occupation. Although the imagery of the Crusade was almost forgotten in Muslim memory, they nonetheless were forced to confront the mounting crusading mania which was spreading through the British press in Britain and the local Christian churches.¹¹²

In the aftermath of the occupation, British propaganda endeavoured to make the new rulers acceptable to the Arab Muslim population. The Foreign Office also sought to stage the British entry in Jerusalem in accordance with a Muslim story which claimed that a prophet would enter the city in order to end Turkish rule while the waters of the river Nile would flow into Palestine; the British were carrying water from Egypt to Palestine through a pipeline. As for the prophet's story, an anagram was made with Allenby's name that was miraculously transformed into *al-Nabi* (the prophet).¹¹³ However, the Foreign offices' planned pipeline proved not to be feasible, in fact it looked quite bizarre and artificial. In Britain Allenby was also presented as a Muslim conqueror as suggested by a headline of *The Times* “Saladin entered [Jerusalem] in triumph as General Allenby enters it to-day.”¹¹⁴ This comparison evoked the compassionate and pro-Muslim stance of the British general as furthermore, another connection between ancient prophecies and the British conquest of Jerusalem was found in

¹¹¹ Gilbert, *The Romance*, 174.

¹¹² There is an interesting debate about the memories of the Crusades in the Muslim imaginary; originally the Muslims looked at the Crusaders as *ifrang*, westerners, therefore not in religious terms; it was only later with the arrival of the Zionists and the imperial policies of the British that the Muslims evoked the ancient memory of the Crusades. See P.M. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades*, (London: Longman, 1986); J.P. Berkey, *The Formation of Islam*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); see also D.R. Woodward, *Hell in the Holy Land*, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 138-141.

¹¹³ Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda,” 98-99; B. Brian, *The First World War and British Military History*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 192.

¹¹⁴ *The Times* (London), December 11, 1917.

the Bible as the Book of Daniel (Ch. 12, verse 12) states: "Blessed is he that waiteth and cometh to the thousand three hundred and five and thirty days." This passage was promptly understood by some Christians but also some Muslims as the fulfilment of a prophecy as the year 1335 of the Muslim era (*hijira*) corresponded to the year 1917 of the Gregorian calendar.¹¹⁵

In 1917 there were great expectations among the local population. The Christians especially hoped to enjoy more freedom under the aegis of a Christian power. The Arabs envisaged a possible inclusion in an Arab state following the awakening of Arab sentiment after the Arab rebellion led by Sharif Husayn of the Hejaz in 1916. The Jewish population was indeed waiting for a more tolerant rule whilst the Zionist expected to profit from the change of regime as in fact a few weeks before the British occupation of Jerusalem, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration which raised hopes for the creation of a National Jewish Home in Palestine.

Despite popular furore and expectations, the Catholic clergy were sceptical about the British occupation. The Franciscans, for instance, feared that the city rather than liberated was simply passing under Anglican rule. They had hoped for a Catholic power to take over the administration of the city.¹¹⁶ Besides the Custody of the Holy Land, Wasif Jawhariyyeh, an Arab Christian (Greek Orthodox) conscript in the Turkish army, who remained in the city after the Turco-German troops left, provides an interesting perspective on the changing attitude of Arab residents who had some nationalist inclinations. He noted in his diary: "I remember this day [of the British occupation] to have been a very happy

¹¹⁵ A. Bluett, *With Our Army in Palestine*, (London: Andrew Melrose, 1919), 222; Gilbert, *The Romance*, 178.

¹¹⁶ ACTS, *Diario della Guerra*, 8 December 1917.

one for the people. You could see them dancing for joy in the streets, congratulating each other on this happy occasion".¹¹⁷ As far as Wasif was concerned however, the "honeymoon" did not last long. As the diary was written later in the 1940s, there is no doubt that his narrative was affected by the clashes of the 1920s and 1930s between Arabs and Jews, in fact from the same diary, Wasif Jawhariyyeh assess British occupation with the following words: "We did not realize then that this damned occupation would be a curse, not a blessing, for our dear homeland."¹¹⁸

One last section should be dedicated to the British men who occupied Jerusalem. The first reaction of British troops as they entered the city was of strong emotion; some of them felt part of a great mission, others felt like new crusaders. W.T. Massey official correspondent of the London newspapers with the EEF noted that "not a great proportion would claim to be really devout men, but they all behaved like Christian gentlemen."¹¹⁹ Nevertheless it was necessary to stress both to the population and to the troops themselves that British troops were not conquerors but liberators. In this connection a notice was posted on the city walls soon after its conquest:

"The British troops have entered the Jerusalem not as conquerors but as liberators, and their advent has been joyfully welcomed alike by Moslems, by Christians and by Jews. By this historic stroke, Jerusalem has been freed from the shadow of an age-long tyranny, and a prosperous future has been opened up for the virile and intelligent races who inhabit the soil of Palestine."¹²⁰

The Military did not know yet that they were to stay for a long period eventually becoming a long lasting occupying force.

¹¹⁷ Amireh, "My Last Days," 31; also S. Tamari, "Jerusalem's Ottoman Modernity: The Times and Lives of Wasif Jawhariyyeh," *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, Issue 9, (Summer 2000).

¹¹⁸ Amireh, "My Last Days"; Tamari, "Jerusalem's Ottoman Modernity," 7-9.

¹¹⁹ W.T. Massey, *How Jerusalem Was Won*, (London: Constable and Company, 1919), 201.

¹²⁰ LP, H5672 J4 4, Document 12.

3.4.2 Response in Britain to the occupation of Jerusalem

In Britain Jerusalem represented the Biblical focus of Christian life. Furthermore, Jerusalem was the city that had been precluded centuries earlier to the national hero Richard Coeur de Lion (the Lionheart) who, in the attempt to re-take Jerusalem from Salah al-Din in 1192, never reached Jerusalem. The popular press celebrated the news of the conquest of Jerusalem with great headlines as the one of the *Daily Telegraph* who celebrated Allenby as the hero who accomplished the feat which Richard Coeur de Lion, our Crusader King, just failed to achieve.¹²¹

The Foreign Office aimed to strengthen the effects of this event in terms of propaganda while the War Office was concerned with the continuation of the military campaign in Syria and Palestine. From the Foreign Office Sykes wrote to the British headquarters in Cairo: "If we have full and detailed information [on the occupation of Jerusalem] we can get much atmospheric advantage wherever these influences [propaganda on Vatican, Zionist, Orthodox] have effect."¹²² The idea was to create a "mediatic" effect in Britain. In early 1918 Sykes invited the News Department to send correspondents to Palestine in order to write articles on the history, politics and society of Jerusalem. Through these articles Sykes proposed to "spice up" the case in order to exploit the capture of Jerusalem in order to support the British cause. It seems Sykes was setting up the ground, looking for support for the Balfour Declaration. The conquest of Jerusalem was also important as it boosted the morale of British troops deployed on all war fronts but also of all military and civilians involved in the war. W.T. Massey

¹²¹ *Daily Telegraph* (London), December 12, 1917. Press cuttings from Allenby's Papers 4/3, Liddle Hart Centre from Military Archives, King's College, London.

¹²² TNA: PRO FO 371/3388, Sir Mark Sykes to Clayton, London, 14 January 1918.

claimed that “the capture of the Holy City by British arms gave more satisfaction to countless of millions of people that did the winning back for France of any big town on the Western front.”¹²³

The British Jews also rejoiced as highlighted by *The Jewish Chronicle* in London: “The capture of Jerusalem illumines with the picturesque grim battlefields of the world.”¹²⁴ Vladimir Jabotinsky, a leading Zionist and future leader of a prominent paramilitary organisation (*Haganah*) which operated during the Mandate period, published many articles in the British press, suggesting the close involvement between the British Foreign Office and the Zionist leadership.¹²⁵ His first article was published in *The Times* in February 1918 and dealt with the last days of Jerusalem under the Ottomans, stressing the positive effect of the British occupation in opposition to the weak and inefficient Turkish rule. This article left religious issues aside and refrained from mentioning words such as crusade or crusaders in order not to alarm the Muslim public opinion belonging to the British Empire.¹²⁶ In another article published few months later, Jabotinsky criticised the despised the old Jewish communities of Jerusalem as they contributed to the lowering of “Jewish prestige in the eyes of the British” and as they resisted the activity of the Zionist Commission which

¹²³ Massey, *How Jerusalem Was Won*, 190.

¹²⁴ *The Jewish Chronicle* (London), December 14, 1917.

¹²⁵ Vladimir Jabotinsky was born in 1880 in Odessa (Russia). He studied in many European countries and in 1903 joined the Zionist Movement. Until 1914 he worked as journalist in Russia, and then he became correspondent of war from Egypt. Between 1915 and 1917 Jabotinsky conducted a campaign for a creation of a Jewish legion under British command. In 1920 he was involved in the Nebi Musa riots as he created a self defence armed unit (*Haganah*). Tried and convicted by British authorities he travelled across Europe and then moved to the United States. He became the promoter of revisionist movement within the Zionism. He died in 1940 while campaigning for the creation of a Jewish army to fight the Nazi. For biographical details see Y. Benari, *Zeev Vladimir Jabotinsky*, (Tel Aviv: Jabotinsky Institute, 1977); J.B. Schechtman, *The Life and Times of Vladimir Jabotinsky*, vol. 1, (Silver Spring MD: Eshel Books, 1986).

¹²⁶ TNA: PRO FO 395/237, Jabotinsky, “The Last Days of Jerusalem Under the Turks”, February 1918.

handed out the funds available as war relief.¹²⁷ Jabotinsky openly criticised those Jews belonging to the old Jewish communities who lived off alms collected, the *Halukka*. He was also critical of those Jews whose only function was to say prayers before the Wailing Wall. This article also tells us of the mounting tension among the Zionist Commission and the “*Halukka* Jews.” The Zionist Commission wanted to show that Jews were different from this stereotype and that the new Jewish style was represented by the Zionist settlers in Tel Aviv and Rehovoth.¹²⁸

3.4.3 *International views on the British capture of Jerusalem*

As suggested by a telegram of the War Cabinet sent on 13 December 1917 “the capture of Jerusalem [...] is an event of historic and world-wide significance.”¹²⁹ It is not surprising how events in Jerusalem attracted the interest of many governments around the world as the British occupation of the city had long term strategic and political consequences for the future of the Middle East. The main concern of this section is to discuss the international responses to the British occupation of the city, particularly in its immediate aftermath.

The Christian Churches and the Christian Powers who had interests in Jerusalem officially welcomed British rule. The Greek Orthodox Church in London wrote in December to the Archbishop of Canterbury praising: “The great achievement of the fall of Jerusalem fills [...] the glory and honour [of] the brave British army fighting for the liberty of Nations and of Justice.”¹³⁰ In many

¹²⁷ TNA: PRO FO 395/237, Jabotinsky, “No Idlers”, July 1918.

¹²⁸ TNA: PRO FO 395/237, Jabotinsky, *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 165; Gardner, *Allenby*, 160-161.

¹³⁰ LP, Davidson 400, Greek Church in London to Archbishop, 11 December 1917.

European countries church bells rang in order to celebrate the return of the city to Christian hands.¹³¹ The Italian and French governments began a campaign to secure control of the Catholic institutions of Jerusalem and Palestine. While the British occupation of the city raised the issue of the traditional protection over the Catholic population exercised by the French government, the Italians were keen on extending their influence as much as possible. In December 1917 the Italian Ambassador in Paris wrote to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The British occupation of Jerusalem has given new strength to the question of the French protection of the Catholics in the Middle East. [...] We should be ready to defend our rights when times will come."¹³² In a discourse delivered to the Parliament, the Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando underlined the desirability of Italian and French cooperation in order to define mutual rights in the future asset of Palestine and Jerusalem.¹³³ Nevertheless French and Italian interests had a different nature, in fact the French besides the control of the Christian institutions were also interested in the future of the Middle East as France was one of the Powers who had territorial ambitions in the region in accordance with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916; on the other hand Italy yet had not expressed large colonial interests in the region.

In France a *Te Deus* was sung in Notre Dame of Paris and a thanksgiving prayer was recited in the Mosque of Nogent de Marne in the suburbs of the French Capital in order to praise the deliverance of the city from Turkish rule. The French Government supported these public celebrations but as the British,

¹³¹ LHCMA, Allenby's Paper, *The Universe*, 21 December 1917.

¹³² MAE, Archivio Politico e Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Italian Ambassador to Italian Foreign Office, Paris, 24 December 1917.

¹³³ ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl., Straordinari, Africa Asia Oceania*, Pos. 53(2), Fasc. 34, On. Orlandi, 12 December 1917.

Government, it was concerned not to give the impression that the occupation of Jerusalem was a sort of Christian victory over the Muslims. In relation to this the Quay d'Orsay, the French Foreign Office, issued a letter stating that Jerusalem had not been conquered but freed from Turkish misrule. Eventually some French Muslim troops were employed as guardians of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem.¹³⁴

Pope Benedict XV following his strict policy of neutrality in the conflict forbade celebrations in Vatican City. The Secretary of the State Cardinal Gasparri, explained this course of action with the necessity to keep strong ties with all belligerents, clearly also a strategy which aimed to ensure to the Vatican a prominent position in any post-war settlement.¹³⁵ At this time the attention towards Jerusalem was also as a result of the position of some Catholic clerics resident in the city. As the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Camassei had been deported to Damascus by Turkish authorities earlier in 1917, the Congregation of the Propaganda Fide (the Catholic institution dealing with the Catholics around the world) informed the Vatican that Cardinal Dolci, the Apostolic Delegate in Turkey, was working in order to free the Latin Patriarch and for the Catholic community in Jerusalem as a whole.¹³⁶ Obviously other Christian non-Catholic communities like the Abyssinians appealed directly to the Foreign Office. They expressed their delight for the British conquest of Jerusalem but voiced their anxiety with regard to their co-religionists still in the city.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ R. Laurens, *La Question de Palestine 1799-1922*, (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 374-375.

¹³⁵ Giovannelli, *La Santa Sede*, 22.

¹³⁶ ASV, *Segr. Stato Guerra*, Propaganda Fide to Cardinal Gasparri, Rome, 14 December 1917.

¹³⁷ TNA: PRO FO 141/666. British Legation to High Commissioner Egypt, Addis Ababa, 31 December 1917.

Among the most prominent players in the international stage was the Zionist movement. In December 1917 Chaim Weizmann, President of the British Zionist Federation since February of the same year, wrote to Herbert Samuel, a member of the British cabinet who, in 1920 became the first British High Commissioner for Palestine, refuting rumours that the Zionists had decided to relinquish any claim on Jerusalem.¹³⁸ In the same letter it is clear that Zionist claims over the city relied on the numerical strength of its Jewish inhabitants who constituted the majority of the urban population.¹³⁹

The reactions on German and Austrian sides reflected their position in war. In Germany the popular press understandably presented the British victory as a moral, rather than a military achievement. The *Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten*, a popular paper published in Bavaria, underlined the moral importance of the conquest of Jerusalem together with the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, published in Cologne, emphasised: “for the British the capture of Jerusalem is undoubtedly a success, but it is more of a moral than of the Military significance.”¹⁴⁰ The *Frankfurter Zeitung* stressed the undeniable political value underplaying the military achievements of the British Army.¹⁴¹ The Austrian *Neue Freie Presse* showed a degree of optimism when it published an article which stated that: “though regrettable in itself it [the loss of Jerusalem] will bring no change into the main lines of struggle.”¹⁴² In reality the British conquest of Jerusalem had

¹³⁸ CW Papers, Vol. VIII, Letter 25, to Herbert Samuel, London, 12 December 1917.

¹³⁹ See figures reported in Chapter 3.

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari Africa Asia Oceania*, Pos. 53 (2), Fasc. 34, Osservatore Romano, 14 December 1917. TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, W. Towley to Foreign Office, The Hague, 12 December 1917.

¹⁴¹ Quoted in ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari Africa Asia Oceania*, Pos. 53 (2), Fasc. 34, Osservatore Romano, 14 December 1917.

¹⁴² TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, W. Towley to Foreign Office, The Hague, 12 December 1917.

serious military repercussions as it allowed the British army to march towards Syria in the following months.

3.5 The “End of the Last Crusade”?

It has already been discussed that there was a great propagandistic value attached to Jerusalem as showed by the careful planning by the British Government in staging this event. The questions under discussion here however are the origin and the outcome of this propaganda in relation to Jerusalem.

In Britain, the idea of the war as a “holy war” appears to have originated in the Church environment. It was the sermons of the Anglican Bishop Winnington-Ingram in London and the articles of the editor of the nonconformist paper the *British Weekly*, William Robertson Nicholl (a close friend of Lloyd George), that labelled the conflict from the beginning as a holy crusade.¹⁴³ Considering defeat as a punishment for sin, victory in the war was to come with the redemption of the combatants.¹⁴⁴ The Crusader spirit was to be the means to obtain redemption. It would be, however an exaggeration to consider the crusade idea as the main image portraying the war; however since the successes of the Palestine campaign and the capture of Jerusalem, the allusion of a “new” or a “last” crusade became widespread among the British public.¹⁴⁵ First hand accounts of the campaign in diary form were published. The feeling spread of being party to something important, to be part of the fulfilment of an eschatological project. It was necessary to report the events and to recollect the memories of those moments. Most of those diaries bore titles referring directly to

¹⁴³ Siberry, *The New Crusaders*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 87-88.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 90.

¹⁴⁵ Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda,” 87.

the crusades: *The Aussie Crusaders*, *Khaki Crusaders*, *The Great Crusade*, *The Modern Crusaders*; none of these books, however, resembled the diary of a crusader, of someone fighting in the name of God as they looked more like chronicles of war.¹⁴⁶ Captain Adams, once it was announced that Jerusalem had been occupied, reported a bottle of wine was opened in order to celebrate the occasion suitably.¹⁴⁷

Alternatively these people used the word crusade as synonymous with holy war. Crusade comes from the Latin word “Cruciare” which means to mark with a cross, and has a particular Christian connotation, whilst holy war, on the other hand is not unique to Christianity as both Islam and Judaism have forms of holy war.¹⁴⁸ Crusade and holy war are different from the idea of “just” war as they have their own justification while the just war requires a set of conditions to be satisfied; “Deus Vult” (God wills it) was the cry of the first crusaders.¹⁴⁹ Some Englishmen became convinced that the Great War was a struggle between the Christian civilisations as opposed to the German Teutonic savagery. It has been suggested by Bar-Yosef that the Crusading theme was confined and available only to the upper classes as a consequence of their higher education.¹⁵⁰ Indeed the knowledge of the Bible was more spread than that of the Crusades; the Holy Land was more associated with vernacular Bible culture than with memories of medieval conquest of Palestine.¹⁵¹ However sermons, press and propaganda made the Crusade theme, more popular and accessible to the public.

¹⁴⁶ J. Bowes, *The Aussie Crusaders*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1920); F.H. Cooper, *Khaki Crusaders*, (Cape Town: Central News Agency, 1919); F.L. Stevenson, *The Great Crusade*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918); M.C. Adams, *The Modern Crusaders*, (London: Routledge & Sons, 1920).

¹⁴⁷ Adams, *The Modern Crusaders*, 84.

¹⁴⁸ A. Marrin, *The Last Crusade*, (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1974), 124.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 124.

¹⁵⁰ Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda,” 89.

¹⁵¹ Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land in English Culture*, 250.

Poems and songs talking of the war as a last crusade became a normal feature. One example is the collection of *Songs of the Last Crusade*, written by Ella McFayden in 1917. It is interesting to look at a poem she wrote in 1915, well before the Palestine campaign where even the members of the Saint John ambulance service, based in England, part of the Red Cross, had been defined as Crusaders:

“Among the shifting chances / of intake, siege and fray;
Time’s ever green romances / Can never pass away;
Where desert foes are halted / And bared the Turkish blade
Today the Cross, exalted / Leads out the Last Crusade.
Of old the Hermit pleaded / By market-square and street;
The humble ploughman heeded / the seigneur left hi seat;
Then Antioch was shaken / Edessa fell our gain,
Jerusalem lay taken / by Godfrey of Lorraine.
Now ‘gainst the Unbeliever / old paynim fields upon,
The Red Cross of Geneva / leads out thy knights, Saint John!
Our manhood holds thy measure / thy work goes forward yet;
Rest well and take thy leisure / great soul of Jean Valette!
From treacherous invader / from scathe in filed of fight,
God guard my young crusader / Geneva’s swordless knight.
The hospitallers’ daring / was worthy all men’s cheers,
But what of these men faring / unarmed among the spears?
They chase no proud ambition / no gilded, glad emprise;
Their consecrated mission / among the stricken lies;
‘Mid Bedouin of Dervish / or that more hated foe,
Where’er men need their service / the Knights of mercy go.
The prayers of those that love them / be more than shield or balde
Spread thou thy might above them: / God bless the Last Crusade.”¹⁵²

If indeed the knowledge of the Crusades was reserved for a small section of society, the war and the media disseminated this idea to a larger public who in

¹⁵² E. McFayden, “The Last Crusade – 1915” *Songs of the Last Crusade*, (North Sydney: Winn & Co., 1917).

times of crises turned its attention to mystical, prophetic and miraculous beliefs.¹⁵³

As shown, the origins of the crusading theme are to be found alongside the genesis of the war itself; however the Palestine campaign did indeed act as a catalyst and the crusading theme was boosted and expanded. This popular theme then came to be exploited and feared at the same time; exploited as part of the official propaganda and feared as it may have damaged the relations with the Muslim component of the British Empire. Despite this, however, the Crusade theme was very strong after the war, it appears that it then faded away quite rapidly. The British soldier Cecil Sommers, writing his memoirs, differentiated himself from the numerous other war diaries talking explicitly of the Crusade theme. Sommers wrote to his daughter: "Your Grandmother, who is apt to sentimentalize, will tell you that Daddy was a crusader."¹⁵⁴ Indeed Sommers recognized that the Crusader comparison was quite impossible on the real ground, but he acknowledged the power of this particular idea. Sommers went further claiming that in idealistic terms, every soldier, who was a butcher or a baker before the war, became a temporary crusader, regardless of being employed in France or Palestine or in any other front of war.¹⁵⁵ Sommers, having reached Palestine wrote: "This morning I woke up to the old familiar sound of the guns. So far I have been on a Cook's tour. Now, I suppose I become a Crusader."¹⁵⁶ The Crusading metaphor was deeply rooted in the education, imagery and even genealogy, as some looked back to their family history looking for crusader

¹⁵³ Marrin, *The Last Crusade*, 136.

¹⁵⁴ C. Sommers, *Temporary Crusaders*, (London: John Lane, 1919), v.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, vi.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 77.

ancestors, that once properly stimulated could arise easily. It is therefore not surprising that a myth was eventually born.¹⁵⁷

Looking at the literature of the time it appears that the Crusade theme was mainly a feature of British belief and propaganda as the examples of Crusading mania in other countries are almost entirely unheard; the only exception is the collection of letters written by a French officer, then translated into English, under the title *A Crusader of France*.¹⁵⁸ There are examples of Crusading literature among the Australian, New Zealander and South African components of the British Army like the South African *Khaki Crusaders* and the Australian *The Aussie Crusaders*.¹⁵⁹ However they all shared the common history of Richard Coeur de Lion that indeed forged part of British identity. The temptation, for chroniclers but also for the military establishment to use the success of Allenby as the final victory of Christianity over Islam, remained a temptation which proved to be too much and out of touch with the real context of the war.¹⁶⁰ A real contentious Christian-Muslim context was never set up in the battlefield; Allenby himself underlined many times the crucial role played by the Muslim members in the Palestine campaign, like the Egyptian Camel Corps.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless at the same time he often turned to Bible images advancing into Palestine. Allenby added to his title of Field Marshal Viscount Allenby of Felixstowe the name of Megiddo, following the military success at the Biblical place of the Armageddon.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ Bar-Yosef, "The Last Crusade? British Propaganda," 95.

¹⁵⁸ Siberry, *The New Crusaders*, 101.

¹⁵⁹ Bowes, *The Aussie Crusaders*; Cooper, *Khaki Crusaders*.

¹⁶⁰ J. Newell, "Allenby and the Palestine Campaign" in *The First World War and British Military History*, ed. B. Bond, 191 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

¹⁶¹ Siberry, *The New Crusaders*, 96.

¹⁶² Newell, "Allenby and the Palestine Campaign," 196.



Illustration 5: "At last my dreams come true"¹⁶³

3.6 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to show the directives which guided the transition from Ottoman to British rule of Jerusalem. The British occupation of

¹⁶³ *Punch* (London), Vol. 153, December 19, 1917. The cartoon shows Richard Coeur de Lion watching Jerusalem.

the city was a pivotal event in the history of Jerusalem. Three main themes have been discussed in this chapter. The first is that of the mobilisation of human, material and ideological resources prompted by the Turco-German military authorities since the beginning of the war. In contrast, on the British side the emphasis has been placed on propaganda and how the British authorities sought to exploit a possible victory and occupation of Jerusalem. It is clear that the British government intended to use the occupation of the holy city in order to boost the morale of their nation and to increase their prestige vis-à-vis the enemies like Germany and the Ottoman Empire but also vis-à-vis France, Italy and Russia.

Plans for the military conquest and occupation of Jerusalem by the British Army under the command of General Allenby have been discussed focussing less on military issues and more on political and propaganda issues emerging with the closing victory over the Ottomans in Palestine. It is evident that the occupation of the holy city was carefully staged in London showing the political and ideological magnitude of this event. In this chapter the British occupation of Jerusalem has been assessed in the short period, focussing on the immediate reactions of the local population, the allies and enemies of the British. Jerusalemites hoped that the new rulers would solve some of their most urgent problems, lack of food and general resources. Yet both Allied and Central powers focussed on the symbolic value of this event.

The last part of this chapter discusses the particular theme of the crusades. It shows how this theme appeared in Britain in late 1917 was mainly the creation of the Anglican and Non-Conformist Churches in relation to the “evil Germany”

that was eventually exploited in some form by the British government whilst staging the propaganda supporting the Palestine campaign and the occupation of Jerusalem. This “mania” was short-lived and did not lead to the creation of any long-lasting policy making. The “holy war” was fought far from Palestine, in the trenches of the Western front where the news of the capture of Jerusalem was welcomed and led to the emergence of a strong imaginary in relation to the holy land.

4 The Christian Churches during the War

“Pray for the peace of Jerusalem:
They shall prosper that love thee.
Peace be within thy walls,
And prosperity within thy palaces.”
(Psalm 122:6-7)

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the political and social role of the Churches belonging to various denominations from the beginning of the twentieth century until 1920. The aim of this chapter is also to highlight the changes in their own structures, in the relationships vis-à-vis the local population and amongst themselves that took place from 1914 to 1920. The first part of the chapter provides some historical background in order to set the stage to measure the changes brought about by the war and British occupation. Such background focuses on the history of the Christian Churches, the relationship between the Churches and the Ottoman authorities, the competition with the European Powers for the control of the Holy Places, and the Status Quo and the capitulations which were the most important political features of Christian Jerusalem until 1914. The second part of the Chapter focuses on the war period and of the creation of the Christian-Muslim associations which united the Arab population of the city and were the expression more of the followers than of the religious institutions. This case clearly marked the renegotiation of local alliances between the different religious groups of Jerusalem as a consequence of the war and the British occupation of the city. The case study of the Custody of the Holy Land concludes the chapter detailing developments which affected this institution in the aftermath of the war, particularly in 1918 when the Custody re-built its influence

both in the city and on the international stage. This case study aims to highlight the effects of the war on the microcosm of this strong and influential Christian institution suggesting to use this example as a pattern for the study of other Christian institutions in the city.




Illustration 6: Holy Sepulchre¹

4.1 The Christian Churches of Jerusalem in history

In 1914 the Christian Churches of Jerusalem were an integral part of the social, political and religious landscape of the city. However since the very beginning of the Christian era, Christianity was divided. In the fourth century the Roman Emperor Constantine revolutionised the history of the Christian church. With the edict of 313, he gave legal recognition to the faith, moved the imperial capital from Rome to Byzantium.² Constantine also called for the first Ecumenical Council of 325 held at Nicea that endeavoured to respond to the threat of heresy and divisions. The Council discussed the nature of Jesus in relation to God and produced the Nicene Creed, a statement of belief agreed by all participants. The Council was unable to prevent the schism within the Church

¹ Copyright The Matson Photo Service, Jerusalem.

² T. Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, (London: Penguin Books, 1963), 18-19; Colbi, *Christianity*, 16.

which soon after became divided into a number of denominations.³ As Christianity was declared legal, contest for the control of the Holy Places began. Because Jerusalem was the place where Jesus lived and died, a special status was granted to the city by the first Christian communities as the city was the seat of the first Christian Church headed by St. James.⁴

In 451 at the council held at Chalcedon a Christological dogma was approved, affirming that Christ possess two natures, divine and human. Alexandrian, Syriac, Armenian and other churches did not accept this dogma, and proclaimed only one nature (monophysitism), the divine one. Some churches, like the Coptic, the Syrian and the Armenian, eventually, adhered to a third Christological formula that proclaimed the single nature of the Word of God.⁵ The Council of Chalcedon recognised also five major Episcopal Sees as having a priority status and among these was Jerusalem.

Possibly, the greatest schism in Christian history took place in 1054, when the Church of Constantinople split from the Church of Rome: the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church were born. Since the schism of 1054 the history of the Catholic Church in Jerusalem was separated from that of the Greek Orthodox, especially after the establishment of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem by the Crusaders in 1099. The Catholic Church began to implement policies of latinization of the local Church damaging the Eastern (Greek speaking) Churches. Most of their clergy were banned from the Holy Sepulchre and from other places and the Greek Patriarchs of Jerusalem were exiled to Cyprus in 1291

³ L. Kenneth Scott, *A History of Christianity*, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954), 153-157.

⁴ C. Wardi, "The Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem," *Journal of the Middle East Society* 1, no. 3-4, (Autumn 1947): 5.

⁵ A. Pacini, "Glossary," in *Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East*, ed. A. Pacini, 348 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

after Acre was lost to the Muslim armies.⁶ It seems that the local population, Greek as well as Latin, accepted the authority of the new Patriarchate.⁷

When Salah al-Din entered Jerusalem in 1187, the Latin Patriarch left while the Christian Orthodox population was allowed to stay and eventually the Orthodox Patriarch moved back to the city.⁸ The Latin Patriarchate moved to Ptolemais (St. John of Acre) until 1291 when the Crusaders were expelled from the city by the Mamluks.⁹ In this period the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem became very close to Constantinople and to the Byzantine tradition. When the city fell in the hands of the Ottoman Turks in 1453 the Patriarchate of Jerusalem began to suffer and became destitute. As the Mamluk government was no longer able to rule Palestine the area was occupied by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I 1517.

After the Latin Patriarchate had moved, first to Cyprus and then to Rome in 1374, it was only with the Franciscans that the Catholics recovered a foothold in Jerusalem. Although the history of the Custody of the Holy Land will be discussed in more detail below; it is important to underline that it was the visit of Saint Francis of Assisi in 1219 to Jerusalem that slowly re-opened the doors of the city to the Latins. With the Bulls "Gratias Agimus" and "Nuper Charissimae", Pope Clement VI in 1342 granted the Franciscans the guardianship of the Holy Places. The Franciscan institution became known as the "Custody of the Holy Land" which was lead by a Custodian called "Custos."¹⁰

⁶ Colbi, *Christianity*, 39.

⁷ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, 59.

⁸ S. Khoury and N. Khoury, eds., *A Survey of the History of the Orthodox Church of Jerusalem*, 1st ed. 1924, (Amman: Feras Printing Press, 2002), 47-48; Colbi, *Christianity*, 48; Wardi, "The Latin Patriarchate," 6.

⁹ Wardi, "The Latin Patriarchate," 6.

¹⁰ Colbi, *Christianity*, 62.

Jerusalem was also the seat of the Armenian Patriarchate whose history goes back to the very beginning of Christianity as in fact Armenia declared Christianity as the state religion in 301 and Armenian presence in Jerusalem date to same period. In the nineteenth century the Armenian Apostolic Church (which was headed by a Patriarch) was, despite its small size, on par with the Greek Orthodox and Latins as custodian of the Holy Places in virtue of its ancient tradition in the city.¹¹ Armenians have lived in the city since the fourth century when pilgrims from Armenia flocked to Jerusalem to venerate the sacred sites. Their long settlement in Jerusalem is reflected in the presence of an Armenian quarter in the city.¹²

By 1912 the 15,000 Christian who lived in Jerusalem belonged to the following denominations: Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Greek Catholic, Armenian, Copt, Ethiopian, Syrian, Anglican and Protestant.¹³ The size of the city's Christian communities did not determine their political and religious influence. Rather, it was the degree of control exercised by their clergy and the European Powers over the Holy Places which determined their importance. The Copts for instance were a very small group but held the right to hold hanging lamps in the Holy Sepulchre (at least from the sixteenth century), the possession of a small chapel behind the aedicule from the thirteenth century and the right to organise a procession on Good Friday in the church; all this gave

¹¹ Ibid, 101; H. Hagopian, "The Armenians of Jerusalem and the Armenian Quarter," in *Christians in the Holy Land*, eds. M. Prior and W. Taylor, 115 (London: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1994); A. Sanjian, "The Armenian Church and Community of Jerusalem," in *The Christian Communities of Jerusalem*, ed. A. O'Mahony, 57 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003).

¹² Hagopian, "The Armenians of Jerusalem," 116; Hintlian, *History of the Armenians*, 1.

¹³ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 193.

them a status never achieved by the larger Anglican community, which until this day does not enjoy such rights.¹⁴

Since 1187 when Salah al-Din re-conquered the city, Christians and Jews were granted the status of *dhimmi*, protected people as people of the book, *ahl al-kitab*. Islam established the legal superiority of Muslims over *dhimmi* but granted privileges of protection over non-Muslim subjects.¹⁵ As long as Christians accepted Muslim rule, they were allowed to practise their religion and to control matters regulating personal status. Christians were limited in their expressions of religiosity in the public arena. Restrictions were imposed on the display of Christian symbols, like the Cross, and very strict laws regulated the construction and restoration of churches. Christians were also excluded from military service, they were not allowed to carry weapons, and had to pay a special tax. These limitations set their legal and social inferiority in Jerusalem as well as across the Dar al-Islam.¹⁶

When in 1517 Selim I conquered Jerusalem, Christians remained second class subjects, but their condition improved considerably. The Ottomans consolidated their status of *dhimmi* through the establishment of the *millet* system, a semi independent religious organisation for *ahl al-kitab* communities, which granted legal recognition to these particular religious communities throughout the empire.¹⁷ In the beginning only four *millets* were recognized: the Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish. The Catholics were nominally part of the Greek

¹⁴ S.P. Colbi, *Christianity in the Holy Land*, (Tel Aviv: Am Hassefer, 1969), 105-106; O.F.A. Meinardus, *The Copts in Jerusalem*, (Cairo: Costa Tsoumas & Co., 1960), 70-72.

¹⁵ See D. Chevallier, "Non-Muslim Communities in Arab Cities," in *Christian and Jews in Ottoman Empire*, eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, vol. 2, 159 (London: Holmes & Meier, 1982).

¹⁶ Pacini, *Christian Communities*, 3.

¹⁷ For a debate on the definition of *Millet* see R.H. Davison, "The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire," in *Christian and Jews in Ottoman Empire*, eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, vol. 2, 319-337 (London: Holmes & Meier, 1982).

Orthodox *millet*. Rapidly the Christian *millets* increased in number due to the pressure of the religious authorities and of the various European countries.¹⁸ Each community was responsible for the allocation and collection of taxes, for the educational system and for religious matters. The *millet* organisation applied only to Ottoman subject as foreigners were under the jurisdiction of the capitulations from the sixteenth century.¹⁹ The *millet* system lasted until the end of the Ottoman rule, although it witnessed considerable transformation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a result of the Tanzimat reforms, CUP rule and the Balkan Wars.²⁰

The Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholics indeed represented the largest and more powerful Christian communities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Armenian Church grew in importance during the war as a result of the fierce conflict between Ottomans and Armenians which ended with massacres and forced deportation of Armenians throughout the Empire including to Jerusalem. The following sections will highlight the relations between the Patriarchs and the Ottoman administration on the one hand and between the Churches and their European protectors on the other. It also focuses on the competition over the control of the Holy Places and the influence of the clergy over the urban population.

¹⁸ Pacini, *Christian Communities*, 5.

¹⁹ A. O'Mahony, "Church, State and the Christian Communities and the Holy Places of Palestine," in *Christian in the Holy Land*, eds. M. Prior and W. Taylor, 15 (London: World of Islam Festival, 1994).

²⁰ McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks*, 345.

4.1.1 Patriarchates between the Ottomans and the European Powers

The new Ottoman rulers did not alter the historic relation between the Orthodox Patriarchate and Istanbul and the former became closely linked to the Ottoman administration.²¹ At the beginning of Ottoman rule the authorities of Jerusalem supported the Orthodox Church against the Latins who were identified with the European powers. In the seventeenth century the Ottoman Sultans also restored some possessions and rights to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate which had been given to the Catholics by local authorities.²² In 1605 Sultan Ahmet I issued a *firman* giving the Greek Orthodox the control of the northern part of the Calvary in the Holy Sepulchre and another *firman* of 1637 issued by Sultan Murad IV gave the Orthodox the possession of the Stone of Unction and of the whole Calvary.²³ At the same time, however, the residence of the Patriarch was moved from Jerusalem to Istanbul consolidating the tight links between the Patriarchate and the Ottoman state.²⁴ The appointment of the Patriarch of Jerusalem was decided by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople; the latter was dependent on the Ottomans.

The Ottoman administration tended to play the Orthodox and Catholic Churches one against the other. It was like a pendulum swinging according to the interests of the Ottomans and also according to the pressure of the European powers.²⁵ Since the Ottoman occupation of Jerusalem the Catholics looked for support from Venice, Genoa, Austria and eventually from France which emerged

²¹ Roussos, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate," 38-39. The Orthodox Church supported the Ottoman authorities thus making a sudden transition from Byzantine to Ottoman rule of Istanbul.

²² Ibid, 39.

²³ Colbi, *Christianity*, 68.

²⁴ Roussos, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate," 39.

²⁵ See the alternate events that affected the Orthodox and Catholic communities in Colbi, *Christianity*, 65-77.

to be the protector of Catholic interests in the sixteenth century, following the stipulation of capitulations.²⁶ For much of its long history the Greek Orthodox Church was not under the influence of the European powers, but from the early eighteenth century Russia strove to become the protector of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Sultan.²⁷

After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca which was signed in July 1774 and marked the end of the Russo-Turkish war (1768-1774), Russia accomplished its goal. In 1845 a Russian protégé, Cyril, was elected Patriarch of Jerusalem an event which sealed the entry of Russia in the religious politics of Jerusalem. This coincided with the return of Jerusalem on the European stage: in 1847 Pope Pious IX re-established the Latin Patriarchate in the city while the first Protestant missions started to operate in Palestine. Following these events the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, resident in Istanbul, was forced to move back to Jerusalem in the mid eighteenth century following Russian pressure.²⁸ It was at the end of the nineteenth century that a conflict between the Arab laity and the Greek hierarchy became apparent and eventually exploded violently with the deposition of the Patriarch Cyril in 1872 by intrigues of the Russians that caused the stirring up of the local Orthodox Arab laity.²⁹

The history of the Catholics in Jerusalem was linked to the politics of the European powers much more consistently than in the case of the Orthodox Church. The capitulations, commercial treaties between the European powers and

²⁶ W. Zander, "On the Settlement of Disputes About the Christian Holy Places," *Israel Law Review* 8, (1973): 332.

²⁷ Roussos, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate," 41; Colbi, *Christianity*, 73.

²⁸ Colbi, *Christianity*, 78; Khoury and Khoury, *A Survey*, 121; Roussos, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate," 41.

²⁹ D. Tsimhoni, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem," *Asian and African Studies* 112, no. 1, (March 1978): 78-84; A. Bertram and J.W.A. Young, eds., *The Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), 25-33.

the Ottomans which were first signed in 1536, granted privileges to foreign traders and diplomats but did not cover religious affairs. Yet the European governments took advantage of these treaties in order to intervene in religious issues.³⁰ The capitulations gave the French government the moral duty to intervene and to protect the Latins and particularly the Franciscans from 1740.³¹ Furthermore, from the Ottoman conquest of Palestine in the sixteenth century the question of the control and possession of Holy Places became an international question. The Franciscans, the only Catholic representatives in the city were not only a monastic order, but also a political actor. As Franciscan friars came from various European countries they could appeal to their own governments thus projecting the Custody of the Holy Land and the order onto the international stage.³²

Catholics in Jerusalem competed with the other denominations for the control of the Holy Places. However, unlike the Orthodox Church, they did not experience any substantial intestine struggle in the nineteenth century.³³ While the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem was controlled by the Greek clergy, Ottoman authorities and by Russian diplomats, the Catholic Church was paradoxically freer from any direct interference. In fact, despite the attempts on the part of European governments at controlling the Custody, the Franciscans managed to maintain a good balance. This situation changed in 1847 when Pope Pious IX re-installed in the city the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, who became honorary from the fourteenth century, and named Monsignor Giuseppe Valerga

³⁰ See M. Piccirillo, ed., *La Custodia di Terra Santa e l'Europa*, (Rome: Il Veltro Editrice, 1983).

³¹ B. Collin, "La Francia e la Custodia di Terra Santa," in *La Custodia di Terra Santa*, ed. M. Piccirillo, 74 (Rome: Il Veltro Editrice, 1983).

³² N. Moschopoulos, *La Terre Sainte*, (Athens, 1956), 10; Giovannelli, *La Santa Sede*, 6.

³³ As showed earlier within the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem there was an intestine struggle between the local Arab followers and the Greek hierarchy.

as Patriarch.³⁴ Many voices were raised against this decision as the Franciscans saw the newly appointed Patriarch as a duplication of their activity and as a rival.³⁵ In the mind of the Vatican, the Patriarchate was mainly meant as a political institution by the Vatican, its duties and activities had not been fixed at the time of its re-establishment in order to avoid any clash with the Custody. Catholics were generally not regarded as a local community but mainly as a foreign enclave, despite their use of the Arabic language.³⁶

From the mid nineteenth century until the outbreak of First World War several Catholic institutions established many seminaries, convents, hospices, schools, orphanages and also small factories throughout Palestine in an attempt to establish a stronger control over the Holy Land.³⁷ They were particularly active in promoting pilgrimages which were a great source of income.³⁸ Like all the other Churches, Catholic institutions survived thanks to the contributions coming from European countries and from America. The Custody of the Holy Land through commissariats (local branches) opened throughout the world and was able to collect the money which supported their activities.³⁹ Catholic institutions ran charitable activities for the poor and towards the end of the Ottoman era were the richest in Jerusalem. This situation was to change with the outbreak of the First World War as it will be explained below.

Since the Ottoman conquest of Armenia in the sixteenth century, the relationship between the Armenians and Ottomans were strained. The Ottoman

³⁴ A. Possetto, *Il Patriarcato Latino di Gerusalemme*, (Milan: Crociata, 1938), 25.

³⁵ Colbi, *Christianity*, 94.

³⁶ O'Mahony, "The Christian Communities of Jerusalem," 7.

³⁷ Possetto, *Il Patriarcato Latino*, 562-568; Franciscans, *Custodia di Terra Santa*, (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1951).

³⁸ For the question of pilgrimage see Prior, "Pilgrimage to the Holy Land," 171.

³⁹ Giovannelli, *La Santa Sede*, 6-7.

government forced all the high echelons of the clergy residing in Armenia to be under the control the newly established Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople (Istanbul). The Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem which was established in the fifth century eventually accepted the authority of Istanbul.⁴⁰ The Armenian laity of Jerusalem never exceeded one thousand people under Ottoman rule. Following the clashes between the Ottoman army and the Armenians in east Anatolia at the end of the nineteenth century, their number rose as many Armenian refugees arrived in Palestine and took permanent residence in the Armenian quarter.⁴¹ In Jerusalem, the relationship between Armenians and the Ottoman establishment were relatively peaceful. Both represented a small minority of the population and to the Ottomans as well to the Arabs the Armenians did not represent a major threat. Even in 1915, when the Turkish army came into direct conflict with the Armenians living in north and northeast of Anatolia, it seems that the communities of Jerusalem were not subject to persecution and physical threats.⁴²

⁴⁰ Sanjian, "The Armenian Church," 63.

⁴¹ Ibid, 67; Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 193.

⁴² See Sanjian, "The Armenian Church"; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 119-121; for a survey of the Armenian question see D. Gwynne Dyer, "Turkish 'Falsifiers' and Armenian 'Deceivers'," *Middle Eastern Studies* 12, (January 1976): 99-107.



Illustration 7: Jerusalem and Mount of Olives⁴³

4.2 Features of Christian Jerusalem: Capitulations and Status Quo

The position of Christianity in Jerusalem was defined by the capitulations, which were treaties between the Ottoman Empire and the European countries and the Status Quo, a set of rules which regulated the ownership, control and management of the Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem.

4.2.1 The Capitulations and their abolition

The capitulations were bilateral treaties between sovereign states, but also unilateral concession granted to groups of merchants, which in the Ottoman Empire started to be signed in 1569 with an agreement between the Sultan and

⁴³ Copyright The Matson Photo Service, Jerusalem. Likely beginning of the twentieth century.

the King of France Francis I.⁴⁴ Known in Turkish as *ahdname* or *imtiyazat*, the capitulations had precursors in the early Muslim tradition to the Fatimid and Mamluk governments.⁴⁵ The first capitulations were mainly commercial agreements which allowed French citizens the right of residence and trade in the Ottoman Empire, allowing them to enjoy rights of extra-territorial jurisdiction in the Empire.⁴⁶

After the French signed capitulatory treaties other European countries followed the example. In the sixteenth century the Ottomans granted England and Holland capitulatory rights; later in the eighteenth century capitulations were also granted to Austria, Sweden and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.⁴⁷ Overall the Capitulatory regime first favoured the Ottomans but it became increasingly disadvantageous as it was exploited by the European powers. Originally the capitulations granted the Ottomans an opportunity to share the benefits of world trade, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with Florence, Genoa, Venice, Netherlands, France and England.⁴⁸ The capitulations allowed European countries to maintain consular posts in Ottoman territories but the same was not granted to the Ottomans who started to establish representatives in Europe only at the end of the eighteenth century.⁴⁹ The rise of a stronger Europe from the fifteenth century coincided with the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the capitulations mirrored this situation in the nineteenth century

⁴⁴ Pacini, *Christian Communities*, p. 342; Colbi, *Christianity*, 67; A.H. De Groot, "The Historical Development of the Capitulatory Regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the 15th to the 19th Centuries," *Oriente Moderno* 3, (2003): 596.

⁴⁵ De Groot, "The Historical Development," 577.

⁴⁶ J.B. Angell, "The Turkish Capitulations," *The American Historical Review* 6, no. 2, (January 1901): 256.

⁴⁷ M.H. Van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System*, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 7.

⁴⁸ D. Goffinan, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 187.-188.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 228-229.

when the capitulary regime became the most important instrument of economic and political penetration in the Empire.

In Jerusalem the capitulary regime affected the foreigner communities living in the city, mainly in the religious sphere. From the mid nineteenth century as the Europeans renewed their interest in the Holy Land the British government opened the first consulate in Jerusalem during the rule of Muhammad 'Ali. It was the beginning of the arrival of a considerable number of European and American citizens. They were not simply Christian pilgrims as they planned to settle in the city and to start to work as physicians, teachers and businessmen.⁵⁰ Under the protection of the capitulations and of the foreign consulates, educational and health institutions were built by European entrepreneurs and governments. The capitulations granted Europeans substantial cut in tax and customs duties and extraterritoriality rights.⁵¹

Capitulations were considered by locals as a restrictive measure and an interference of foreigners in several areas. By the late 1914 Jerusalem services like post offices and higher education were in the hands of the Europeans, who promoted their own interests. In the summer 1914 the Ottoman government used the outbreak of the war in Europe to abolish the capitulary system throughout the empire. In September 1914 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to the foreign embassies of Istanbul a note stating that the capitulations were going to be abolished from the 1st of October. In Jerusalem Macid Şevket, the Governor of the city wrote to the foreign consuls informing them of the closure of the foreign

⁵⁰ See Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*.

⁵¹ McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks*, 202-203.

post offices which was tantamount to the abolition of the most visible capitulatory privileges.⁵²

The Imperial order which abolished the capitulations was read to the people of Jerusalem in an official ceremony held in the garden of the municipality. After the Governor read the document, Said al-Husayni, a local member of the Ottoman parliament, delivered a speech on the value of this measure but also invited the crowd to show respect for the foreigners.⁵³ As elsewhere in the empire the abrogation of the capitulations was hailed as the beginning of a new era. Religious orders, foreign clergy and laity had to deal with this new situation without relying on any foreign help.⁵⁴ Among the Christians, panic spread rapidly, as demonstrations against the Europeans started to be staged throughout the city.⁵⁵ During the mobilisation for the war, Ottomans occupied schools and hospitals, which were previously under the protection of the European governments.

4.2.2 "Peace" among Christians: the *Status Quo*, origins and developments

The so called "Status Quo" of the Christian Holy Places was the result of treaties and customary practices which regulated the right of control and access to the Christian places of worship in Jerusalem, and more generally in the Holy Land, between the various Christian Churches. These rights reflected both the divisions between the Churches and the external support granted to them by the

⁵² NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, 22 September 1914, Jerusalem: "With the abolition of the capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, the foreign offices will have to close on the morning of 1 October 1914."

⁵³ ASMAE, Serie Politica P, Busta 498, Conte Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, 20 September 1914, Jerusalem.

⁵⁴ Christian Churches relied on incomes coming from pilgrims and remittances from foreign countries; however Churches also established local enterprises.

⁵⁵ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 63.

European powers.⁵⁶ The Status Quo was progressively settled by the issue of several documents during Mamluk rule and of firmans in the Ottoman times, the last promulgated in 1852 which confirmed the state of affairs existing in 1757. The codification of these agreements into a body of official regulations was only proposed during the drafting of the charter for the British Mandate in Palestine in early 1920 and included as Article 14 which envisaged the appointment of a special commission in order to define the rights and claims on the Holy Places.⁵⁷

As early as 1690 the Latins were granted a superior status in the Holy Sepulchre by a *firman* which confirmed the politics of the switching pendulum as explained earlier.⁵⁸ In 1757 Sultan Osman III promulgated a new firman re-establishing the rights of the Greek Orthodox Church on their possession which they claimed were looted by the Catholics in 1689. This *firman* was carried to Jerusalem by a special functionary with the purpose to enforce it directly.⁵⁹ It clearly re-established the authority of the Orthodox Church and it became the corner stone of the future regulations issued by the Ottoman government on the holy places.⁶⁰ In the mid nineteenth century Ottoman policies aroused much controversy between the Greek Orthodox and Catholic clergy and European Powers tried to intervene.⁶¹ After a thorough investigation Sultan Abdülmecid in

⁵⁶ W. Zander, *Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom*, (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1971), 45.

⁵⁷ For the whole history of the early documents and Ottoman firmans see P. Baldi, *The Question of the Holy Places*, vol. 1, (Rome: Typographia Pontificia, 1919); see also W. Zander, *Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom*.

⁵⁸ Colbi, *Christianity*, 69.

⁵⁹ Moschopoulos, *La Terre Sainte*, 201.

⁶⁰ Colbi, *Christianity*, 71; B. Collin, "Questione e Problema dei Luoghi Santi," in *Custodia di Terra Santa*, eds. Franciscans, 81-86 (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1951).

⁶¹ To this extent see the episode reported by Baldi, *The Question of the Holy Places*, 89-91.

1852 despatched a *firman* to the Governor of Jerusalem, Vizir Hafiz Ahmet Paşa.⁶²

This *firman* established the rights of several Churches in relations to the Holy Places, and it confirmed to a large extent the course of policy advocated in 1757 by Osman III. The question of the Holy Places led to a major European conflict in Crimea between Russia on the one side and Britain and the Ottoman Empire on the other.⁶³ As a result of this conflict, the Status Quo received formal recognition at the Conference of Paris in 1856, later confirmed at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.⁶⁴

When General Allenby entered Jerusalem in December 1917 he confirmed existing provisions in order not to upset the balance between the Christian communities. The text of the proclamation read as follows:

“[...] Since your city is regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of these three religions for many centuries, therefore, do I make it known to you that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer of whatsoever form of the three religions will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faith they are sacred [...]”⁶⁵

The British authorities were fully aware of the complexity and instability of the balance between the Christian Churches of Jerusalem and the international

⁶² The full text of the Firman dated 8 February 1852 is available in: B. Collin, *Pour une Solution des Lieux Saints*, (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1974), 30-32.

⁶³ R. Heacock, “La Palestine dans les Relations Internationales 1798-1917,” in *De Bonaparte à Balfour*, eds. D. Trimbur and R. Aaronsohn, 37-39 (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2001).

⁶⁴ R. Lapidoth, “Gerusalemme: Aspetti Politici e Giuridici,” in *La Questione di Gerusalemme*, ed. P. Pieraccini, 39 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005).

⁶⁵ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Allenby's Report, 11 December 1917.

dimension attached to the issue. As early as 1915 the De Bunsen Committee, as discussed in Chapter One, discussed British policies in the Middle East recommending that the Holy Places should be placed under international control.⁶⁶ The committee suggested separating the question of Palestine from the question of the Holy Places.⁶⁷ Mark Sykes, who had also been member of the De Bunsen Committee, was aware that the Italian and French governments would compete for the control of Catholic institutions. In November 1917 he proposed to keep the city under martial law in order to avoid direct confrontation between French and Italian diplomacy but also to give them direct control over their unmixed institutions. These were Christian institutions with a clear majority of their members belonging to one specific country.⁶⁸ British officials were aware that the Status Quo could become a trap, a net without escape as the granting of rights to a confession was likely to trigger the objection of another Church and of European states.

4.3 Christian Churches facing mobilisation and war

As explained in the previous chapter the process of mobilisation for war began in the early summer 1914 when the Turkish authorities imposed martial law. After the abolition of the capitulations on several occasions the Austrian and German representatives intervened on behalf of the Christians.⁶⁹ As noted by the

⁶⁶ TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, London, 8 April 1915; see also Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East*, 19.

⁶⁷ TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia: "They [the British] desire to repeat that they see no reason why the sacred places of Palestine should not be dealt with as a separate question." 29.

⁶⁸ TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Sykes, 13 November 1917.

⁶⁹ ACTS, *Diario della Guerra*, 1917.

German consul Brode the local Catholics and possibly also other Christian denominations were pro French.⁷⁰

The first Christian groups to be affected by the war were the Anglicans as they were citizens of an enemy power living on Ottoman soil. The Church Missionary Society and the London Jews Society were advised by the Foreign Office to remove their missionaries in September 1914.⁷¹ As a result, the Anglicans were the only Christian residents to abandon the city before it was occupied by British troops in 1917. While Ottoman officials seized Anglican buildings and possessions, members of the Church moved to Egypt. The newly appointed Rev. Canon Rennie MacInnes, who succeeded Blyth as Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem in 1914 also settled in Cairo.⁷² Upon his appointment, Bishop MacInnes began to work to establish a relief fund for the Holy Land.⁷³ Despite being banned from Ottoman territory, the Anglicans maintained contacts in Jerusalem with Arabs converted to Anglicanism and the so-called Hebrew Christians, a group of Christians supporting Jewish immigration to the Holy Land, who supplied vital information to British intelligence.⁷⁴ Although the followers of the Anglican Communion were not a significant number, they provided many services to local communities particularly schools and hospitals. St. George's College, where local children played cricket and football, was

⁷⁰ ISA, RG 67, 419/86, German Consul report, Jaffa 11 December 1914.

⁷¹ LP, Davidson 398, Renwick to Lord Bryce, Jerusalem, 25 September 1914.

⁷² LP, Davidson 396, Archbishop, 28 September 1914.

⁷³ T. Hummel, "Between Eastern and Western Christendom: The Anglican Presence in Jerusalem," in *The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land*, ed. A. O'Mahony, 160 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 160-161.

turned into a military camp leaving Jerusalemite children without a popular playground.⁷⁵

Late in 1914 the Turkish authorities ordered that all religious orders were to abandon their convents and to gather in residences in Jerusalem where it was possible to control them more easily.⁷⁶ The Franciscan Casa Nova and St Saviour Convent hosted members of different religious congregations present in the city. The last Ottoman governor of Jerusalem described in these terms the situation of the Christian institutions in Jerusalem: "At the beginning of the war churches were respected and even sealed up, but later, as Turkish officers took possession of them, robberies of church ornaments, robes etc. began."⁷⁷

The Greek Orthodox Church was particularly affected by the war. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate at the outbreak of the hostilities found itself in financial straits. The pilgrimage, which was its main source of income halted and the Patriarch was forced to borrow increasing sums of money.⁷⁸ During the war the Patriarchate borrowed more than 100,000 French Lira from individuals and institutions including Almiso Zarfudhaki in Alexandria (a Greek Orthodox businessman), the Credit Lyonnaise and the Greek and Russian governments. Russians diplomats were expelled from the city as Russia joined the war against Turkey. They did not return to Jerusalem following the Bolshevik revolution.⁷⁹ In the meantime the Christian Orthodox population, who were mostly Ottoman subjects, had to pay a heavy exemption tax in order to avoid military service.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ I.M. Okkenhaug, *The Quality of Heroic Living*, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 44.

⁷⁶ Giovannelli, *La Santa Sede*, 19.

⁷⁷ TNA: PRO FO371/3388 Clayton to Sykes, 16 January 1918 see also Khoury and Khoury, *A Survey*, 196-198.

⁷⁸ Tsimhoni, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem," 84.

⁷⁹ Roussos, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate", 44.

⁸⁰ LP, Davidson 398, Renwick to Lord Bryce, Jerusalem, 25 September 1914.

The political crisis between the Arabs and the Greek hierarchy intensified during the conflict as attempts made on the part the Arab laity and lower clergy to take control of the Patriarchate were counteracted by the Greek hierarchy.⁸¹ Because of the financial constraints, Patriarch Damianos secretly sold land to the Zionists. The financial question left the Church quite inoperative during the three years of war. Evidence suggests that the Arab laity worked towards the protection of local interests, while the Greek upper hierarchy tried to save ecclesiastical properties from requisition of the Ottoman authorities.⁸² Although Greece remained neutral, Turkish officials began to look suspiciously at the Greeks living in Jerusalem.⁸³

Religious functions were celebrated as usual despite the distress. In April 1915, the Spanish Consul Ballobar witnessed the religious procession of the Holy Fire led by Patriarch Damianos. Ballobar noted that the procession was not as animated as in the past, because of the absence of pilgrims from outside the Empire.⁸⁴ By 1917 the celebrations for the Greek New Year were mainly restricted to Ottoman officials and the high clergy. The laity celebrated with great sobriety given the high prices of essential food stuffs and other goods caused by the general paucity of provisions.⁸⁵ Financial help from Orthodox private donors and associations based in the United States came after repeated appeals from the Patriarchate through the American Consul Dr. Glazebrook.⁸⁶ The worst came in

⁸¹ Tsimhoni, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem," 84-85; Bertram and Anton, *The Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem*, 95-112; Roussos, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem," 44-46.

⁸² TNA: PRO FO 371/4000, Pro Memoria, London, 7 August 1918: "The Greek Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem had found itself in severe financial straits, which were temporarily relieved by means of loans at usurious rates. It is now established that a syndicate of rich Jews have been buying up the bonds of these loans with the object of foreclosing on the termination of the present moratorium, and of thus becoming masters of the property held by the Greek Church for centuries past."

⁸³ Roussos, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem," 44-45.

⁸⁴ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 97 and 176.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 176.

⁸⁶ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 75, Glazebrook to American Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 23 June 1916: "Sometime ago I wired State Department in interest of Greek Patriarchate asking that needs of his

July 1917 when Greece finally joined the war against Turkey and Russia was shaken by the Bolshevik revolution. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem was left completely alone. As an institution which was under the control of the Ottoman authorities when the Ottomans retreated from the city they ordered also the Greek Patriarch to leave and they left the institution under the control of the Greek clergy.⁸⁷ The Latin Patriarch Mons. Camassei shared the fate of his Greek Orthodox counterpart, as he was deported in November 1917. The Latin Patriarch appealed to the German General Von Falkenheyn but the Ottomans were determined to carry out the deportation order. Cemal Paşa himself visited Mons. Camassei and forced him to leave for Nazareth.⁸⁸

Some Christian groups coped quite well during the war. They survived and offered services to their co-religionists and to the local population. Despite not being part of any ecclesiastical establishment the members of the American Colony, who were mainly Protestants, offered their services to the population regardless of the religious affiliation.⁸⁹ The American Colony raised funds from the United States and then worked to alleviate the refugees and the wounded. The American Secretary of State in 1915 instructed the Consul Glazebrook to investigate whether the American Colony was in need of funds as they operated several soup kitchens and fed more than two thousand people every day.⁹⁰ Early in 1917, when it became known that the United States was to join the war against

community be made as public as possible in America. This appeal brought no result and Patriarch is again urging me to call attention of members of Greek Orthodox Church America to dire financial distress of this Patriarchate. I leave to your good judgement best way of effectively bringing to American public this deserving appeal."

⁸⁷ Tsimhoni, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem," 85.

⁸⁸ Possetto, *Il Patriarcato Latino*, 431-432.

⁸⁹ For a survey on the American Colony see: M. Shamir, "'Our Jerusalem': Americans in the Holy Land and Protestant Narratives of National Entitlement," *American Quarterly* 55, no.1, (March 2003): 29-60; H. Dudman and R. Kark, eds., *The American Colony*, (Jerusalem: Carta, 1998).

⁹⁰ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 70, Secretary of State to Glazebrook, Washington D.C., 22 December 1915. B. Vester Spafford, "Jerusalem, My Home," *National Geographic* 126, (December 1964): 838.

Germany, German officials started a campaign against the Americans residing in Jerusalem.

When the United States declared war on Germany in April the soup kitchens ran by the American Colony were closed leaving the poor people to die from starvation and disease.⁹¹ Bertha Vester Spafford and her husband, the leaders of the Colony, met Cemal Paşa, the minister of the Marine and Commander of the fifth army, asking him to allow them to assist the wounded. Until then the American Colony was the only institution which had the funds to continue charitable work. Cemal accepted the offer and left them the Grand New Hotel, inside Jaffa Gate, at their disposal as hospital. Apart from attending to the sick and wounded, members of the American Colony made sure that burial traditions were respected: Jews would not be buried by Muslims nor Catholics by Greek Orthodox.⁹² As soon as the city was occupied by the British army, the Colony sought the support of General Shea and twenty truck loads with food and medical supplies were sent soon after from Egypt to Jerusalem. The American Colony was soon to be involved in the "Syria and Palestine Relief Committee", an Anglican institution founded by the Anglican Bishop MacInnes which was based in Cairo with the purpose to help the reconstruction of Jerusalem after the war. Considering the stringent religious and social character of the American Colony, evidence suggests that the work of the Colony has always been genuinely impartial as they worked towards the wellbeing of the people regardless of religion, nationality and politics, a very peculiar characteristic in Jerusalem.

⁹¹ Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem*, 246.

⁹² *Ibid*, 243-244.

Among the small Christian communities of Jerusalem, was the Ethiopian Church, an ancient institution, dating back to the first centuries of the Christian era, which claimed a small chapel in the church of the Holy Sepulchre at least from 1172.⁹³ During the war the Church was handed over to Turkish officers, and one building was converted into a hospital.⁹⁴ According to a British report written soon after the occupation of the city, the Abyssinian community, both of Catholic and Orthodox rites, were in good conditions, relatively untouched by deportations and disease.⁹⁵

During the war thousands of Armenians were deported from Anatolia to Palestine because of the bloody conflict unfolding in Anatolia between Armenians and the Ottoman army. Some of them reached Palestine in extreme condition of need.⁹⁶ Allegedly, as a result of the friendship between Cemal Paşa and the former Armenian Patriarch Maghakia Ormanian, the Armenian residents of Jerusalem were not forced to leave Jerusalem.⁹⁷ In 1916 when epidemics of typhus and cholera hit the city; it appears that the Armenians living close to the Church of the Holy Archangels suffered particularly.⁹⁸ In the aftermath of the war about 10,000 Armenian refugees arrived in Palestine;⁹⁹ many Armenians survivors were gradually moved to a camp in Port Said.¹⁰⁰ About 4,000 were accommodated in Jerusalem.

⁹³ Colbi, *Christianity*, 107.

⁹⁴ TNA: PRO FO 141/666, British Legation Addis Ababa to Sir Reginal Wingate, Addis Ababa, 31 December 1917.

⁹⁵ TNA: PRO FO 141/666, Arab Bureau to British Legation Addis Ababa, Cairo, 15 January 1918.

⁹⁶ LP, Davidson 397, MacInnes to Archbishop, Jerusalem, 7 May 1918.

⁹⁷ Sanjian, "The Armenian Church," 68.

⁹⁸ J.H. Melkon Rose, *Armenians of Jerusalem: Memories of Life in Palestine*, (London: The Radcliffe Press, 1993), 79.

⁹⁹ Sanjian, "The Armenian Church," 69.

¹⁰⁰ LP, Davidson 397, MacInnes to Archbishop, Jerusalem, 7 May 1918.

In conclusion it is necessary to underline how Christianity was affected during the war and how it reacted to war conditions. All churches experienced distress, lack of provisions, deportation, requisition and other measures. However some of them were able to keep a public profile and others could only just cater for the basic needs of their followers. A good example of how the war affected Christian institutions is provided by the Custody of the Holy Land; traditionally the Custos was required to keep a diary which has proved to be significant in the historical reconstruction of the war conditions in Jerusalem. Later in the chapter the Custody of the Holy Land will be discussed as a case study, thus providing more details on the Christian institutions during the war.

4.4 The odd allies: Arab Christians and Muslims together

The war had a profound ideological impact on Jerusalem's Christian communities. It was during the war that rumours concerning Jewish immigration, which later turned into more consistent news, were received by local Arabs with anxiety. When the Balfour Declaration began to become public knowledge in late 1917, though it was only published in 1920 in Palestine, the attitude of local Arab Christians towards the Jews changed, as they felt threatened by Jewish immigration. Local Christian notables in Jerusalem joined Muslims in political, cultural and literary associations which opposed Jewish immigration.

Muslim and Christian Arabs acknowledged the common threat represented by Zionism. Despite political differences and the division among different Christian denominations protected by European countries the anti-

Zionist struggle became a crucial concern.¹⁰¹ The creation of Muslim-Christian associations was part of the development of the Palestinian national movement, which started to take shape during the last phase of Ottoman domination.¹⁰² It is important to stress that despite the fact that Zionism shaped the national Palestinian movement, the same movement did not emerge solely as a response to Zionism and to Jewish immigration.¹⁰³ Khalidi argues that Palestinian identity was also the outcome of the increasing identification with the new boundaries set in the post First World War period.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, evidence suggests that within months of the British capture of Jerusalem, local Muslim and Christian notables began to organise their response to Zionist activities.¹⁰⁵ One of the main problems of these associations was the political vision of their Muslim members concerning the future of Palestine. Despite the importance of Christianity in the social and religious life of the area, Muslims tended to stress the Islamic character of Palestine. Some local Muslim leaders prompted Palestinian Christians to convert to Islam as they viewed Christianity closely intertwined with European interests in the region and therefore corrupted.¹⁰⁶ Further, the activities of these associations were affected by the rivalries between the great Arab, both Muslim and Christian, families of the city such as the Husayini, the Nashashibi and the Khalidi.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ O'Mahony, "The Christian Communities of Jerusalem," 17-20.

¹⁰² Pappe, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 56-62.

¹⁰³ Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 20.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, 77. According to Ilan Pappe the Christian-Muslim association represented the first ever political party in Palestine; *A History of Modern Palestine*, 80.

¹⁰⁶ A. O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics and Society, c. 1800-1948", in *Palestinian Christians*, ed. A. O'Mahony, 45-53 (London: Melisende, 1999).

¹⁰⁷ J. Gray, *A History of Jerusalem*, (London: Robert Hale, 1969), 297. For the structure of the local Notables see Chapter 2.

This phenomenon was not confined to Jerusalem as many committees including Arab émigrés, both Muslim and Christian, were formed around the world. One of the main purposes of these groups was to lobby the British authorities and, outside Palestine, European governments, the United States and other countries. In Mexico the “Hijos de Palestine”, which included mainly Christians of Palestinian origins, wrote to the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in 1919 asking the Patriarchate what right the Russian Jews had to possess Palestine.¹⁰⁸ Similarly a group of about 4,000 Christian Palestinians living in Bolivia wrote to the Vatican stressing that Palestine should not be ruled by the its Jewish population.¹⁰⁹ Ultimately these associations were not particularly successful in attracting international support but they nonetheless suggest the strength of the feelings aroused around the world by the emerging Palestinian question among émigré communities.

The Muslim-Christian associations which operated in Jerusalem did not succeed in attracting global attention as suggested above. However, their constant lobbying and actions raised the issue of Palestine and Zionism and opened a serious debate among the countries with a stake in Palestine. The first official Muslim-Christian Association was formed in 1918 by the Arabs of Jaffa and Ramallah with the purpose to fight Zionism and Jewish immigration but also to oppose the British argument that Arabs in Palestine were divided along religious lines.¹¹⁰ Some time later similar associations were formed in

¹⁰⁸ ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari, Africa-Asia-Oceania*, Pos. 53, Fasc. 39, Committee “Hijos de Palestina”, to Latin Patriarchate, Mexico, 5 January 1919.

¹⁰⁹ ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari, Africa-Asia-Oceania*, Pos. 53, Fasc. 39, Apostolic See Bolivia to Secretary of State Card. Gasparri, La Paz, 30 November 1918.

¹¹⁰ Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire,” 251.

Jerusalem.¹¹¹ At least six organisations operated in the city. By 1918 the two most important associations were the Arab Club (*al-Nadi al-'Arabi*) and the Literary Club (*al-Muntada al-'Arabi*). By 1920 also other organisations gained relevance, such as the Association of Brotherhood and Chastity (*al-Akh wa al-'Afa*), the Arabic Association of Ladies, the Educational Club and the Arabic Association of Jerusalem. These associations were chaired by notables who were at the head of the emerging national movement. Members of the Nashashibi family for instance, chaired the Literary Club while the al-Husaynis chaired the Arab Club.¹¹²

A Supreme Committee of the Arab Societies in Palestine was established in November 1919 in Haifa as an umbrella organisation to coordinate their activities. Writing to the Government of the United States, first made a statement of support towards the Allies, then they asked for the independence of Palestine, its territorial integrity and the prohibition of Jewish immigration.¹¹³ Despite the diplomatic tone of the letter sent to the American Government, it is clear that these associations were eager to move from diplomacy to action if necessary as suggested by the concluding statement: "We hereby declare that we are irresponsible for any trouble or disorder that may occur in this country as a consequence of the obvious general excitement and dissatisfaction."¹¹⁴ This does not mean necessarily that these associations had little control over the population; on the contrary it suggests that these associations would be able to control people and if necessary they would not stop demonstrations against British and Zionists.

¹¹¹ O'Mahony, "The Christian Communities of Jerusalem," 19.

¹¹² TNA: PRO FO 608/96, J.M. Camp. (Asst. Political Officer), to Chief Administrator O.E.T.A. and Military Governor, Jerusalem, 12 August 1919.

¹¹³ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, Supreme Commission of the Palestine Assemblies to the Government of the United States of America, Haifa, 27 November 1919.

¹¹⁴ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, *Ibid*.

A letter sent from the Literary Club based in Jerusalem to the American representative in the city in August 1919 shows the militancy of these associations as stated by the opening line: "We live as Arabs, We die as Arabs."¹¹⁵

The same associations attempted to put pressure on other governments. In 1919, before the Versailles Peace Conference, the Supreme Committee wrote to the Pope asking him to intercede on behalf of the Palestinian people to save their country from Zionists.¹¹⁶ A statement of the Committee after the Versailles Peace Conference, sent also to the Vatican, can be read as an attempt to provide a political rationale to the disturbances already taking place like the Nebi Musa Riots of April 1920:

"The decision of the Conference of San Remo regarding the Arab countries generally and Palestine specially is to us a sentence of gradual death. We ask you to decide for us a quick death which would spare us all pain [...] The transformation of Palestine into a National Home for the Jews is a source of great troubles and serious disturbances in the land where the prophets lived and where Jesus Christ was born and crucified. Disturbances have already started in several towns, notably in Jerusalem on 4th April 1920. The responsibility of this is yours and not that of Arabs who are defending their rights and doing everything in order to revive their nationality. History shall blame you for your deed. [...]"¹¹⁷

The document mentions Jewish immigration, the Balfour Declaration and the Conference of San Remo, but also brings into the political scene an important religious element. As this letter was addressed to the countries involved in the

¹¹⁵ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, Literary Club to American Representative in Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 20 August, 1919.

¹¹⁶ ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari Asia-Africa-Oceania*, Pos. 53, Fasc. 40, Christian Muslim Association to Vatican, 21 October 1919.

¹¹⁷ ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari Asia-Africa-Oceania*, Pos. 53, Fasc. 40, Arab Committee, Jerusalem, 17 May 1920.

Peace Conference, which was convened to discuss the future asset of the Ottoman Middle East, the petitioners underlined the status of Palestine as the land where Jesus lived and died; thus using Christianity in order to gain support for the emerging Palestinian cause.

While throughout 1919 the Literary Club among other associations continued to urge the Vatican to intervene against Jewish immigration, by early 1920 the tone of their statements changed as a result of the outcomes of the Peace Conference.¹¹⁸ During a meeting held at Nablus, the Supreme Committee of Arab Societies decided to boycott economic Jewish activities and to publicise their decision both in the Arabic press and the British official news in order to oppose Zionist immigration.¹¹⁹ With the fourth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration closing, the Zionist leadership announced a great celebration in Jerusalem as they did in the previous years. The Palestinian Association of Egypt, one of the numerous groups to emerge during the war, sent a circular recommending that the occasion should be treated as a mourning day and all Arab shops should close. This particular occasion turned out to be relatively peaceful as only one Arab was killed in the Jewish quarter of the city.¹²⁰

The impact of these Muslim-Christian associations on urban politics was substantial as they were crucial gatherings which supported the evolution of national sentiment in the formative years of the Arab Palestinian movement. The role of Christian activists however, appears to have been fairly marginal as opposed to the role of their Muslim counterparts. The war changed inter-

¹¹⁸ ASV, *Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari Asia-Africa-Oceania*, Pos. 53, Fasc. 42, Literary Club to Vatican, Jerusalem, 21 September 1919.

¹¹⁹ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 91, Islamic-Christian Conference to American Representative, Nablous, 16 January 1920.

¹²⁰ PC, The Paper of Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 7, Box III, Report 4613/G, Storrs, November 1921.

communal relations between Muslims and Christians which was once of suspicion and at times of open conflict, into a more balanced one. Christians were originally over represented at the establishment of the Muslim Christian Associations, however by late 1920s and more so in the 1930s, Muslim notables gained control of the nationalist movement.¹²¹ These associations were however important in so far as they sanctioned the first alliance between Christians and Muslims against the threat of Zionism. Although these groups increasingly targeted and opposed Zionism as a political movement, inevitably it created a great deal of tension with the Jewish residents. Nevertheless the Muslim Christian Associations made distinctions between local Jewish residents and Zionist immigrants as suggested also by a note of General Money, chief administrator of OETA.¹²² However tension escalated and culminated in episodes of violence, demonstrations and riots, like the Nebi Musa incident of 1920. This episode, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, saw major clashes between Arabs (Muslim and Christian) and Jews and it may be considered a watershed in the history of Jerusalem as it marked the beginning of a latent conflict.¹²³

4.5 The Custody of the Holy Land: a case study of the Christian Churches

Among the Christian institutions of Jerusalem one of the most rooted in the social fabric of the city at the beginning of the twentieth century was the Catholic *Custodia Terrae Sanctae* (Custody of the Holy Land). The Franciscan order was founded during the thirteenth century by St. Francis of Assisi who

¹²¹ O'Mahony, "The Christian Communities of Jerusalem," 20.

¹²² TNA: PRO FO 608/99, Report by General Money, Jerusalem, 31 March 1919.

¹²³ See Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*; Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, Ch. 9.

visited the Holy Land and established relations with its Muslim rulers. In 1217 the General Chapter (the general meeting of the order) established the province of the Holy Land, receiving official status in 1342 by Pope Clement VI.¹²⁴ The original headquarters of the Franciscans in Jerusalem was established in the Cenacle, however after the Ottoman conquest in the sixteenth century the Cenacle was transformed into a mosque and the Franciscans moved their headquarters to the convent of St. Saviour located within the walls in the Christian quarter.¹²⁵ The Custody was led by the *Custos Terrae Sanctae* and was assisted by a council. The Franciscan order always possessed an international character. Although since its establishment the Custos was Italian, membership to the council was based on nationality, with predominance of Spanish and French elements. In the period under discussion the Custody was administered by a Discretory composed of the Custos, one French vicar, one Spanish procurator and six members, one Italian, one French, one Spanish, one German, and after 1921 one British and one Arabic speaking member.¹²⁶ The Custos had religious jurisdiction on the Catholics of Palestine, parts of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The Custos alongside the Greek Orthodox Patriarch and the Armenian Patriarch became responsible for the enforcement of the Status Quo regarding the Holy Places.

After 1914 the seat of Custos was left vacant when Fr Cimino left Jerusalem for Istanbul where he endeavoured successfully to prevent the expulsion of the Franciscan friars from the city in the following year. In the

¹²⁴ G.M. Faccio, "Lettera Circolare" in *Custodia di Terra Santa*, eds. Franciscans, 10-13 (Jeusalem: Fransican Printing Press, 1951).

¹²⁵ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 226.

¹²⁶ Giovannelli, *La Santa Sede*, 3.

meantime the activities of the Custody continued while Fr Cimino then went back to Italy where he became General of the Franciscan order; it was only after the war that a new Custos was appointed.¹²⁷

In the nineteenth century the Franciscans established the Casa Nova, a lodge where they welcomed pilgrims. In 1847 they opened their own printing press, known as the *Stamperia Francescana*, publishing many books about the region as one of their main activities was to act as guides for the pilgrims. Locally the Custody opened and managed some small workshops employing local carpenters, blacksmiths, shoemakers and other workers. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Custody employed some 150 workers belonging to the Arab Catholic families living in the old city.¹²⁸ Franciscans in the nineteenth century established two institutes for orphans, which hosted 150 children both male and female, of different religious background. The Custody, furthermore, managed two professional schools with the purpose of teaching artisan skills to local residents.¹²⁹ The Franciscans also assisted the poor Christian and Muslim families but there is no evidence of any help offered to Jewish residents. They owned five pharmacies where drugs were mainly given for free; they also distributed to the poor food, medicines and clothes on a weekly basis.¹³⁰

The Custody also to manage a complex relationship with the European governments. The balance in the council ruling the Custody was quite fragile as these governments attempted through its members to influence the institution.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 19.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 11.

¹²⁹ G. Incelli, "Le Scuole di Terra Santa," in *Custodia di Terra Santa*, eds. Franciscans, 168-176 (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1951).

¹³⁰ ACTS, *La Custodia di Terra Santa e la Guerra*, March (no year has been specified); Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 226-230; Giovannelli, *La Santa Sede*, 9-12; A. Mombelli, *La Custodia di Terra Santa*, (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1934).

However, it was the nature of the Custody as a trans-national organisation which ensured its existence throughout the centuries. The Custody, as an institution under the Ottoman law, was not allowed to own properties such as convents, schools and other buildings. Only individual friars were allowed to own properties in their name and the choice of who should be entitled to ownership was taken by the Custody according to nationality. The international character of the Custody meant that every decision was subject to international scrutiny, but during the war the Custody was left somewhat to its own devices although the Spanish and Austrian consuls did intervene in its favour. In a report compiled soon after the war by the newly appointed Custos, Fr Fernando Diotallevi, we understand that during the war Spain, donated at least 60,000 Francs to the Custody, whilst the Central Powers, mainly Austria, supported the organisation financially.¹³¹ When the conflict broke out the Ottomans began to seize the buildings and properties of the Custody that were registered in the name of fellow brothers of Allied citizenship.¹³² The Vatican, concerned with the future of the Holy Land, urged the Cardinal Dolci in Istanbul to explain to the Ottoman authorities that an infringement upon property rights was to be considered as an act of defiance against the Vatican State which claimed ownership of these properties contrary to Ottoman provisions.

As it was customary for the Custos of the President of the Custody to keep a diary of events it is possible to study the Custody throughout the war. The diary

¹³¹ ASMA, Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Diotallevi to Cimino, Jerusalem, 6 March 1918.

¹³² As explained earlier the Ottoman Law, in relation to the property of religious estates, permitted only individuals and not institutions to be the owners of real estates. A change took place in 1912 as it was permitted to own a property in the name of an institution rather than in the name of an individual; however ownership was still belonging to the individual and not to the institution. See for instance *Bible Lands* 54, (October 1912), Bishop in Jerusalem Blyth: "Since the Constitution, however, these things have widened considerably, and I am now negotiating the transference of St George's property from my personal holding to that of the Bishop of Jerusalem."

of Fr Eutimio Castellani, the President of the Custody, between 1914 and 1918 is written in the form of chronicle and includes notes kept on a daily basis. Since the Ottoman government had entered the war, the Custody found itself isolated internationally and the main framework of action became Palestine and particularly Jerusalem. The financial situation of the Custody started to worsen as its main sources of income became no longer available. Early in September 1914 the Custody reduced the activities of their workshops dropping the wage of their employees by 15%.¹³³ In November the Turkish authorities ordered religious congregations scattered around Jerusalem to gather in the city. The Franciscans hosted the men in the convent of St Saviour and the women in the Casa Nova located in Jerusalem inside the walls. A few days later the police registered all names of the clergy living in the two houses.¹³⁴ The police visiting the convents became a common event throughout the war, often for the purpose of seizing provisions. For instance, with the winter approaching, the military requisitioned coal from the Custody and their mill which started to work for five days in order to supply the Ottoman troops in Jerusalem.¹³⁵

When Italy joined the war alongside the Allies the situation worsened as the Ottomans looked at the Vatican as an ally of the Italian government.¹³⁶ Although the Ottomans had seized schools, convents and hospitals as part of the process of mobilisation, Cardinal Dolci obtained the permission to reopen the convents in Jerusalem belonging to the Custody. However the order coming from Istanbul was not followed by prompt action on the part of the local authorities in

¹³³ ACTS, *Diario della Guerra*, 1914.

¹³⁴ ACTS, *Diario della Guerra*, November 1914: "3 November. [...] 24 Franciscan nuns, 19 Carmelitan nuns, 20 Benedictine nuns, 17 Franciscan of the tertiary order nuns, 60 orphans and other 12 nuns came to Casa Nova." "7 November 15 White Fathers came to St Saviour."

¹³⁵ ACTS, *Diario di Guerra*, 1915.

¹³⁶ ASV, *Segreteria di Stato-Guerra-111*, Card. Gasparri to Card. Dolci, Rome, 3 September 1915.

Jerusalem and most of the convents remained closed.¹³⁷ The few British missionaries among the Franciscans and the French were ordered to leave since they were subjects of hostile nations.¹³⁸ The Ottoman order concerned only men; however it further suggested that “all nuns, the women who are not nuns and the male children below 18 years of age, who may desire, must also be sent away out of the country.”¹³⁹ Once the undesired members of the Custody left, Turkish troops seized nearly all properties in the form of buildings and supplies and the process of mobilisation in relation to the Custody was over.

In June 1915 an invasion of locusts severely damaged the areas surrounding Jerusalem and also reached the city: all male from 15 to 60 years were ordered to hunt and kill the locusts but the order was not given to the clergy.¹⁴⁰ The summer proved to be hard for the Custody as Italy joined the war against Turkey in late August and the Ottoman authorities ordered that all clerics of Italian nationality, mostly Franciscans, should leave Jerusalem. Thanks to the American and Spanish consuls and to the decisive intervention of the Austrians, they were however allowed to remain.¹⁴¹ To summarise in 1915 the Franciscans living in the city were 72 Italians, 17 Ottoman subjects, 4 Portuguese, 31 Spanish, 13 Germans, 3 Americans, and 5 Dutch.¹⁴²

In 1916 the Custody suffered a tremendous blow. In April the pharmacy of St Saviour was looted and closed down and in June Turkish troops occupied St Saviour and Casa Nova which were converted into a hospital, leaving only ten

¹³⁷ ASV, *Sacra Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari-Africa, Asia, Oceania*, Pos. 13. Fasc. 5, Card. Dolci to Card. Gasparri, Istanbul, 5 April 1915.

¹³⁸ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 22 December 1914.

¹³⁹ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Government of Jerusalem, 20 December 1914.

¹⁴⁰ ACTS, *Diario della Guerra*, June 1915.

¹⁴¹ ACTS, *Diario della Guerra*, 1915.

¹⁴² NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 73, Custody of the Holy Land, 8 November 1915.

rooms in the two convents for the use of friars and nuns.¹⁴³ Despite the great distress, the Custody continued to run a soup kitchen for the Jerusalemites. As the activities of the Custody were reduced drastically, the entries of the diary for 1917 also fell and mainly dealt with the news coming from outside Jerusalem. Understanding that the British army was not far from the city after the evacuation of Jaffa in March 1917 they hoped one day the British would free Jerusalem.

4.5.1 The Custody in aftermath of the war: local and international dimensions

As soon as the city was captured by the British forces in December 1917 the Custody had to deal with Jerusalem's internal situation and to re-establish its connections outside Palestine. One of the most urgent questions was the religious protectorate over Catholicity in the Holy Land that had been for a century granted to France. A few weeks after the British conquest the Franciscan order named Fr Ferdinando Diotallevi as the new Custos. The Vatican Secretary of State, Card. Gasparri, kept the activities of the Custody under strict control, as the Vatican desired to deter the influence of Italy, Spain, France and Great Britain which were attempting to use this institution to gain more influence in Palestine.¹⁴⁴

A British report on the Italian institutions in Jerusalem compiled in early 1918 described the material conditions of the Custody. The British estimated damages for £10,000. The two convents Casa Nova and St Saviour did not suffer

¹⁴³ ACTS, Diario della Guerra, April-June 1916.

¹⁴⁴ Giovannelli, *La Santa Sede*, 4.

any major damage during the occupation but all furniture, table linen and silver as well the cellars were despoiled.¹⁴⁵ According to this report the workshops run by the friars were not entirely destroyed as most of them were closed during the war. Once Fr Diotallevi reached Jerusalem in 1918 he wrote a report for the General of the order Fr Cimino, the former Custos before the war. He stressed once again that all properties had suffered looting but also emphasised that the Franciscans still served one daily meal to the needy.¹⁴⁶ Diotallevi also reported that the Franciscans took care of both Abyssinian and Armenian Catholics.¹⁴⁷

Politically the Custos reported that the Status Quo was maintained and confirmed in its previous terms; furthermore he stated that the voice of the Custody was not as strong as it used to be in the past. As a matter of fact the Latin Patriarch was still in the hands of the retreating Turkish troops while the Vatican was carefully monitoring the development of the events in Palestine.

As soon as the war was over the Custody came to the forefront of international politics including the future of the Holy Places, the question of Zionism, the conflict with the Latin Patriarchate and other issues. Card. Gasparri in Rome genuinely believed that the administration of the Holy Places would be given to the Vatican, in fact he believed that an internationalisation of the city looked almost impossible to achieve. Furthermore he believed that the French protectorate over the Catholics was to expire as Palestine was now in the hands of the British. To this effect the General of the Franciscan order Fr Cimino sent a telegram to the Custos Fr Diotallevi which stated that: "Turkish domination in

¹⁴⁵ TNA: PRO CAB 27/23 Balfour to De Salis reported to Wingate, 23 January 1918.

¹⁴⁶ ASMAE, Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Diotallevi to Cimino, Jerusalem, 6 March 1918.

¹⁴⁷ ASMAE, Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Diotallevi to Cimino, Jerusalem, 6 March 1918.

Palestine having ceased, the ancient French protectorate has ceased also.”¹⁴⁸ The British military and the Foreign Office concerned with public security invited the Custody and the Vatican to postpone the question. The liturgical religious honours (a set of religious privileges granted by the Church to individuals) towards the French were kept alive until 1924 despite the great opposition of the Custody and that of the majority of the non-French-Catholics following the instruction by Card Gasparri.¹⁴⁹ In 1926 France and the Vatican reached an agreement to the effect that liturgical honours throughout the Ottoman territories could be reinstated with the permission of local governments.¹⁵⁰ This effectively marked the end of the centuries old French protection over Catholics in the region and in Jerusalem.

The activities of the Custody have been rarely studied in the local context as the international dimension of this institution has taken centre stage. The diary kept by the Custos Ferdinando Diotalleivi from his appointment in 1918 to 1924 is clear evidence of the predominance of international and diplomatic issues.¹⁵¹ Looking at Diotalleivi’s diary it is possible to see that there is no mention of the local community. The editor of the diary, Daniela Fabrizio has rightly pointed out that relationships with both Catholic and non-Catholic Christian institutions were the two main concerns of the Custos. One last point to underline is the apparent lack of interest on the part of the Custos Diotalleivi concerning the Zionist issue unless it directly involved the Holy Places.¹⁵² It was the Vatican

¹⁴⁸ TNA: PRO CAB 27/23, From G.O.C. to C.I.G.S., Cairo, 25 January 1918.

¹⁴⁹ Giovannelli, *La Santa Sede*, 27.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 36.

¹⁵¹ D. Fabrizio, ed., *Diario di Terra Santa*, (Milan: Edizioni Biblioteca Francescana, 2002).

¹⁵² Ibid, 12-13.

and the Latin Patriarchate that became more involved in the controversies surrounding the Zionist question.

4.6. Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed three main topics in relation to Christian institutions in Jerusalem. This, in order to establish continuities and changes in the political and social roles of the Christian institutions and to show the impact of the war upon these institutions. First, the dual role of the Christian Churches; in the period preceding the war, these institutions were mainly concerned with competition over the control of the Holy Places and with internal issues like conflict between the Arab laity and the Greek hierarchy of the Orthodox Church, but also the internal competition for the control of resources between the Catholic Custody of the Holy Land and the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The outbreak of the war radically changed this particular context as in fact the attention of the various Christian denominations turned to more local issues. Christian institutions and clergy began to focus on the protection of their own clergy and properties, above all on the protection of the local population which was extremely weakened by war conditions.

In the second part of the chapter I argued that the war brought about considerable change for Palestinian Christians. One of the outcomes of the war was, in fact, the emergence of the Muslim-Christian Associations. These groups were the direct response to Zionism and Jewish immigration to Palestine and reshaped the traditional alliances which bound the notables to the residents of Jerusalem. In fact under an emerging Palestinian identity both Muslims and

Christians joined their forces against the new common enemy represented by Zionism. The role played by Christians as national activists was, however, to diminish in later years as Muslim notables became the main promoters of Palestinian nationalism.

The dual role of the Christian institutions, dealing with local and international issues, mentioned above has been investigated in this chapter through the case study of the Custody of The Holy Land. The survey of this institution has given us some hints of the relations between the Franciscans and, in a wider context, of the Christian institutions of Jerusalem, and local Ottoman as well as German authorities during the war. The very study of the Custody of the Holy Land has also shown the dynamics of the shift from wide issues involving international relations to more local ones during the war and the reversal process soon after the end of the war and the establishment of the British military administration, suggesting also the possibility to use this model in the study of other Christian institutions in Jerusalem.

5 Foreigners in Jerusalem

“From Bethlehem to Jerusalem is a journey of about three miles. The whole way is full of vineyards and orchards. The vineyards are like those in Romagna, the vines being low but thick. [...] The inhabitants, I am told, number about four thousand families. [...] Jerusalem, notwithstanding its destruction, still contains four very beautiful, long bazaars, such as I have never before seen, at the foot of Zion. [...] Most of those who come to Jerusalem from foreign countries fall ill, owing to climatic changes and sudden variations of the wind, now cold, now warm. All possible winds blow in Jerusalem to prostrate itself before the Lord.”

(Obadiah Yareh di Bertinoro *circa* 1450)¹

The aim of this chapter is to identify foreigners in Jerusalem and to define their legal and political status and ideological distinctiveness in order to assess their impact upon the socio-political milieu of the city. Foreigners living in Jerusalem may be defined negatively in cultural terms as they did not belong to local groups, they did not speak local idioms, nor did they share the same customs of residents.² However, they were familiar with the environment, since they possessed knowledge of the local milieu, historical knowledge of the territory, and wanted to redefine the image of Palestine in order to include themselves in the same concept.³

The second purpose of this chapter is to discuss and analyse the role played by European and American consuls during the war period in order to assess how the foreign presence changed and how foreign activities unfolded in the specific transitional period. The consuls, it will be shown, proved to be the main channel through which the foreigners of the city attempted to redefine its image and its environment. The consuls helped make the land more accessible

¹ M. Grindea, *The Image of Jerusalem*, (New York: University of Rochester, 1968), 134-136.

² Saunders, *The Concept of the Foreign*, (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2003), 3.

³ Pappe, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 33.

and attractive for visitors facilitating travels and businesses in the Holy Land, they often served the purpose of their own governments and they also became part of the development of eschatological plans of several religious groups. It appears that if the Ottomans ruled the administrative apparatus of the city, it was the foreigner population that managed its ideological machinery as suggested by the import in Jerusalem of the European concept of modernity. Eventually the war acted positively on this process as a catalyst for rapid and radical change. Foreign presence in the city has proved to be a permanent feature, even during the war. It may be argued that foreigners did represent a strong element of continuity in the transitional period.

Foreigners coming from every corner of the world have crowded Jerusalem since time immemorial, however during Islamic rule and partly during Ottoman rule, Jerusalem was almost inaccessible although not at all forgotten in the western world. Only a few pilgrims adventured to the bare hills of the Holy City and it was only after the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt and Muhammad 'Ali's rule (1831-1840) over Syria and Palestine that the city of Jerusalem was suddenly re-opened.⁴ Jerusalem, until the mid nineteenth century, was a destination for pilgrims travelling from Europe as well as from other Muslim lands, seeking to experience the spiritual dimension emanating from the city. However with the establishment of convents, hospitals, schools and new businesses linked to foreign enterprises, Jerusalem was then projected outside its own stage. The British government in 1839 felt that the time was ripe to open a consulate in the city. The doors of Jerusalem were thus opened to the presence of a new type of foreigner: no longer pilgrims but diplomats, scholars and tourists.

⁴ Ibid, 3.

These newcomers had different backgrounds, purposes and ideologies; however all of them aimed to modernise Palestine and Jerusalem according to western values.⁵ Foreigners acted more as agents of westernisation and thus helped the fusion of the West with Palestine.⁶

5.1 Visitors to Jerusalem

Since Jerusalem became more accessible in the nineteenth century as a result of new means of routes and transport with faster steam ships and new railways in the Ottoman Empire, we can distinguish at least three kinds of visitors: tourists, pilgrims and scholars. If tourists and scholars represented a minority of the visitors, it was indeed pilgrims who represented the majority. During the war the influx of visitors obviously ceased but it is of interest to examine them in the previous period in light of the discussion of the policy making adopted by the British military administration from 1917 to 1920 in relation to visitors which will be presented in Chapter 6.

5.1.1 Pilgrims to the Holy City

Pilgrims are a different category from tourists. It is not only a matter of the purpose of the visit but also a matter of the services required. For the most part pilgrims were also tourists, but rarely were tourists pilgrims.⁷ Pilgrimage is strictly linked to the idea of a sacred space discussed in the previous chapter,

⁵ Ibid, 32-33.

⁶ Ibid, 6.

⁷ See some definition in E. Badone and S.R. Roseman, "Approaches to the Anthropology of Pilgrimage and Tourism," in *Intersecting Journeys*, eds. E. Badone and S.R. Roseman, 10 (Chicago: University of Illinois, 2004).

with the journey playing an important role in the process.⁸ Pilgrims to Jerusalem had to sometimes face long travelling distances lasting weeks and months, during which they prepared themselves, through prayer and fasting, for the meeting with the sacred.

The reasons for performing a pilgrimage to Jerusalem were numerous; people looking for a safe seat in the afterlife; people asking for grace and blessing; many were the sick travelling to Jerusalem for cure. Some were just looking to spend the final days of their lives near the sacred space; it was considered a special honour to die and be buried in Jerusalem, the very place of the manifestation of God. Pilgrimage was also about returning home with souvenirs and stories to share.⁹ Pilgrimages were not based on class division; they were taken by both poor as well as rich people.¹⁰ The Austrian and German emperors visited Jerusalem at the end of the nineteenth century also taking the opportunity to go on pilgrimage. Considering the sacred meaning of Jerusalem for Christians, Muslims and Jews, it is not a surprise that the city was a very popular destination. Christian pilgrims, from Europe and United States, represented the majority of the visitors at the turn of the century however both Jews and Muslims held their own pilgrimages too. Jews, from Central and Eastern Europe as well as from America, visited the city during the Passover or other important religious festivities while the most important Muslim religious

⁸ S. Coleman and J. Elsner, eds., *Pilgrimage*, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 6.

⁹ Ibid, 6.

¹⁰ See J. Krammer, "Austrian Pilgrimage to the Holy Land," in *Austrian Presence in the Holy Land in the 19th and early 20th Century*, ed. M. Wrba, 66-80 (Tel Aviv: Austrian Embassy Tel Aviv, 1996).

pilgrimage was the Nebi Musa festival, held at the same time of the Jewish Passover and of the Christian Easter.¹¹

Pilgrims, throughout the late Ottoman period, were mainly Russians. The Russian Orthodox Church believed that Russia as a state was to play an eschatological role in imposing Christian orthodoxy on the world and Jerusalem would be the place for the second coming of Christ.¹² For the Russian Empire, however, Palestine was also a sensitive and a strategic region which could play a crucial role in the weakening of the Ottoman Empire.¹³ The British consul reported in 1910 that out of 33,000 pilgrims visiting the city, 12,000 were Russian subjects. The second nationality was Greek with 3,500 pilgrims, showing the huge gap between the Russian pilgrims and those of other nationalities; in this respect it is worth noting that only 500 French pilgrims visited the city in 1910.¹⁴ The impact of these pilgrims on the city became increasingly apparent; pilgrims affected the urban environment, economics, politics, cultural and social relationships. Pilgrims were, according to the capitulations, under the protection of the consulates representing their own countries. One of the reasons of the power of the foreign consuls in Jerusalem derived from the protection of pilgrims. Pilgrims, most of them of poor origins, brought with them offers gathered before their departure for the pilgrimage. As

¹¹ The Festival of Nebi Musa expressed Muslim reverence for the Prophet Moses; it coincided with the Christian Easter festivities and it consisted of many pilgrimages and marches from and to the burial site of Moses on the road to Jericho from Jerusalem. See T.A. Idinopulos, *Jerusalem Blessed, Jerusalem Cursed*, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1991), 271-272.

¹² D. Hopwood, "The Resurrection of Our Eastern Brethren: Russia and Orthodox Arab Nationalism in Jerusalem", in *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period*, ed. M. Ma'oz, 395 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975).

¹³ Ibid, 395-396.

¹⁴ ISA, RG 123.1, 790/12, H.E. Satow, Report on Consular District Year 1911. See also Y. Ben-Arieh, *Jerusalem in the 19th Century. The New City*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984), 304-305.

this money was destined to the main Churches in the city, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate supported itself mainly through the monies donated by pilgrims.¹⁵

The European powers took care of pilgrimages to the Holy Land. French, Russians, Italians, Austrians as well as other European nationals began to build infrastructures for pilgrims as a response to the needs of these people. Quite openly, however this was also used in order to set foot in Palestine and Jerusalem and influence Ottoman policies. The large presence of pilgrims in Jerusalem and their strategic role led to the establishment of foreign consulates in the city from the mid eighteenth century, which was then followed by the establishment of hospices and guest houses for pilgrims. For instance the establishment of the British Consulate in Jerusalem was a strong objective for a long time of Lord Shaftsbury (a member of the British Parliament and later member of the House of the Lords) at least from the late 1820s following a strong religious revival in Britain which brought up the question of the restoration of the Jews to the Holy Land which will be discussed in Chapter 7.¹⁶ One positive reflection of these policies was that the local population enjoyed most of the services provided.¹⁷ In 1884 the French began to build the Hospice of Notre Dame, an impressive building just outside the walls near Jaffa Road. Notre Dame was by the end of the Ottoman administration, the largest building in the city with more than four hundreds rooms available for pilgrims, moreover, the French did not stop their activity at that; the French St Louis Hospital offered its services both to pilgrims

¹⁵ Tsimhoni, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem," 84; Roussos, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate," 44.

¹⁶ Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, 80-81.

¹⁷ Ibid, 17.

and to the local population.¹⁸ The Franciscans built their Casa Nova hospice in order to host more pilgrims. The Italians through the Italian National Missionary Aid Society began to build a hospital, designed by the famous architect Antonio Barluzzi in the Renaissance style; a square tower built next to the hospital recalling the tower of Palazzo Vecchio in Florence.¹⁹

Russians, considering the large number of pilgrims, built from 1864 an entire area outside the walls close to the Jaffa Road, then known as the Russian Compound, it was managed according to the needs of the pilgrims.²⁰ The Compound was composed of the Russian Consulate, a Cathedral, one hospital, three hospices for pilgrims and other buildings.²¹ Russian pilgrims were allowed to stay in the Russian Compound for two weeks free of charge then they were normally charged with a nominal sum.²² Other foreign governments and foreign private citizens contributed to the development of the facilities for pilgrims. In some cases the reception of pilgrims became a business. Some Jewish and Christian entrepreneurs from Jerusalem began to export religious artefacts, for both Christians and Jews. In the mid 1890s this business reached the value of twenty thousand pounds.²³

¹⁸ Ben-Arieh, *The New City*, 284-285.

¹⁹ Ibid, 197.

²⁰ See D. Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843-1914*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

²¹ Y. Ben-Arieh, "The Growth of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 65, no. 2 (June 1975): 263.

²² Ben-Arieh, *The New City*, 300.

²³ G.G. Gilbar, "The Growing Economic Involvement of Palestine with the West, 1865-1914," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period*, ed. D. Kushner, 202 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).

5.1.2 Tourism in Jerusalem

Tourism at the end of nineteenth century was the new fashion for rich Europeans and Americans willing to spend a lot of money in order to satisfy their spirit of adventure. The famous British travel agent Thomas Cook organised visits to the holy land towards the end of nineteenth century, and the first Baedeker Guide of Palestine and Jerusalem was published in London in 1876.²⁴ Tourism in Jerusalem was to be considered an elite phenomenon as opposed to the pilgrimage which was open to everybody. Among the tourists visiting Jerusalem the famous writer Mark Twain who visited Palestine and the city in 1867. Twain, a member of a group of American travellers crossing the Middle East, cynically depicted Palestine as “monotonous” and “uninviting”.²⁵ As tourists, as well as pilgrims needed services: hotels began to be built by European entrepreneurs and private houses started to be converted into guesthouses. The tour operators hired interpreters and guides from among the local population. In 1898 when the German Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Jerusalem, it was a boom year for tourism as hotels were fully booked for weeks and visitors had to hire tents.²⁶ Except in the case of the visit of the German Kaiser, tourist services did not have a great impact in the amelioration of the city. During the visit the city was thoroughly cleaned and a number of public works were carried out.

In the years preceding the outbreak of the war tourism became a more relevant activity, which began to affect the city in a more substantial way, however it should be noted that tourism was still not a large industry. According

²⁴ For an overview of the tourist guided of Jerusalem see: E. Bosworth, “The Land of Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period as mirrored in Western Guide Books,” *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (Bulletin)* 13, no. 1 (1986):36-44.

²⁵ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 56; Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, 109-110.

²⁶ Ben-Arieh, *The New City*, 388-389.

to a report by the British consul Harold Eustace Satow in 1911 the tourists who visited Jerusalem between June 1908 and May 1909 were 5,595 with an increase to 7,196 in the following year but the number decreased in 1911 to 5,759 as a result of the Balkans Wars and the war against Italy. The consul reported that in 1911 among the tourists that visited Jerusalem there were 1,626 Americans, 957 British and 895 Germans.²⁷ Satow in the same report stated that among the people that travelled through the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway in 1911, there had been 6,700 tourists and 33,500 pilgrims travelling as second class passengers from Jaffa to Jerusalem.²⁸ The Jaffa-Jerusalem railway was the fastest means of transport in order to reach Jerusalem once travellers or goods were disembarked at Jaffa port. The number of tourists compared to the number of pilgrims was merely a fraction. Nevertheless these tourists represented a good source of income, according to the Jewish paper *Ha-Or* the shopkeepers of Jerusalem were waiting for British tourists who were quite generous with their purses.²⁹

On the whole, tourism at the end of the Ottoman period played a small role in the urban modernisation of the city, though it is undeniable that the city itself enjoyed some improvements.³⁰ Although, as explained above, locals were employed in tourist services, mainly in hotels or as guides, at the beginning of the twentieth century tourism was not a major economic activity compared with the olive soap industry or the production of handicrafts which denominated the economic life of the majority of the population.³¹ The growth of the tourist

²⁷ ISA, RG 123.1, 790/12, H.E. Satow, Report on Consular District Year 1911.

²⁸ ISA, RG 123.1, 790/12, H.E. Satow, Report on Consular District Year 1911.

²⁹ Quoted in Ben-Arieh, *The New City*, 389.

³⁰ Ibid, 385-390; Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 47.

³¹ Locals were employed in hotels, restaurants, hospitals, shops and transports: Cook's, *A Guide to Jerusalem and Judea*, (London: Thomas Cook & Son, 1924); E. Reynolds-Ball, *Jerusalem*, (London: A.

industry, however, led to an increasing request of services for tourists and numerous tourist agencies were opened along Jaffa Road.³² The most popular accommodations located along Jaffa Road or just inside the Jaffa Gate were the Grand New Hotel patronized by Cook's Agency, the Jerusalem Hotel and the Hotel Palestine. Souvenirs shop like the Oriental Bazaar, the White Store and Kurt & Eftemios shop were situated near Jaffa Gate.³³ Two British reports of 1900 underline how the population suffered from lack of services while tourists were relatively well catered for.³⁴

As the Ottoman administration did not have enough funds to deal with visitors, the development of the infrastructure for tourism was left to foreign institutions such as consulates which ultimately worked towards the development of their own interests. Europeans established sea routes to Palestine with fast steam ship, invested money in infrastructures, built hotels and organised tours; the local administration was in charge of courses for interpreters and guides since the 1890s.³⁵ Tourism during the war was completely halted. The American consul stated that 500 German tourists arrived in Jerusalem in July and left in August and no new arrivals in the city were recorded.³⁶

& C. Black Ltd, 1924). For a discussion of the local economy before 1914 see Gilbar, "The Growing Economic Involvement," 188-210.

³² Ben-Arieh, *The New City*, 389.

³³ Matson, *Guidebook to Jerusalem*, 17-18.

³⁴ TNA: PRO, FO 195/2084, Dickson to de Bunsen, Jerusalem, 13 November 1900; TNA: PRO, FO 195/2084, Wheeler and Masterman to Dickson, Jerusalem 13 November 1900.

³⁵ Ben-Arieh, *The New City*, 388.

³⁶ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69A, Report on Commerce and Industries of the Jerusalem Consular District, Jerusalem, 15 March 1915.

5.1.3 Scholars and explorers of Jerusalem

With the Napoleonic invasion in 1799 and with Egyptian rule Palestine was brought on the international stage as religious missionaries, explorers, researchers and eventually tourists began to crowd the Holy Land. Research on Palestine and Jerusalem was biblically oriented. The main purpose of the explorer, geographer and archaeologist was to study the Bible using empirical data gathered through surveys of the Holy Land. Although there was some genuine scientific interest, all this activity was meanly geared towards the discovery of evidence in support of the authenticity of the Bible. The first British, German and American explorers of Palestine in the mid nineteenth century were moved by the desire to better understand and analyse the Bible through the study of the Holy Land from a geographical and archaeological point of view.³⁷ Biblical archaeology used the techniques of main stream archaeology but it was intentionally confined to the areas relevant to the Bible stories.³⁸ Although the main focus of these scholars was on the archaeology of the Old Testament, biblical sites relevant to the New Testament were also considered. A Protestant researcher, Edward Robinson, in the 1840s, gave rise to controversy on the authenticity of the site of the Holy Sepulchre: eventually some Protestants and Anglicans began to search for the place where Jesus had been buried outside the walls of the city.³⁹

Different European nations competed for the exploration and study of Palestine in nineteenth century. In 1865 the British government founded the

³⁷ Kark, *American Consuls in the Holy Land*, 29.

³⁸ S.M. Paul and W.G. Dever, eds., *Biblical Archaeology*, (Jerusalem: Keter, 1973), ix.

³⁹ Y. Ben-Arieh, *The Rediscovery of the Holy Land in the Nineteenth Century*, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1979), 133-139.

Palestine Exploration Fund and in 1877 the Germans founded their own German Society for the Exploration of Palestine.⁴⁰ It was only in 1900 that the Americans established the American School of Oriental Research. Dominicans, of French nationality, founded the Ecole Pratique d'Etudes Bibliques, then to be known as Ecole Biblique. Other new societies were formed like the Russian-Orthodox Society of Palestine in 1882, or existent institutions began to devote part of their activity to the exploration and study of the holy land, like the Custody of the Holy Land.⁴¹

The role of these institutions was mainly to support archaeological discovery.⁴² The surveys carried out in the city shed light on its evolution through different historical periods in order to substantiate Biblical stories. The Palestine Exploration Fund investigated the possibility to map Palestine in 1871. By 1876 the survey of the Eastern part of the country was completed while the map of Western Palestine was published in 1877.⁴³ As early as 1870s the British War Office provided funds for this project since the mapping of the Jordan Valley was considered to be of strategic value.⁴⁴ One of the main purposes of the Fund was to uncover Biblical sites.⁴⁵ This mapping activity also became crucial in the process of acquiring land and claiming rights on land, houses and properties by Jews migrating to Palestine and Jerusalem and from mid nineteenth century

⁴⁰ Krammer, "Austrian Pilgrimage," 67.

⁴¹ See Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, 86-106.

⁴² A.L. Tibawi, *British Interest in Palestine 1800-1901*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 185; Ben-Arieh, *The Rediscovery of the Holy Land*, 195. The Founding meeting of the Exploration Fund proclaimed the aims of the Palestine Exploration Fund to be the investigation of the archaeology, geography, geology, and natural history of Palestine.

⁴³ For a history of the Palestine Exploration Fund see: J.J. Moscrop, *Measuring Jerusalem*, (London: Leicester University Press, 2000).

⁴⁴ Ibid, 123.

⁴⁵ Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine*, 184-198.

Jewish organisations and Jewish private citizens began to purchase land in Palestine and in the city despite the legal obstacles placed by Ottoman laws.⁴⁶

The impact of this search for Biblical roots was felt across Europe and America. Reports of discoveries were published and publicised in the press. The image of Jerusalem portrayed was oriental and romantic as the interest was the city of Biblical times, an idealised city. The scholars visiting Jerusalem were imbued with the romance of the archaeology and the adventure of the discovery of the past.⁴⁷ Nonetheless the role played by these associations was crucial in mapping, surveying and retracing the history of the city and in promoting new studies of it.




Illustration 8: The Italian Hospital⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Kark, and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and Its Environs*, 294-297.

⁴⁷ Y. Ben-Arieh, "Jerusalem Travel Literature as Historical Source and Cultural Phenomenon," in *Jerusalem in the Mind of the Western World*, eds. Y. Ben-Arieh and M. Davis, 29 (London: Praeger, 1997).

⁴⁸ ACTS, free Copyright.

5.2 Foreign Consulates in Jerusalem: a background

As a result of the new and great interest in Jerusalem starting with the British, the European powers began to establish their own consulates in Jerusalem. The opening of the consulates was the answer to an increase of activity in the economic, social and religious spheres of the foreign subject in Jerusalem and in the surrounding areas. The British consulate was first established in 1839, in the following two decades another four consulates were opened; the German in 1842, then those of France, Piedmont and Sardinia in 1843, the Austrian in 1849 and the Russian in 1858. The Americans opened their consulate in 1844 but it only fully functioned after 1856.⁴⁹ Consuls derived their authority from the capitulations that granted extraterritorial status to them; freedom of movement, trade and settlement to the consuls and their protégés. Consuls, normally, dealt with all aspects of the personal status of the individuals under their protection. Further, consulates were the seats of under consular courts, which dealt with all civil and criminal cases regarding foreigner subjects. Consuls also presided mixed courts which adjudicated cases involving Ottoman and foreign subjects.⁵⁰

Paramount among the European powers which developed interests in Jerusalem from the mid nineteenth century were Britain, Germany, France and Russia. Britain was looking after its strategic, economic and political interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁵¹ Germany was trying to establish itself on the Ottoman scene as an emerging nation. From the 1840s the Prussian state and

⁴⁹ M. Eliav, "The German and Austrian Consular Archives in Jerusalem as a Source for the History of Palestine and its Population in the Late Ottoman Empire," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Empire*, ed. D. Kushner, 372-373 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).

⁵⁰ Eliav, *Britain in the Holy Land*, 15-16.

⁵¹ See Chapter 2; Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine*, 29-57.

subsequently Germany supported the Ottoman Empire and favoured the settlement of their citizens not only Jews but also Christians in the area.⁵² France through its role as a traditional protector of Catholics in the Holy Land was looking to maintain influence among the local population. The Russian government pursued its protection of the Orthodox Church as it was trying to further weaken the Ottoman Empire after the Crimean War.⁵³ At the turn of the twentieth century the United States was not interested in politics or strategic positions but the American Consulate mainly promoted American economic interests and assisted American travellers, pilgrims and scholars.⁵⁴ After the unification of Italy in the 1860s, Italians expanded their interests in Palestine and Jerusalem in particular, where they tried to rival with the French government for the protection of the Catholics.⁵⁵ Spain also opened a consulate in 1854 with the intention of catering for the different Catholic institutions of the city. The situation was to change with the war. As Spain remained neutral throughout the conflict the Spanish consulate took over the interests of other nations. In 1917, after the German and Austrian troops left the city, the Spanish consul Conde Ballobar found himself as the only diplomat left in Jerusalem as well as the caretaker of the interests of all countries involved in the conflict.

⁵² M. Eliav, "German Interests and the Jewish Community," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Empire*, ed. D. Kushner, 426-427 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).

⁵³ D. Kushner, "The Foreign Relations of the Governors of Jerusalem Toward the End of the Ottoman Period," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Empire*, ed. D. Kushner, 301-311 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).

⁵⁴ Kark, *American Consuls in the Holy Land*, 236.

⁵⁵ S. Minerbi, "Italian Economic Penetration in Palestine 1908-1919," in *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period*, ed. M. Ma'oz, 466-482 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975).

5.2.1 Consulates and the local Ottoman establishment

As representatives of their own government, consuls had to deal with both the Ottoman authorities and the local population. Their most important relationship was with the *Mutasarrif* of Jerusalem. Given the high rotation of Ottoman officials, the consuls were always careful and thorough in the assessment of the officials appointed to the governorship of the *sancak*. The main activity of the governors, in their dealing with the consuls, was attempting to circumvent the capitulations through the enforcement of measures restricting the free movement of foreigners or imposing special taxes on foreign business.⁵⁶ Usually the consuls had the upper hand in updating their capitulatory rights. Only on a few occasions did the governors win their legal cases against the foreign consuls.⁵⁷

One particular case of strong friction between the parties was the Jewish immigration towards Palestine. Most of the foreign consulates favoured Jewish immigration under the umbrella of the capitulations, as in fact these Jewish immigrants were citizens of different European countries. The first to favour Jewish immigration were the British.⁵⁸ Following a Christian religious revival during the 1820s a number of British citizens arrived in Palestine in order to proselytise the Jewish population through the "London Society Promoting Christianity", an association whose primary aim was to convert Jews to Christianity.⁵⁹ It was under the heavy influence of the people involved in this particular movement, like Lord Ashley (Earl of Shaftesbury), that the British

⁵⁶ Kushner, "The Foreign Relations of the Governors of Jerusalem," 312.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 312-313.

⁵⁸ Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine*, 31.

⁵⁹ B. Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, (London: Profile Books, 2001), 52-53.

government started to actively support Jewish immigration towards Palestine.⁶⁰ The Ottomans attempted to counteract Jewish immigration with strict laws that prohibited Jewish immigration and with laws which limited and prohibited land and house purchases on the part of Jews. In October 1913, the local Ottoman authorities in Palestine were ordered by Istanbul to stop the system of issuing Red Papers to the Jews entering Palestine as a receipt for their passports.⁶¹ In fact Jews visiting Palestine were requested to leave their passport with Ottoman authorities in exchange of a Red Paper which granted permission to visit Palestine for a limited period. Despite the attempts of the local authorities, Ottoman governors had often to succumb to consular pressure.⁶² Consuls were in general highly critical of the Ottoman administration and dismissive of local government as voiced by the Italian Consul in 1896: "It is general opinion that the Ottomans will not obtain any efficient result from the [Tanzimat] reforms [...] the new administrative system will upset the population. Likely, the reforms will be delayed."⁶³

It was under the constant pressure of the consuls and foreign citizens that the municipality of Jerusalem worked towards the improvement of services like lighting, cleanliness and public security in the city. The British consul supported municipal efforts improving the lighting of the city but advocated the implementation of the capitulatory regime with regards to the enforcement of

⁶⁰ Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine*, 33-34.

⁶¹ TNA: PRO, FO 195/2452 William Hough to McGregor, Jaffa, 27 October 1913.

⁶² There are many examples available regarding the attempt of the Turkish to stop Jewish immigration in Hyamson, *The British Consulate in Jerusalem* and in Eliav, *Britain in the Holy Land*.

⁶³ Kark, *American Consuls in the Holy Land*, 143; Kushner, "The Foreign Relations of the Governors of Jerusalem," 313. MAE, Ambasciata d'Italia in Turchia, Busta 239, Italian Consul in Jerusalem to the Italian Ambassador in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 26 November 1896.

taxation on real-estates on Ottoman and foreign subjects alike according to the capitulary regime.⁶⁴

Consuls also directed relations between European firms that managed the city's public services and the local authorities.⁶⁵ There was great competition among the consulates in order to win concessions from the Ottoman administration. In early 1914 for instance a large project was granted to a French company to construct a tramway line after strong and fierce competition between a number of European companies. The project was unfortunately halted by the outbreak of the war.⁶⁶ At the same time another French company obtained the concession to fit a system of pipes in order to bring potable water to the city. In all these agreements the municipality of Jerusalem would acquire control of both services and infrastructure after a period of ten or fifteen years.⁶⁷ The municipality was thus trapped in a vicious circle of dependency created by the Capitulary System which through political means had greatly favoured the penetration of foreign capital. In 1906 the governor of Jerusalem Ali Ekrem Bey, realistically wrote to Istanbul that in a country (Palestine) where more than half of the population was foreign, it was impossible in questions relating to the municipality to consider them as though they were not existent.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ TNA: PRO, FO 95/2199, J. Dickson to O'Connor, Jerusalem, 31 July 1905.

⁶⁵ TNA: PRO, FO 368/1139, McGregor to Foreign Office, 29 January 1914; McGregor to Foreign Office, 29 January 1914.

⁶⁶ TNA: PRO, FO 368/1139/6143, McGregor to Foreign Office, Jerusalem, 29 January 1914.

⁶⁷ TNA: PRO, FO 368/1139/6144, McGregor to Foreign Office, Jerusalem, 29 January 1914.

⁶⁸ ISA, RG 83/28, Ekrem Bey to Istanbul, 15 November 1906; also quoted in Kark, *American Consuls in the Holy Land*, 145.

5.3 Foreign activity during the mobilisation process

At the moment of the outbreak of the war in Europe the city of Jerusalem was placed under military administration. It was not clear whether Turkey was to join the war and on which side; therefore once the mobilisation process started, the consuls undertook intensive activity for the protection of their own countries' interests and protégés. Confusion was the main feature in the short time before Turkey joined the war alongside Germany and Austria. The mobilisation process has been briefly already discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to the general conditions of the city in this particular period; in the following section we will see how distinctively the mobilisation process affected the foreign residents.

As soon as martial law was proclaimed in the city at the beginning of November 1914 the foreign consuls informed their own protégés not to interfere with the local military operations. All economic activities were halted affecting both local and foreigner inhabitants. For the few weeks between the proclamation of martial law and the actual declaration of war, Jerusalem was caught in a position of stalemate. By October, Jerusalem was cut off from the world as the foreign post services were closed and there was no mail delivery. The actual order of closure for the foreign post offices was sent by the Governor of Jerusalem to the consuls on 22 September.⁶⁹ Services like electricity and water were reduced and only two hotels and two hospices employed small engines to provide for themselves. Telephones lines, previously owned by foreign companies, went under local Ottoman management, however the new management was not able to provide a proper service as the equipment necessary

⁶⁹ Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem*, 231. NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem 22 September 1914: "with the abolition of the capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, the foreign post offices will have to close on the morning of 1 October 1914."

was stacked in Antwerp.⁷⁰ Eventually under Ottoman management telephone lines never worked properly.⁷¹ Schools managed by foreigners were closed and only Ottoman schools were left opened.

The worst however for the foreigners was still to come; in September 1914 the Ottoman government sent to all foreign embassies in Istanbul a note stating that with effect from 1st October 1914 the capitulations were to be considered unilaterally abrogated. Once the circular reached Jerusalem, the news was welcomed by the Muslim population, whilst among the foreigners and among the Ottoman Christians and Jews panic spread, as they feared actions against them.⁷² The people who were most affected however were the Jews, who had normally lived thanks to the support of the *haluka*.⁷³

Although war was not yet declared, foreign subjects, mainly of the Allied Powers, were advised by their own consulates to leave the city.⁷⁴ At the same time all consuls complained to Ottoman authorities against the abolition of the capitulations. Even Germany and Austria, then allied with Turkey had to accept the abolition of the privileges granted by the capitulations. The German and Austrian consuls, as a sign of protest, handed back to the Ottoman governor the official decree which abolished the capitulations. The American consul Otis Glazebrook undertook a campaign against the abolition of the capitulations supported by the American Ambassador in Istanbul Henry Morgenthau. The ambassador proved to be a strong opponent to the Ottoman decision, arguing that

⁷⁰ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69/A, Deputy Consul to Trade Office, Jerusalem, 4 September 1914.

⁷¹ OA, DH.EUM.MEM. 41/19, Mutasarrif of Jerusalem to Ministry of Interior, November 1913; DH.EUM.MEM. 91/39, Mutasarrif of Jerusalem to Ministry of Interior, 1917.

⁷² Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 63.

⁷³ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 68, Glazebrook to American Embassy Istanbul, Jerusalem 14 September 1914; TNA: PRO, FO 369/332, J. Morgan to Foreign Secretary, Jerusalem, 14 December 1910;

⁷⁴ Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem*, 231.

the capitulations could not be abrogated without the consents of the countries which signed those treaties.⁷⁵ Even after the war, when the British took over, the Americans still complained against the abolition of the capitulations.⁷⁶ Since the Americans were not involved in the outbreak of the European conflict they felt it was unfair to suffer the consequences of the abolition of the capitulatory regime that had granted them considerable commercial presence in the area. The abolition of the capitulations was felt to be a rupture with a plurisecular tradition of foreign privileges in the Ottoman Empire. However, apart from a formal reaction from all consulates, and with the only strong opposition aired by the Americans, the consuls did nothing but acknowledge the Ottomans last full act of sovereignty.⁷⁷ At this stage, the consuls endeavoured to protect some employees of Ottoman citizenship and called to serve the Ottoman army declaring them as their protégés. They also protected their own and their protégés' properties through influence upon the local administrative and the local notables.⁷⁸

5.4 Foreign presence in the city during the war

On 3 November 1914 the British Consulate in Jerusalem received a telegram informing them that Turkey had declared war against the Allies.⁷⁹ The British, French and Russian diplomats and residents began their operations of evacuation. On 30 October the Consul received a coded telegram instructing him

⁷⁵ NARA, RG 59, Department of State 711.673/69, Embassy in Istanbul to Secretary of State, 9 March 1916.

⁷⁶ NARA, RG59, Department of State 711.673/107, Oscar S. Heizer to High Commissioner in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 22 September 1920.

⁷⁷ NARA, RG 59, Department of State 711.673/120, Memorandum, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, March 1919: "Capitulations may be remodelled, (however) Turkey must be made to apply them in their entirety as they stood prior to their attempt to abrogate them."

⁷⁸ For instance the American Consul Glazebrook sent to Cemal Paşa a list of American Citizens and of other nationalities under his protection (120 Americans, 25 Italians, 35 English, 30 Russians, 3 Serbs). NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 70, Glazebrook to Cemal Paşa, Jerusalem, 22 July 1915.

⁷⁹ Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem*, 232.

to burn all ciphers and confidential archives; following these instructions William Hough set a huge fire in his garden and in mid-November left the city.⁸⁰ The French consul George Gueyrand and the director of the Credit Lyonnais Miguel Antonio Guerassimo also left the city alongside William Hough.⁸¹ The American consul Glazebrook took charge of British and French interests in Palestine.⁸² Most of the properties belonging to British and French citizens were seized by Ottoman officials after promptly being evacuated, others, mainly Jewish protégés of the consulates were deported to Damascus and their properties either seized or demolished.⁸³ Furthermore an official order of Cemal Paşa claimed that all enemy subjects would be kept as hostages against the bombardment of open ports.⁸⁴ The same day the British and French diplomats departed, the Latin Patriarch Camassei, Conde de Ballobar and the Italian consul Senni, held a meeting in the residence of the American consul. They signed a document asking the Entente powers not to bombard the Ottoman open ports in exchange for the freedom of prisoners held by the Turks.⁸⁵ Eventually the Turkish authorities deported the prisoners to Syria.

⁸⁰ W. Hough, "History of the British Consulate in Jerusalem," *Journal of the Middle East Society*, no. 1, (October-December 1946): 13-14.

⁸¹ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 64-65.

⁸² Eliav, *Britain in the Holy Land*, 91. See also TNA: PRO, FO 369/776, Hough to Sir Grey, Cairo 21 November 1914. In this report the British consul reports the details of circumstances of his departures from Jerusalem. NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, 23 November 1914: "The archives of the British Consulate had already been moved to this Consulate and their premises completely evacuated. Likewise the few articles belonging to the Belgian Consulate had been placed under my charge. The Serbians have no consulate here." NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Glazebrook to American Embassy Istanbul, Jerusalem, 2 November 1914: "French Consul now requests the Consulate to take charge of French interest stop."

⁸³ NARA, Consular Post Vol. 70, Glazebrook to Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem 3 February 1915: "The Jewish subjects of those (Great Britain, France and Russia) countries were either expelled or had to become Ottoman subjects."; TNA: PRO FO 369/776, W. Hough to E. Gray, Jerusalem, 21 November 1914: "Practically all convents, religious institutions, schools, hospitals etc., under the protection of the Entente Powers were seized by the Military authorities."; ASV, *Segr. Stato Guerra (1914-1918)*, 306, Card. Gasparri to Mons. Marchetti, Vatican City, 26 May 1917.

⁸⁴ TNA: PRO, FO 369/776, Hough to Sir Grey, Cairo, 21 November 1914.

⁸⁵ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 65.

Remaining in the city, apart from the representatives of neutral countries such as Italy, the United States and Spain, were the representatives of Germany and Austria, the allies of the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁶ These consuls had a hard task; they had to deal with Ottoman officials and military authorities, the consuls of neutral countries and to an extent with the local population. Despite being allies, the German and Austrian consuls, Johann Brode and Friedrich Kraus, were cut off from any decision making process while the Turkish officials adopted a more aggressive attitude towards foreign nationals including Germans and Austrians.⁸⁷

5.4.1 Relief, aid and consular politics during the war

One of the main activities of the consuls in Jerusalem during the war was to provide relief and aid to the local population. Despite the censorship, the difficulties in communications and the orders coming from their own countries the consuls continued to play an important political role and they retained a patterned competition among themselves. Under war conditions the distribution of aid and the protection of the civilian population became the main political issue among the consuls. Normally relief arrived from the neutral countries via the port of Jaffa, through sea transports declared safe by both belligerent parts and then managed by the foreign consuls in Jerusalem. Notably, the largest part of the aid delivered, targeted the Jewish communities. The local Muslim community also received provisions, which were managed by a local

⁸⁶ The German consul at the beginning of the conflict was Edmund Schimdt then replaced in 1916 by Johann Wilhelm H. Brode; the Austrian consul was Friedrich Kraus.

⁸⁷ G. Hintlian, "The First World War in Palestine and Msgr. Franz Fellingner," in *Austrian Presence in the Holy Land in the 19th and early 20th Century*, ed. M. Wrba, 180 (Tel Aviv: Austrian Embassy Tel Aviv, 1996).

Commission, composed mainly of local notables.⁸⁸ Although there is no direct evidence suggesting which notables were involved in this commission it is possible to argue that the main families of the al-Husaynis, Khalidis and Nashashibis were involved as in fact a member of each provided representation in the Ottoman parliament.⁸⁹

The main activity of relief fell on the Americans who paid special attention to the Jewish population regardless of whether they supported Zionism or not, besides the ambassador in Istanbul was the leading American Jew Henry Morgenthau.⁹⁰ A cargo organised by two American Jews, Levine and Epstein, landed in Jaffa in May 1915. The proportion of distribution was 55% for the Jews, 26% for the Muslims and 19% for the Christians.⁹¹ It was the Jerusalemite Jews who suffered the most from the war conditions as a result of the restrictive measures adopted by the Ottoman government against the Jews. The Christians, either Ottoman subjects or citizens from other countries were under the legal protection of the neutral countries and also of Germany and Austria.⁹² The Austrian Consul Kraus and the Spanish consul Ballobar petitioned, without success, the Ottoman authorities in October 1915 in order to avoid the occupation of one of the Franciscan convent in the city.⁹³ The Austrian consulate also worked for the relief of the Jewish population of the city, providing them with financial aid and food. In 1917 the Austrian consul Friederich Kraus and

⁸⁸ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem 5 August 1915.

⁸⁹ TNA: PRO, FO 882/14, Arab Bureau Report on Jerusalem, Cairo, 20 December 1916.

⁹⁰ V.D. Lipman, *Americans and the Holy Land through British Eyes*, (London: V.D. Lipman, 1989).

⁹¹ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, Jerusalem, 29 May 1915.

⁹² M. Eliav, "The Austrian Consulate in Jerusalem. Activities and Achievements," *Austrian Presence in the Holy Land in the 19th and early 20th Century*, ed. M. Wrba, 48 (Tel Aviv: Austrian Embassy Tel Aviv, 1996).

⁹³ ACTS, Diario della Guerra, Jerusalem, 11 October 1915.

Heinrich Brode, the newly appointed German consul, prevented the expulsion of the Jewish population from Jaffa ordered by Cemal Paşa.⁹⁴

There were several reasons behind the race for helping the Jews. All the countries represented in Jerusalem had a large numbers of citizens who were Jewish and there was widespread feeling of anti-Semitism in these countries. The powerful myth of Jewish supremacy, the idea that the Jews could influence world politics, was well spread.⁹⁵ Ultimately, the protection of the Jews was a political manoeuvre rather than humanitarian, though religious feelings and a particular theological thought that will be discussed in Chapter 7, also played some role. Zionism was gaining ground in Germany as well in Britain and there was fierce competition between countries in order to grant protection to the Jews. From the perspective of this competition it seems that the Balfour Declaration, issued in 1917, did allow the British government to monopolise the Zionist cause.

The Ottomans, perfectly aware of the rising Zionist activity before the war, tried first to stop Jewish immigration and then to expel them from Jerusalem and Palestine.⁹⁶ In December 1914 neutral countries were ordered to notify the Jews under their protection that they were to leave the country within three days.⁹⁷ As all consuls demonstrated against this measure, it was not implemented.⁹⁸ Throughout the war there were many episodes like the one just described; however, towards the end of the conflict Ottomans became harsher and the job of the consuls became increasingly difficult, they could not longer influence the Ottoman authorities. By the end of March 1917 Cemal Paşa ordered the

⁹⁴ Eliav, "The Austrian Consulate in Jerusalem," 48. See also Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 197.

⁹⁵ M. Levene, "The Balfour Declaration: a Case of Mistaken Identity," *The English Historical Review* 107, no. 422, (January 1992): 76.

⁹⁶ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 16-20.

⁹⁷ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 29 December 1914.

⁹⁸ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Glazebrook to Cemal Paşa, Jerusalem, 30 December 1914.

evacuation of Jaffa; Ballobar complained but he could not change this decision, eventually the refugees were allowed to go to Jerusalem.⁹⁹

To help the relief activity two important organisations were established: the local Muslim Commission and the Central Committee for the Relief of Jews. The first was a local institution, as mentioned earlier, managed by the notables for the purpose of distributing aid and relief to the local Muslim population. It was under the control of the Ottomans but it was able to act quite freely.¹⁰⁰ The Ottoman Governor, who was distrustful of the Arab notables, asked the American consul to verify whether the local Muslim commission was working properly and to make sure that part of the rice and sugar available would go to the Municipal Hospital; the hospital accepted Jews and Christians as well.¹⁰¹ The second institution, mentioned earlier, was an international body, composed of mainly American Jews, established by the Zionists for the purpose of helping all Jews, regardless of their support of Zionism, in Palestine.¹⁰² The consul Glazebrook was asked by the local authorities to send them a list showing the payees and the amount of money sent.¹⁰³

The activity of this particular body was quite complex and loaded with strong political connotations. The Americans, as mentioned earlier played a crucial role. The American Consul in Istanbul Henry Morgenthau, of Jewish origin, was the first to appeal to American Jews after the outbreak of the war, in order to help all Jews living in Palestine. The British agreed to grant free passage to vessels carrying food, medicines and other commodities provided by the

⁹⁹ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 196.

¹⁰⁰ See, NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 5 August. 1915; NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 75, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 23 January 1916.

¹⁰¹ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 5 August 1915.

¹⁰² See Lipman, *Americans and the Holy Land*, 253.

¹⁰³ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 75, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 23 January 1916.

American Jewish Committee. This agreement signed in 1915 was made on the condition that the distribution was undertaken with the supervision of the American Consul without any interference on the part of the Ottoman authorities.¹⁰⁴ The effort to relieve the Jews of Palestine proved to be successful as it was corroborated by the enormous amount of money and other help sent. Reports on activities of this organisation suggest that it succeeded in restoring the lives of Jews, at least for 1915, to a state of normality, particularly in Jerusalem.¹⁰⁵

It was also common, as far as the war condition had allowed it, for private citizens in the United States as well in Germany to send money directly to particular individuals living in Jerusalem. Normally the money was paid to the American Ambassador in Istanbul and then transferred to the Consul in Jerusalem. Then under the instructions of the private citizens who had sent the money, it was paid to the beneficiary.¹⁰⁶ In February 1916 for instance the sum of \$110 was made available to be paid to Gerschan Heyman and Neo Sheorim, two Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem. The money was sent first from Louis Heyman, son of Gerschan living in the United States, to the "Central Committee for the Relief of Jews Suffering throughout the War", then from the Committee to the American Consulate in Jerusalem.¹⁰⁷ The "Central Committee for the Relief of Jews Suffering Throughout the War" was formed in 1914 in the United States

¹⁰⁴ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, American Embassy to Department of State, Istanbul, 22 January 1915.

¹⁰⁵ NARA, State Department Record, 867.40 – 867.4016/125, Roll No. 43, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Istanbul, 10 April 1915: "Letter from Yellin dated Jerusalem March 25 states that present situation of Jews very satisfactory."

¹⁰⁶ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 75, Central Committee for the Relief of Jews to Glazebrook, New York, 10 February 1916. TNA: PRO, FO 371/2480, Foreign Office to French Ambassador, London, 16 December 1914.

¹⁰⁷ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 75, Central Committee for the Relief of Jews to Glazebrook, New York, 10 February 1916.

and it was part of the Joint Distribution Committee alongside the American Jewish Relief Committee and the People's Committee.¹⁰⁸ The Joint Distribution Committee was formed in November 1914, chaired by Felix Warburg (a member of the Warburg banking family of German origins), with the purpose to coordinate the activities of the three relief committees.¹⁰⁹

One final example of American relief is medical aid, mainly targeting the Jewish communities. The American Zionist Organisation supported the creation of a medical unit with a military structure to be attached to the British Expeditionary Force in Palestine in May 1917 before the British occupation of the city.¹¹⁰ British authorities, however, considered the unit of no military value and the unit did not work with the troops. British acknowledged its political importance and furthermore they acknowledged the indirect but powerful American Jewish influence on the events in Palestine through the welfare distribution.¹¹¹

Humanitarian activities, as suggested throughout the previous sections were closely linked to politics. Indeed the relief of the Jewish population was at the centre of a strong political activity in all the countries involved in the war. The Jews of Palestine throughout the war received constant help whilst the Zionist Commission was touring Europe for the purpose of looking for support for the establishment of Jewish colonies in Palestine. Zionist pressure on European governments, eventually, found a careful listener in the British

¹⁰⁸ I.C. Clarke, *American Women and the World War*, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1918), Ch. XXXI.

¹⁰⁹ D. Heddesheimer, "The First Holocaust" (Chicago: Theses and Dissertations Press, 2003), 33; see also M. Engelman, *Fifteen Years of Effort on Behalf of World Jewry*, (New York: Ference Press).

¹¹⁰ TNA: PRO, FO 371/3057, Barclay to Foreign Office, Washington, 30 May 1917.

¹¹¹ TNA: PRO, FO 371/3057, Foreign Office to Spring Rice, London, 24 July 1917. See also Lipman, *Americans and the Holy Land*, 281.

Government and it is arguable, as it will be shown later, that the Zionist lobby played a strong role in the issuance the Balfour Declaration.¹¹²

Consuls, besides relief and aid, also had to deal with questions related to the prisoners, economy and local religious institutions. Consuls were responsible for the fate of prisoners of war as well as local political prisoners.¹¹³ On the eve of the British occupation of Jerusalem, the Spanish consul Ballobar noted his concern in relation to several Jews detained by Ottoman authorities because of their Zionist activities.¹¹⁴ During the war the attempts of foreign economic penetration in Palestine and Jerusalem did not halt. As Europeans were busy with the war, American firms expressed their interest in possible investments with some extraordinary developments. The American Film Company in 1916 asked the American consul Glazebrook to investigate whether it would be possible to invest in the film/theatre business, ignoring that a war was raging in the region. It appears that the war, at least in America, was felt to be very distant and should not interfere with trade and business. This perception changed of course in 1917 when the United States joined the war leaving the Spanish consul, the only foreign representative not involved in the war, holding and protecting the interests of the allied countries.¹¹⁵

Lastly we may look at the very personal issue of consuls during the war. As the conflict broke out, consuls were affected just as the population, by the shortage of money. The American consul was in possession of some gold that was left under the care of the Franciscans since it was almost impossible to use or

¹¹² A detailed discussion of the Balfour Declaration and the reasons for its issue will be discussed throughout chapter 7.

¹¹³ See NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 70, Consular Agent in Jaffa to Glazebrook, Jaffa, 2 July 1915.

¹¹⁴ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 233-235.

¹¹⁵ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 83, Consul Conde Ballobar, Jerusalem, 9 May, 1917.

even to exchange it.¹¹⁶ The Spanish consul himself experienced lack of money towards the end of the war. With great bitterness Ballobar believed that Ottomans were not far to provide political justification for theft and robbery in order to seize the small quantity of food and medicines left.¹¹⁷

5.4.2 Consuls of War: Conde de Ballobar and Otis Glazebrook

Two of the most important political foreign figures in Jerusalem during the war were the Spanish Consul Conde de Ballobar and the American Consul Otis Glazebrook. As mentioned earlier they played a crucial role in the protection of their own interests and the distribution of aid.

Antonio de la Cierva Lewita, later on Conde de Ballobar, was born in Vienna in 1885. His mother was of Jewish origin but converted to the Catholic faith, his father was a Spanish military attaché to the Spanish embassy in the Austrian capital. In 1911 Ballobar entered the Spanish consular service and then he was sent as vice-consul to Cuba. In 1914, when he was less than thirty years old, he was appointed consul to Jerusalem, which he left in 1920, when he first married Rafaela Osorio de Moscoso Duchess of Terranova and secondly served for a short period in Tangier. In 1949 the Conde de Ballobar was named once again consul to Jerusalem where he served until 1952. Ballobar died in Madrid in 1971 aged 86 years.¹¹⁸

During his first stay in Jerusalem, the Conde de Ballobar, while still in his twenties, wrote a diary from September 1914 until the 27 May 1919. This diary

¹¹⁶ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 73, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, Jerusalem 6 August 1915.

¹¹⁷ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 179.

¹¹⁸ All personal information is from the introduction edited by Eduardo Manzano Moreno in Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 25-26.

is an important source for the history of Jerusalem during the war, and furthermore adds depth in order to understand the consul's perceptions, opinions and expectations whilst living in the city. There are three main interesting developments that emerged from his diary: the extremely poor attention paid to the local Arab indigenous population; the shift of focus from international questions to more local ones during the war period; a shift in his personal attitude vis-à-vis his official position, as he became more disillusioned as the war progressed.

Ballobar throughout his diary avoided granting any significant attention to the local population. The first reference to the local population to be found is on a note on 13 February 1915 in relation to the local Jews.¹¹⁹ It took three months from the outbreak of the war for Ballobar to write a note on the locals; a clear reflection of his poor attention to the local inhabitants, at least in the first stages of his consular mission in the city. Later on Ballobar took some interest on the condition of the Turkish army and the development of the Palestinian front. At the same time, however, Ballobar continued to dine with the other foreign officials in the city as well as with the German commanders enjoying until the very end a glass of cognac with them, a sign that the war was very far from his mind.¹²⁰

As mentioned earlier, during the war Ballobar began to shift his focus from international issues to more local ones. Once the communications with his own country and with the embassy in Istanbul began to deteriorate, he could not avoid turning his attention to issues regarding mainly Jerusalem and the

¹¹⁹ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 90.

¹²⁰ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 31.

surrounding areas. Considering that Ballobar did not speak local languages and did not speak English, he turned his attention to the question of the local Christian Churches. At the outbreak of the war he was mainly concerned with the protection of Spanish interests.¹²¹ Afterwards his main activity turned towards the protection of the buildings belonging to the Catholics and the protection of some of the clergy deported by the Turks.¹²² Another major shift in Ballobar's view was towards the local administration. He became very close with Ottoman officials and towards the end of Ottoman rule was able to comment with a degree of knowledge on the Ottoman establishment.¹²³

The last great shift experienced by Ballobar was regarding his personal attitude towards his role. As a young diplomat, when he arrived in Jerusalem, in 1914 on the eve of the outbreak of the war, he was confident that he would play an important role in defending Spanish interests, mainly of a religious nature. War changed many aspects; Ballobar found himself playing a different role, one which it is quite possible he never imagined playing starting with the episodes of November 1914, when Ballobar was charged with the French interests and he became more involved in local politics.¹²⁴

At the very end of the war in Jerusalem, Ballobar played an international key position, as he represented all the Allied and Central powers, besides his own country. Despite this huge nominal power, Ballobar became quite disillusioned.

¹²¹ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 68: "The Spanish monks are very upset and unless a positive answer will come from the ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Marquis de Lema, they will go back to Spain. I sent to all them their passports."

¹²² Ibid, 119-120: "The Porte ordered that the Franciscan convent in Jaffa was to re open, however the governor of Jerusalem is not enforcing it. Djemal Pasha is dictator of first category."

¹²³ See Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 303-304. Ballobar made some comments to Ronald Storrs: "He (Ballobar) tells me the Boches were indifferent to the fate of the city, and drank and laughed till the night before evacuation. Jemal was *sale type* but *bon garcon*, and Enver *aimait beaucoup la boisson*: Falkenhayn and Kress *sympathiques*."

¹²⁴ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 64-65.

He tried hard to make sure his diplomatic mission and its work would be properly rewarded after the war; however the British administration along with the other countries Ballobar represented, simply thanked him with no extra reward.¹²⁵

When Ballobar met the new governor of Jerusalem Ronald Storrs early in 1918, the British official wrote in his diary: "His (Ballobar) diary, judging from other samples with which he occasionally favoured me, is, to my regret, not likely to be published *in extenso* during his lifetime."¹²⁶ Unfortunately for Ballobar this statement turned out to be true as the diary was only published in 1996. Ballobar played a game that was possibly over his abilities; however he coped with the unusual and certainly unexpected situation he was confronted with; it is unfortunate for him that he has not been rewarded by history.

The second consul of war to be discussed is the American consul Otis Allan Glazebrook. He was born in Virginia in 1845; he was educated at the Virginia Military Institute and then at the Virginia Theological Seminary. Glazebrook was deeply religious; he served for seven years in missionary fields in Virginia after the civil war. He was ordained in 1869. Glazebrook was a young civil war veteran who after the conflict founded the Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, an organisation with the purpose to reunite the Southern and Northern part of the country through Christian principles.¹²⁷

From 1914 Glazebrook served in the American Foreign service, as he was a personal friend of the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson. It seems that the President directly appointed Glazebrook to Jerusalem as they

¹²⁵ The British presented to Ballobar a decoration, the C.M.G. as reported by Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 319.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 304.

¹²⁷ Most of the biographical references are from Kark, *American Consuls in the Holy Land*, 333-334.

shared the same strong faith. Glazebrook arrived in Jerusalem in April 1914 and left the city when the United States joined the war in April 1917. Glazebrook returned to Jerusalem in December 1918 and remained until December 1920 when he was assigned to Nice and later on to Monaco; Glazebrook died 26 April 1931 on his way back to the United States.¹²⁸

As Consul, Glazebrook played a crucial role in the city after the outbreak of the war. The Americans were entrusted with the interests of the British and French and later on of other countries represented in Jerusalem. The main activity of Glazebrook in Jerusalem became the distribution of relief aid coming from the United States destined for the Jewish communities; furthermore Glazebrook was ordered to take care of the American Colony.¹²⁹ His job was difficult considering Ottoman scepticism of American help to Jews. Paradoxically at the beginning of the 1917, when it was clear that sooner or later the United States would join the war, Glazebrook's activity was stopped by the Germans, who interrupted relief distribution activity propaganda, whilst the Turks allowed American relief to arrive in Jerusalem, as the same Turks and the local populations enjoyed this relief.¹³⁰

Glazebrook was quite different from his colleague Ballobar. The American consul was less mundane and less interested in the question of the churches in Jerusalem. They indeed cooperated, as shown by Ballobar's notes, although they never became real friends and Glazebrook never crossed the line of acquaintance with his colleague. We have no records of any diary or collection of papers left by Glazebrook, a mirror of his more introspective character. He had

¹²⁸ Ibid, 333-334.

¹²⁹ Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem*, 239.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 242-243.

an extensive correspondence, despite the censorship, with the American Consul in Istanbul Morgenthau and with some American Companies eager to invest in Palestine. Of his relationship with Morgenthau, with the sources available, we understand that there was mutual respect and that Glazebrook was eager to follow the orders asking for intervention in favour of the Jews. This was different from the approach taken by the American Business community, who during the war continued to petition the Consul asking for perspectives of business in his area. Glazebrook, politely but consciously managed to explain a clear misinformed public that Palestine was involved in war and business was closed.¹³¹ Glazebrook never set aside his Christian values in favour of other businesses.

Apart from the different personalities, Glazebrook, as opposed to Ballobar, represented the interests of the United States a country that looked at Palestine and Jerusalem particularly, mainly from a religious point of view as well as a land for future business. The Spanish consul was interested to protect the Christian churches and their properties; he was concerned with the politics of city while Glazebrook cared firstly for inhabitants and then for the American affairs.

5.5. The aftermath of the war 1917-1920

Once British military authority was established in December 1917 all foreign residents, mainly German and Austrian clergy in the city were put under surveillance.¹³² There were only ten Germans in the city as the others had been evacuated earlier. All religious clergymen of Austrian and German citizenship

¹³¹ NARA. Consular Post, Vol. 81, Glazebrook to American Film Company, Jerusalem, 9 December 1916.

¹³² TNA: PRO, FO 371/3061, Mark Sykes, 13 November 1917.

had also left, while German and Austrian Jews were to be recognised as Jews, and therefore treated as such: religious identity, in this particular case, took precedence over the national one.¹³³ The American Colony promptly offered its services to the British military authority, while Conde Ballobar as the only consul in the city until 1919 became a sort of universal consul representing all the countries involved in the conflict.¹³⁴

5.5.1 Consular missions and the British

Allenby, as supreme military authority, had to face pressing political and administrative issues. Italy and France wanted to be represented in Jerusalem in view of future talks regarding the status of Palestine and of the city itself. Apart from Ballobar, who was an anomaly since he also represented British interests, diplomatic or consular missions were not allowed to enter the city though travelling permits had been granted *ad personam*.¹³⁵ The Italian government was quite anxious to send a diplomat to Jerusalem to counterbalance the influence of the French representative Georges Picot. The Italians, aware of the Sykes-Picot agreement, were suspicious that the British would tolerate French activity in the Holy Land. To confirm Italian distrust, Allenby appointed a small French contingent in 1917 to guard the church of the Holy Sepulchre.¹³⁶ Once again the battle over the religious protectorate broke out, however the British, and Allenby

¹³³ TNA: PRO, FO 141/746/3, Lieutenant Deedes's report, Jerusalem, 16 December 1917.

¹³⁴ The history of Jerusalem during the British military rule is discussed thoroughly in chapter 6.

¹³⁵ MAE, Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Custos of Holy Land to Foreign Minister, Cairo, 20 February 1918. TNA: PRO, CAB 27/23, Headquarters Egypt to Foreign Office, Cairo, 25 January 1918. Ballobar was often defined as the universal consul in Jerusalem; the British did not want to interfere with its activities of protection of the foreigner interests, however as they did not allow any official consul in the city when they took over, they informed Ballobar that if he was to leave Jerusalem he may be not allowed to come back in the city.

¹³⁶ Gabellini, *L'Italia e l'Aspetto della Palestina*, 39.

in particular, were not eager to find a lasting solution to this internal conflict while the war was still not over.¹³⁷ The question of the religious protectorate over the Catholics was only part of the quarrel as other interests were at stake, political and economic.¹³⁸ Only in the spring 1919 was the question partly solved, and the Italians were able to re open the consulate. Once the Italian Government confirmed the acceptance of the abolition of the capitulations and to acknowledge the status quo, Italian Consul, Alberto Tuozi, was appointed to Jerusalem.¹³⁹

Also the Americans were, later in 1919, allowed to re open their consulate in Jerusalem. Slowly, consular life in Jerusalem had begun to revive, though with some restrictions.¹⁴⁰ Consular flags could not be exposed, at least up until 1920, and with the confirmation of the abolition of the capitulations, privileges of the foreigners were curtailed. The main work of the consuls was lobbying the British, issuing passports and travel documents to foreigners travelling to Palestine, mainly of Jewish origins and protection to the religious institutions, however on different terms than during Ottoman times. The Italians sought to send a political officer in order to look after the Italian institutions damaged during the war.¹⁴¹

5.6 Conclusion

Overall this Chapter has shown a number of features in relation to foreign presence in the city that were altered by the war in their structure but not in their nature. Foreign activities adapted to the new situation brought by the war but as

¹³⁷ S. Minerbi, *L'Italie et la Palestine*, (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1970), 157.

¹³⁸ The full question cannot be discussed here, however it has been discussed quite thoroughly by Ibid; Gabellini, *L'Italia e l'Aspetto della Palestina*.

¹³⁹ Minerbi, *L'Italie et la Palestine*, 248-249.

¹⁴⁰ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 85, Glazebrook to Secretary of State, Jerusalem, 28 March 1919.

¹⁴¹ Gabellini, *L'Italia e l'Aspetto della Palestina*, 41.

suggested by the study of the various cases presented, did not stop to interact with the local authorities and population in the attempt to shield and promote their own interests. Also, the war did not stop the process of modernisation that indeed was partly channelled through those foreigners living in Jerusalem.

In nineteenth century following the Muhammad and Ibrahim 'Ali conquest of Palestine and Syria, European powers began to show some interest in the region.¹⁴² This interest became apparent with the establishment of consulates, which became political agents who often concealed major political interest behind religious issues. Despite most of the visitors of the city did not possess or promote hidden or secondary purposes in relation to Jerusalem, as shown in this Chapter these foreign travellers became instruments of European powers in their plans regarding Jerusalem and Palestine. This Chapter has also shown how often foreigners shared the same interests with local residents and tended to promote the interests of their own countries. Some of these foreigners were also interested in the redefinition of the image of Palestine in order to include themselves as part of the local milieu. Indeed the Zionist wanted the most with the cultural, linguistic and political reshaping of the country in their own terms, but also Christians wished to change the landscape in order to build a 'New Jerusalem'.

The second part of the chapter discusses in detail the role of foreign consuls in Jerusalem, particularly the American consul Glazebrook and the Spanish consul Conde de Ballobar, in the war period. The investigation of these consuls as well of consular activity of other countries like Italy during the war serves as evidence of the extent to which consuls were mainly political agents in

¹⁴² Y. Shalit, *The European Powers' Plans Regarding Jerusalem Towards the Middle of the 19th Century*, (Berlin: K.S. Verlag, 2004), 8.

promoting the interests of their countries. It underlines the modernising role played by these actors through the net of relations established by consuls with local authorities, institutions and inhabitants. Consuls not only provided relief and aid for the local residents during the war but often tried to impose their own wishes and tastes on several areas from politics to urban planning. In light of this, the two case studies I presented at the end of this chapter aimed not only to be evidence of the consular role in Jerusalem, but I also endeavoured to present two almost neglected figures who proved to be crucial actors in the particular context of Jerusalem during the First World War.

6 British Military Rule 1917-1920 and the case of the Nebi Musa Riots

“Urbs beata Jerusalem dicta pacis visio,
Quae construitur in coelis vivis ex lapidibus”
(7th Century)

6.1 *British Military Rule*

Following the conquest of the city, the British established military rule which lasted until 1 July 1920. From the perspective of the Arab majority the government of the city had passed from Ottoman rule to a new foreigner power. However, the British were not only Christian rulers but had also shown their support for Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine with the issue of the Balfour Declaration. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the main features of the British military in Jerusalem, focussing on the administrative structure in order to observe the main continuities and changes between the Ottoman and British administrations, also to discuss the role of the military in relation to the local elites and the Zionist Commission. This chapter also focuses on the Nebi Musa riots of April 1920 in order to show how the military authorities dealt with the emerging Arab-Jewish conflict and how the riots proved to be the catalyst for the change of the British administration from military to civil. If on one hand the civil administration of the city after 1920 has been studied extensively, the military administration has been reviewed as a transitional period.¹ Military rule did not create a complex structure of government in Jerusalem but was based upon a high degree of concentration of power in the hands of the military governor Ronald Storrs. The military establishment was generally reluctant to

¹ See for instance B. Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*; N. Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000).

engage with the complex net of high politics.² In Jerusalem one of the key characters of the British administration was Ronald Storrs. As we shall see as military governor Storrs ruled the city almost undisturbed between 1917 and 1920.

6.1.1 Military rule: 1917-1920

The actual establishment of military rule in Jerusalem took place the day Allenby entered the city on 11 December 1917. The first military governor of the city was General Bill Borton, who was Postmaster General of Alexandria and had been involved in the Sudan campaign, later serving as governor of Khartoum.³ The military administration of the region was left to Allenby and then to the O.E.T.A. (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration). Eventually a Chief Administrator, who was also in charge of appointing the Military Governors over the five districts into which the country was divided, ruled Palestine in Allenby's name.⁴ Three Chief Administrators held office in this period: Major General Arthur Money, General H.D. Watson and Major General Louis Bols; Allenby's orders were dispatched through General Walter Congreve.⁵ The execution of policy was left to the War Office although it was acting under instructions from the Foreign Office.⁶ The leading principles of the Military Administration were drawn in the *Manual of Military Law*, compiled at

² Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 87.

³ N. Bentwich, *England in Palestine*, (London: Kegan Paul, 1932), 20.

⁴ J.J. McTague, "The British Military Administration in Palestine 1917-1920," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 7, no. 3 (Spring 1978): 57.

⁵ S. Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 27.

⁶ *Ibid*, 27.

the Hague Conference in 1907, which imposed on the occupying army the adherence to the principle of the *status quo ante bellum*.⁷

According to international law the military administration of occupied territories had to preserve the *status quo* in order to avoid the introduction of changes in both procedures and legislation.⁸ For instance, the governor of Jerusalem Ronald Storrs, confirmed previous administrative arrangements and the former mayor of Jerusalem Salim al-Husayn retained his privileges. Yet the Jerusalem municipality was deprived of any real power and the mayor became a figurehead: the Municipal administration was charged with the task of liaising with the local population and the British. Quite significantly the military administration could not radically change the system of taxation.⁹ The military regime set up by Allenby was meant to be provisional and to last only as long as military reasons were prevalent but it eventually lasted two and half years.¹⁰ The length of the military administration mirrored the uncertainty in London regarding the future of the Middle East, and particularly of Palestine.

At the conclusion of the military operations the former Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire were divided into three military administrations. Palestine was part of the O.E.T.A South, ruled by the British alone. Technically the administration was acting under a Chief Administrator as mentioned earlier who received orders from the commander in chief, General Allenby, who was

⁷ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 20; McTague, "The British Military," 56.

⁸ TNA: PRO FO 371/3384, Allenby to War Office, 23 October 1918: "Turkish system of government will be continued and the existing machinery utilised [...]"

⁹ H.C. Luke and E. Keith-Roach (eds), *The Handbook of Palestine and Trans-Jordan*, (London: MacMillan and Co., 1930), 312-315; *Palestine Royal Commission*, London, 1937, 112; Bentwich, *England in Palestine*, 28; TNA: PRO FO 371/3384, Allenby to War Office, 23 October 1918, "Turkish system of government will be continued and the existing machinery utilised [...] Chief Administrators are reminded that the administration is a military and provisional one."

¹⁰ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 18.

responsible for the general laws to enforce in the occupied territories.¹¹ Besides the Chief Administrator, General Gilbert Clayton was appointed Chief Political Officer attached to the Expeditionary Force of Allenby.¹² The Chief Political Officer (C.P.O.) received orders from the Foreign Office and the relationship between the Chief Administrator and the C.P.O. was never clearly defined.¹³ The military government was part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force therefore under the control of the War Office, however it is important to underline once again that it was up to the Foreign Office to draw the major lines of the policy making.¹⁴ The British government in line with the Balfour Declaration, allowed a Zionist Commission to travel to Palestine working as an advisory body to the British authorities whose role and composition will be discussed below.¹⁵

The first task of the military administration was to cope with the general lack of food, medicines and fuel; in other words it had to cater for the needs of the army and of the population. The army re-established the railway connection through the reconstruction of the line between Jaffa and Jerusalem and food was brought from Egypt. Like Borton, Ronald Storrs, governor of Jerusalem from early 1918, had to face the immediate necessity of supplies for the city and decided that the distribution should be placed in the hands of the municipality. The activity was to be supervised by a representative of all three religious

¹¹ *Palestine Royal Commission*, (1937), 112.

¹² According to Ronald Storrs, General Clayton was quite optimistic and to him "no problem seemed insoluble" furthermore Storrs wrote that Clayton was too busy to think about the real administration of Palestine as he (Clayton) "was never in the way and never out of the way". Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 306.

¹³ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 18.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 19.

¹⁵ M.F. Abcarius, *Palestine Through the Fog of Propaganda*, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1946), 59-60.

communities (Muslim, Christian and Jewish) to be at some future stage delegated to a representative of the military governor.¹⁶

Within the boundaries and limitations of the *status quo ante bellum*, the military administration, in order to administer the occupied territories, established departments of health, law, finance and commerce.¹⁷ Health was a priority and the Health Department started to be operative in 1918 with the purpose to fight an outbreak of cholera and typhoid and to deal with widespread diseases like malaria and trachoma.¹⁸ In restoring essential services, the O.E.T.A. was assisted by the American Red Cross, the Hadassah Zionist Organisation of America and the Syria and Palestine Relief Committee established by the Anglican Bishop Rennie MacInnes.¹⁹ Their main purpose was to re-organise the hospitals, the relief work and to improve the sanitation of the city, which in the final stages of Ottoman control was carried out mainly by the American Colony through a soup kitchen and direct help to the inhabitants.²⁰ Also veterinary provisions were made as to eliminate cattle diseases.²¹ The shortage of water and the lack of a proper drainage system at the moment of the occupation however impeded the implementation of full sanitation works needed as it was found also necessary to restrict the water supply.²² Despite this, the Royal Engineers started to pump water to Jerusalem from several reservoirs around the city, the problem of water was never solved efficiently until the 1920s.

¹⁶ TNA: PRO, FO 141/746, Military Administrator's Report, Jerusalem 15 December 1917; TNA: FO 141/688, Clayton to Headquarters, Jerusalem, 22 December 1917.

¹⁷ *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, 1937, 113.

¹⁸ *Annual Report of the Department of Health*, Government of Palestine, 1921, 1-7.

¹⁹ Bentwich, *England in Palestine*, 29.

²⁰ *Annual Report of the Department of Health*, (1921), 1.

²¹ *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, (1937), 113.

²² *Ibid.*

In the legal sphere the British appointed a Senior Judicial Officer, who exercised control over the courts and land registers, eventually also working as legal adviser to the chief administrator.²³ Ottoman criminal and civil law was largely maintained. Although Arabic became the official language of plea in the courts, the business of the courts was carried out in English with simultaneous translation into Arabic and Hebrew.²⁴ A court under the authority of the municipality was also established dealing with minor criminal offences. Religious courts were maintained but they had jurisdiction only in matters regarding personal status such as registration of marriages, birth and deaths, and it also solved disputes which concerned Muslim Waqfs.²⁵ Overall, the military administration preserved the Ottoman system of courts but reduced their number and size in terms of personnel. The only court of appeal in the region was established in Jerusalem, composed of two British officials and five local.²⁶

Former Ottoman State schools were slowly re-opened and the first measure taken was to replace Turkish with Arabic as the medium of instruction. Hebrew was only used in Jewish private schools as in the Jewish educational institution Alliance Israelite Universelle. The military administration in 1917 appointed Major Williams, of the India Civil Service in order to rebuild the educational system, eventually he was replaced by Major Tadman of the Egyptian Ministry of Education in October 1918.²⁷ Non-governmental schools continued to function and they offered religious and technical education. According to a report of the Palestine Zionist Office (the name of the Zionist

²³ *Report on Palestine Administration*, Government of Palestine, London, 1922, 84-85.

²⁴ Luke and Keith-Roach, *The Handbook of Palestine*, 213; Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, 31.

²⁵ Luke and Keith-Roach, *The Handbook of Palestine*, 213-219.

²⁶ TNA: PRO, 141/688, Samuel to Curzon, Jerusalem, 20 November 1920.

²⁷ A.L. Tibawi, *Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine*, (London: Luzac & C., 1956), 23-25.

Commission during the Mandate) at the end of 1919 there were 94 Jewish educational institutions: 32 kindergarten schools, 45 primary schools, 8 secondary schools, 4 business schools, 1 school of music.²⁸ Government schools were mainly attended by Arabs as these classes were taught in Arabic, though also in some Christian schools Arabic was used as medium of education.²⁹ The Zionists established a school system which became a parallel of public education, though were attended only by Jewish students.³⁰

In order to carry out the work of reconstruction of basic infrastructures, funds were needed. According to Ashbee, the Civic Advisor of the Military Administration, the works of reconstruction first to be carried out in Jerusalem were sanitation, health service, engineering and scavenging, it would then be necessary to think about the preservation of the Holy City.³¹ Nevertheless the military administration was not entitled to change the system of taxation and it proved quite difficult to collect revenues to pay for the reconstruction works from a starving population. As noted by Storrs the immediate liabilities of Jerusalem far exceeded the assets.³² The principal source of revenue remained customs duties, house and land tax, tithes, animal tax, fees of court and surplus from the Post Office.³³ The British administration modified the method of collection and abolished the most vexatious and oppressive imposts like the *temettü* (a professional tax imposed mainly on merchants and artisans), a number

²⁸ D. Fabrizio, *La Battaglia delle Scuole in Palestina*, (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2003), 18.

²⁹ J.S. Bentwich, *Education in Israel*, (London: Routledge, 1945), 17-18; N. Nardi, *Education in Palestine*, (Washington DC: Zionist Organization of America, 1945), 22-23.

³⁰ Luke and Keith-Roach, *The Handbook of Palestine*, 240-242.

³¹ C.R. Ashbee, *A Palestine Notebook 1918-1923*, (London: William Heinemann, 1923), 79.

³² Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 308.

³³ Luke and Keith-Roach, *The Handbook of Palestine*, 222-223.

of licensing fees and at last the tax substituting the forced road labour.³⁴ Apart from the budget, the military administration introduced the Egyptian currency as the Turkish Lira lost all its value and it was declared illegal.³⁵ The new currency did not win public confidence as some locals expected the return of the Turks. Later in 1918 the Foreign Office in accordance with the Treasury ordered a removal of the restrictions on the Turkish paper;³⁶ however people were no longer interested in the old currency as the Egyptian paper money slowly gained the confidence of the public. This, to an extent, implied that people had realised the Turks would never come back to Jerusalem and that the British were likely to stay for a while or longer.

The military administration also worked towards the re-establishment of commerce and industry. After six months of British rule, commerce was lively thanks to financial grants by the British military administration to the local entrepreneurs.³⁷ Ronald Storrs in person endeavoured to support the establishment of local industries. The British administration developed a legal and economic framework into which business could expand, however investments mainly belonged to the private sector. In the process of establishing a framework for the commerce and industry, Storrs in 1918 founded the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce but at the same time the military administration prohibited, temporarily, the import of articles like salt, printed

³⁴ Ibid, 222 and 227. See also *Report on Palestine Administration*, (1922), 3; S.J. Shaw, "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 6 (1975): 13: "[...] local roads were constructed by the fief holders and tax farmers, mainly by force labor which they were able to impose on the cultivators living nearby through law and tradition."

³⁵ TNA: PRO, T1/12286, General Routine Order, 18 January 1918.

³⁶ TNA: PRO, T1/12286, Foreign Office to Clayton, London, 7 November 1918.

³⁷ Conde de Ballobar, *Diario*, 252; "The streets are honestly clean and the commerce, almost inexistent during Turkish rule, was livelier and the farmers coming to the city in order to sell their products are helped."

matter, cotton, copper and other materials in order to promote local industries.³⁸ Licences for the import of these goods were eventually issued, after the payment of the necessary fees, by the administration in Jerusalem.³⁹ After the foreign consuls were permitted to return in 1919, their activity as promoter and intermediaries of their own countries' industry restarted. The American consul Glazebrook replied to a request of information from an American firm about the situation of the transport in Jerusalem in 1919. Glazebrook stated that there were no private cars in the city and only a few bicycles, but he forecasted large possibilities in the time to come.⁴⁰ Glazebrook also replied to an American enterprise interested in the cinema business. In this particular case the consul was more pessimistic, he told the American firm that there were three cinemas in 1919 in Jerusalem, but that they could not afford to buy films at the moment.⁴¹ Eventually business and trade were promoted under British rule, which favoured the establishment of local and foreign companies.

The question of the local police was one of great importance as the different religious groups wanted to be represented. The Police force for the Jerusalem region was re-organised and reduced, as in the opinion of the military, it was necessary first to improve the quality of the corp.⁴² During late Ottoman times there were two police systems in Palestine and Syria. In Jerusalem there was a municipal police force composed of trained policemen and regular army troops under the command of Turkish senior officers. The second force was a gendarmerie composed of irregulars called to reinforce the local police force in

³⁸ Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 333.

³⁹ CZA, L3/10/1, O.E.T.A. to Zionist Commission, Jerusalem 5 September 1919.

⁴⁰ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, Glazebrook to The Diamond Chain & Mfg. Co., Jerusalem, 10 May 1919.

⁴¹ NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, Glazebrook to Van Siclen & C., Jerusalem, 8 November 1919.

⁴² *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, (1937), 114.

times of troubles as riots.⁴³ At the moment of the British occupation of the city responsibility for policing fell on the Military Police, however soon after a city police force was re-established and by January 1918 one British and several Arab officers led a total of 340 men engaged in police work.⁴⁴ By July 1920, with the establishment of the civil administration, the Palestine Police Force was born. The force was composed of 18 British officers, 55 Palestinian officers and 1,144 ranks, mainly local Arabs.⁴⁵ Some Indian Muslims were employed in the police force in order to serve in the protection of the Muslim Holy Places. Storrs on the occasion of the Nebi Musa riots, claimed that the local police force was only partially trained and without tradition.⁴⁶ What Storrs was referring to was the fact that local Palestinian officers continued to enforce the so called "Turkish System" of obtaining confession and gathering information based on physical violence.⁴⁷ Zionists requested from the Military Administration more Jewish Police officers for Jerusalem and secondly they also requested that the selection would be in the hands of the Zionist Commission.⁴⁸ The military were quite ambiguous on the subject as they did not want to be involved in political games despite strong pressure from the Zionist Commission.⁴⁹

As shown the military government was firmly involved with local issues, and military officers carefully avoided direct involvement with the Foreign and War Offices on the question of the future of Palestine. With the establishment of

⁴³ E. Horne, *A Job Well Done*, (Essex: The Anchor Press, 1982), 16; G.W., Swanson, "The Ottoman Police," *Journal of Contemporary History* 7, no.1/2, (January-April 1972): 253.

⁴⁴ Horne, *A Job Well Done*, 15.

⁴⁵ Horne, *A Job Well Done*, 35.

⁴⁶ Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 348.

⁴⁷ Horne, *A Job Well Done*, 15.

⁴⁸ CZA, L3/52, Zionist Commission to Military Governorate, Jerusalem 23 February 1920.

⁴⁹ CZA, L3/52, O.E.T.A. to Zionist Commission, Jerusalem 18 June 1919; Zionist Commission report, Jerusalem, 20 August, 1919.

the military administration, the Foreign Office decided to postpone crucial decisions in relation to Palestine and Jerusalem and left to the military the business of local politics.⁵⁰ Borton Pasha, as the first military governor of Jerusalem on Christmas Eve, attended mass at Bethlehem and he found himself involved in a clash between the French and Italian representatives.⁵¹ A few days later Borton resigned as Governor of Jerusalem, overwhelmed by its duties, possibly due to a breakdown in his health but also unable to deal with the arising religious and political issues that had emerged amongst the various communities of Jerusalem. On 28 December 1918 Ronald Storrs was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Governor of Jerusalem.

Ronald Storrs, whose personality will be analysed later, had no military experience as he had been Oriental Secretary to the Residency in Cairo. He was meant to act as a bridge between the military, which disliked or did not understand politics, and the political establishment in London.⁵² Issues like the Zionist Commission, then the Arab-Christian Associations and also the internal questions among the religious groups brought the military to face the inevitable issue of politics.⁵³ The military dealt with local politics as it was charged with the task to enforce the status quo while waiting for the developments of events, but the arrival of the Zionist Commission was regarded as contrary to the principle of the status quo and its work interfered with that of the military

⁵⁰ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 18; Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 87.

⁵¹ Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 297.

⁵² PC, The Papers of Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 10, Box III, Liverpool Post, 10 January 1918: "The Appointment of Mr. Ronald Storrs as Governor of Jerusalem in succession to Borton Pasha is regarded in official circles here as a happy one. Though of only thirty six years of age, Mr. Storrs has had considerable experience of administrative affairs in Egypt, and he has shown himself to be possessed of exceptional ability and of great tact in the handling of native people."

⁵³ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 21.

administration.⁵⁴ According to the Foreign Office the Zionist Commission was to be entrusted to a British officer under General Allenby's order but directly linked to the Foreign Office.⁵⁵ In the Foreign Office's plans the Commission should have represented the Zionist Organisation and it should have acted as an advisory body. The main objectives of the Commission were to form a link between British authorities and Jewish population in Palestine; to coordinate relief work directed towards the Jewish community; to develop Jewish colonies; to assist Jewish organisations; lastly to establish friendly relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities.⁵⁶ Indeed through this project of the Foreign Office it is possible to understand why the military thought of the Zionist Commission as competitive and parallel governmental institution. The military granted, to an extent, the peaceful coexistence of the people in Jerusalem however at the high cost of limiting the freedom of the population as in fact the main concern of the military administration was public security and distribution of basic service, which were dispensed under martial law.⁵⁷ In July 1920, as an outcome of the Nebi Musa riots, as it will be shown later and of the Peace Conference in Versailles, the administration was converted from military to civil. It had reached the point where high politics could not be avoided and the military could no longer deliver.

⁵⁴ McTague, "The British Military," 56; Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, 30.

⁵⁵ TNA: PRO FO 371/3394 Foreign Office to War Office, London, 25 January 1918.


⁵⁶ TNA: PRO FO 371/3394 Foreign Office to War Office, London, 25 January 1918.

⁵⁷ TNA: PRO FO 371/3384 Allenby to War Office, 23 October 1918; TNA: PRO FO 141/688, Clayton to G.H.Q., Jerusalem 22 December 1917.

JERUSALEM UNDER BRITISH MILITARY RULE 1917 - 1920

In April 1918 the British Military Governor of Jerusalem, Ronald Storrs, issued two edicts, one forbidding the demolition of ancient or historic buildings, the other forbidding the use of either stucco or corrugated iron within the city walls, "thus respecting", as Storrs explained on 15 March 1921, "the tradition of stone vaulting, the heritage in Jerusalem of an immemorial and a hallowed past".

Following the British occupation of Jerusalem, the British military authorities repaired and widened the railway line to the coast, built a narrow gauge railway to take military supplies to the front line, and repaired the much neglected city gates and walls.



Map 3: Jerusalem under Military rule

6.1.2 The military, urban leadership and the Zionists

In the spirit of the *status quo ante bellum* the British did not distance themselves from the “politics of the notables” but continued the Ottoman practice of relying on the main families of Jerusalem.⁵⁸ Once again the local notables were to play their role as intermediaries between the local population and the administration. As stated above, the mayor appointed before the war by the Ottomans, Husayn Salim al-Husayni, was confirmed in his place. He did not hold any effective power himself unless it was specifically granted by the British, as in the case of the distribution of the relief after the occupation.⁵⁹ When early in 1918 the mayor died, Storrs appointed the most outstanding member of the Husayni family, Musa Kazim, to replace Husayn.⁶⁰ He was a political activist who, once in charge of the mayoral office, managed to play tactful opposition to the British at the beginning; however he was eventually dismissed after the Nebi Musa riots as will be discussed later on.⁶¹ Arab notable families were able to maintain their power base, in fact by opposing Zionism they managed to increase it. Ilan Pappé argues that the leaders of the notable families were young men ready to deal with the new rulers and to support their own political causes with a stronger voice as suggested by the creation of the Muslim-Christian Associations.⁶² Since the arrival of the Zionists, Muslim and Christian Arabs found a common ground that unified them in both ideological and political terms which was then transformed into political action which was developed by the

⁵⁸ Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 79; Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 15.

⁵⁹ See Ch 5 for a more discussion of the distribution of relief after the war.

⁶⁰ Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 308.

⁶¹ See Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, (London: Frank Cass, 1974).

⁶² Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 79-81; see also Ch 5 for a more detailed discussion on the Christian-Muslim Associations.

notables; Pappe argues that indeed Palestinians possessed a strong elite though not a charismatic leader.⁶³

The most complex relationship of the military administration was with the Zionist Commission. When Chaim Weizmann arrived in the region as head of the Zionist Commission in 1918, members of the military administration expressed their disappointment and surprise.⁶⁴ General Money, Chief Administrator, was highly critical of Zionism and of British support to the Zionist cause, besides his opinions might have also reflected a strong feeling of anti-Semitism: "[Jews] were as a class inferior morally and intellectually to the bulk of the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the country."⁶⁵ The Chief Political Officer Clayton, after the occupation of Jerusalem, expressed his concerns in relation to British pro-Zionist support to Mark Sykes as he feared he may alienate Arab support in the region.⁶⁶ Louis Bols, the last Chief Military Administrator, after the Nebi Musa riots in April 1920 became disillusioned with Zionism; in fact he acknowledged that the Zionists were not ultimately claiming a National Home but indeed a Jewish State.⁶⁷ The only pro-Zionist member of the military administration was the Chief Political Officer who held the office from March 1919, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen.⁶⁸ He supported the Zionists as he claimed they would be the most loyal friends of the British in the Middle East, furthermore he added that the administration should have been purged of anti-Zionist elements.⁶⁹ Although the members of the military establishment were

⁶³ Ibid, 80; Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 147-153.

⁶⁴ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 25; Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, 30.

⁶⁵ TNA: PRO FO 371/3386, Money to GHQ, 20 November 1920.

⁶⁶ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 23

⁶⁷ TNA: PRO FO 371/85, Bols to Allenby, 12 April 1920.

⁶⁸ Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, 39.

⁶⁹ McTague, "The British Military," 65-66.

concerned with the political situation, they never went beyond the actual expression of single opinions. The military proved to be more concerned with practicalities than politics. They saw the Zionist Commission as a threat to their legitimacy as in fact the bureaucratic apparatus of the Zionist Commission was almost running parallel of the British administrative one.⁷⁰ The Commission was officially charged by the Foreign Office to carry out, under Allenby's authority, the necessary steps in order to favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home through the formation of a link between the British Authorities and the Jewish population of Palestine, the assistance to Jewish organisations and population, the collection of information in view of the further development of Jewish settlements.⁷¹ It is not a surprise then if the Military British thought of the Zionist Commission as an arrogant newcomer; besides some British Army officers during the war believed that the Turkish Government was controlled by a group of Jewish freemasons which had infiltrated the CUP.⁷²

The second relationship of the military administration was with the religious groups of the city, mainly Christians. The British military administration, particularly the governorate of the city, was ordered by the Foreign Office to settle matters regarding the Holy Places directly between the religious denominations rather than through intermediaries. The Chief Administrator was also ordered to allow for the return of those religious leaders who had left Jerusalem at the beginning of the war.⁷³ A careful eye was placed on the Greek Orthodox Church as it turned had been the most disrupted after the

⁷⁰ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 94.

⁷¹ TNA: PRO FO 371/3392, Foreign Office to Wingate, London, 13 February 1918; TNA: PRO FO 371/3394, Foreign Office to War Office, London 25 January 1918.

⁷² Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 94; Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, 40; see also J. Ershow, "Conspiracies and Commitments: the British in Palestine," in *Yale Israel Journal*, no. 5 (Winter 2005): 21.

⁷³ TNA: PRO, FO 141/665, Foreign Office to Clayton, London, 24 January 1918.

conflict due to financial constraints as explained earlier in Chapter 4. Ronald Storrs, who had power over of the Status Quo, often moved from one church to another in order to control and prevent breaches of the Status Quo by clergy and believers of the different Christian confessions.⁷⁴ He also tried to involve the Churches in public discussions regarding the future of Jerusalem. When Storrs founded the Pro-Jerusalem Society in 1918 in order to develop various projects on Jerusalem, which will be discussed below, he brought together the Franciscans, the Domenicans, the Orthodox, the Armenians and the Anglican Bishop.⁷⁵ Members of the different denominations were quite sceptical with regard to the British military administration. Indeed the most sceptical was the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, Rennie MacInnes, who continued to blame his fellow countrymen for allowing the establishment of the Zionists in Palestine.⁷⁶ Bishop MacInnes became quite disillusioned and in early January 1918 acknowledged that the British authorities were much afraid of the political difficulties in Jerusalem and that they preferred to delay any serious political discussion on the future of the city and Palestine.⁷⁷

6.2 *The “despot” ruler of Jerusalem: Ronald Storrs*

While Otis Glazebrook and Conde de Ballobar were the leading foreign representatives during the war period. Ronald Storrs arose to prominence in Jerusalem under military rule. Despite the fact that a proper study on Storrs as governor of Jerusalem has never been published, scholars have dealt with this

⁷⁴ Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 313-315.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 327.

⁷⁶ LP, LC 105, Bishop MacInnes to the Lambeth Conference, Jerusalem, 7 July 1920.

⁷⁷ LP, Davidson 395, MacInnes to Archbishop, Jerusalem, 19 January 1918.

figure through studying the beginning of the British mandatory government in Palestine. Storrs has been portrayed as a despot and autocrat by several scholars and some of his contemporaries, indeed Storrs properly played the part as he did in 1920 when he claimed in a paper to rule the Jerusalem district like his “predecessor” Pontius Pilate.⁷⁸ In the following sections I will first give a biographical overview of Storrs’s life then I will focus on some of his activities as military governor of Jerusalem in order to understand his influence on the governorship of the city.

6.2.1 A biography

Ronald Storrs was born in 1881 in Bury St Edmunds, the eldest son of Reverend John Storrs, vicar in London and then Dean of Rochester.⁷⁹ Storrs was interested in languages, culture and arts. He studied at Pembroke College in Cambridge. He entered the civil service in 1904 and was appointed to the Egyptian Civil Service in the Ministry of Finance until 1909. He was then appointed Oriental Secretary to the British Agency in Cairo. It was with this appointment, that Storrs had the chance to show his skills in the Arabic language and was able to prove his abilities with Middle Eastern affairs. With the outbreak of the war, Storrs was appointed Assistant Political Officer to the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force in order to deal with Sharif Husayn and Thomas Eliot Lawrence, who led the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman regime. In 1917 he was briefly appointed to the secretariat of the War Cabinet. Following the capture of

⁷⁸ PC, The Paper of Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 10, Box III, Evening News, 21 December 1920.

⁷⁹ The biographical information regarding Storrs have been gathered through: Storrs, *The Memoirs*; Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*; Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*; A.J. Sherman, *Mandate Days*, (Slovenia: Thames and Hudson, 1997); G.S. Georgiallides, *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs*, (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985).

Jerusalem and the resignation of the first military governor of the city, Storrs was appointed governor of Jerusalem. He served until 1920 as military governor of the city and then from 1920 to 1926 as civil governor of Jerusalem.⁸⁰

As governor of Jerusalem, Ronald Storrs' main concern was to rebuild the city after the war and to harmonise relations between the different religious and ethnic communities.⁸¹ As sources are contradictory it is difficult to say whether Storrs was a pro or anti Zionist. He did however pay special attention to Christian matters, as shown in his memoirs, and especially by his two meetings in Rome with the Pope in 1919 and 1921.⁸² In April 1920 following the Nebi Musa riots, Storrs was accused of having been negligent as we will see later in the discussion of the riots. In 1926 Ronald Storrs' career came to an end as he was appointed governor and commander in chief to Cyprus. In Cyprus he found a similar situation to Jerusalem, as the island was divided between the Turkish and Greek communities. Though he proved to be balanced, Storrs could not avoid clashes. During the riots of October 1931 the Government House was burned and his private art and antiquities collections were also destroyed.⁸³ Twice in his career Storrs had to face the outbreak of violent riots and it appears in both cases, he could not have predicted them.

After the Cyprus experience Storrs was appointed as governor of North Rhodesia. He was clearly out of his environment as he had little knowledge of Africa. During this time here Storrs suffered from tropical diseases; in 1934 he retired from civil service and went back to Britain. He then dedicated himself to

⁸⁰ Georghallides, *Cyprus*, 1-2.

⁸¹ For the question of buildings and damages of war see Chapter 3.

⁸² Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 343,458.

⁸³ Georghallides, *Cyprus*.

local government for Islington council in London and was active in social life promoting cultural and music societies. Ronald Storrs died in 1955 survived by his wife but no children.⁸⁴

6.2.2 Storrs in power

In order to discuss and assess the influence of Ronald Storrs upon Jerusalem as military governor of the city I will first discuss the Pro-Jerusalem Society and then I will analyse the contents of some of the decrees Storrs issued. Ronald Storrs unequivocally intertwined imperial interests and his personal views in his way of government. Aesthetics, a very high civic and religious sense, and a feeling that the communities of the city should be involved, led Storrs towards the creation of the Pro- Jerusalem Society in 1918; a non governmental association with the purpose to assist the military governor in the “preservation and advancement of the interests of Jerusalem, its districts and inhabitants.”⁸⁵ The Pro-Jerusalem Society as a non-governmental institution was the transitional organisation able to avoid the restrictions imposed on the military administration by the customs of the *status quo ante bellum*. The Society was composed of the Mayor of Jerusalem, the chiefs of the Christian denominations and other leading members of the British, Arab and Jewish communities. According to the statute of the Society the main purposes of the Pro-Jerusalem were the preservation and advancement of the interests of Jerusalem; the provision and maintenance of parks, gardens and open spaces; the establishment of libraries, museums, music

⁸⁴ See D. Birn, ed., *Middle East Politics and Diplomacy*, (Marlborough: Adam Matthew, 1999).

⁸⁵ C.R. Ashbee, ed., *Jerusalem 1918-1920 Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council During the Period of the British Military Administration*, (London: John Murray, 1921), vii.

and dramatic theatre centres; protection and preservation of antiquities.⁸⁶ Charles Robert Ashbee, a member of the Arts and Crafts movement was appointed as Civic Advisor and Secretary to the Pro-Jerusalem Council. As such he was involved in all aspects of the planning of Jerusalem and he was regarded by the administration as the resident professional planner.⁸⁷ However Ashbee was neither a government nor a municipal employee, in fact he was paid by the Pro-Jerusalem Society.⁸⁸ The Pro-Jerusalem Society did not receive funds from the local government but mainly through private donors. The Pro-Jerusalem Society also worked towards the encouragement of the establishment of arts and handicrafts industries under the sponsorship of Ashbee.⁸⁹

The members of the Pro-Jerusalem Society gathered on a regular basis; they met 58 times from its first meeting on 6 September 1918 to 1924.⁹⁰ Ashbee and Storrs' voices were often the strongest as suggested by the operation of re-naming the streets.⁹¹ The question of street naming was a sensitive one as it carried strong ideological value.⁹² Storrs minimally followed the familiar British colonial pattern in street naming, indeed the majority of the names chosen were not linked to the British Empire; in other words he chose to link street naming to the history of Jerusalem, perhaps in the attempt to achieve some sort of sectarian harmony.⁹³ In fact Storrs chose saints, prophets, scholars and kings, supposedly belonging to the three religious camps. He personally named St Francis Street, St

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ B. Hyman, "British Planners in Palestine 1918-1936" (PhD thesis, LSE, London, 1994), 352.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 360.

⁸⁹ Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, 49.

⁹⁰ Hyman, *British Planners*, 362.

⁹¹ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 61. For the naming of the streets see also Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 331-332.

⁹² Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 61-62.

⁹³ In relation to street naming I am in debt to Yair Wallach who has discussed a paper "The 1920s Street-Naming Campaign and the British Reshaping of Jerusalem," WOCMES, (Amman, June 2006).

Paul's Road, Coeur de Lion Street, Saladin's Road, Streets of the Prophets and also Queen's Melisende Road, the only one dedicated to a woman.⁹⁴ As I mentioned earlier these names were indeed linked to the history of the city, however none of them symbolised the unity of Jerusalem, on the contrary they suggested a clear division of the city according to a religious cleavage. In this sense Storrs and the Pro-Jerusalem campaign failed to promote some unity or at least a common sense of citizenship amongst the Jerusalemites. The Pro-Jerusalem Society generally worked efficiently although criticism from the local population was frequent, in fact they did not always appreciate the reforming zeal of Storrs and Ashbee.⁹⁵ The personal decrees of Storrs, in form of Public Notice, and the suggestions of the Pro-Jerusalem society under military rule, later on became the basis of the building and town planning under civil administration as we will see below.

Let us now analyse some of the decrees issued by Storrs as military governor of the city. In April 1918 Storrs issued a statement to the effect that "No person shall demolish, erect, alter or repair the structure of any building in the City of Jerusalem or its environs within a radius of 2,500 meters from the Damascus Gate until he has obtained a written permit from the Military Governor."⁹⁶ The necessity to establish basic rules in relation to town planning coincided with the conservative attitude of Storrs as he was trying to protect the traditional aspect of the city avoiding any stylistic corruption in the architecture. Furthermore Storrs tried always to preserve the "celestial" character of Jerusalem.

⁹⁴ Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 331-332.

⁹⁵ Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, 51.

⁹⁶ Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 326. Public Notice 34, April 1918.

Storrs also prohibited commercial advertisement unless out of sight of the walls of the city. Sense of aesthetics prevailed even upon business.⁹⁷

“The limitation of advertisement is an urgent need. The promiscuous placarding and profanation of every conspicuous wall-surface must at all hazards be stopped. The Society, therefore, drew up for and in conjunction with the municipal authorities the series of regulations which are given in Appendix VII, an appropriation was made for them in the municipal budget of 1920, and they have since been incorporated in the legislation of the country.”⁹⁸

Storrs did not work only towards the amelioration of Jerusalem's built environment but also he made efforts in order to restore the city's moral image. Non licensed public bars within the walls were closed and distilling was prohibited except in private homes. In licensed bars alcohol was not served between 2 pm to 6 pm and between 8 pm to 5 am.⁹⁹ Also prostitution was regulated. Brothels were forbidden within the walled city and allowed only in Feingold Street (a courtyard on Jaffa Road). Women carrying sexual diseases were liable to imprisonment if caught having sex and therefore transmitting the disease to members of the military force.¹⁰⁰ This decree was indeed issued because of health reasons but in the eyes of Storrs prostitution was almost unconceivable in a city like Jerusalem. He also prohibited hotel dances and cabarets within the walled city.¹⁰¹ This conservative and puritanical behaviour was nevertheless mitigated by the lifestyle of the British military officials who often attended parties and dancing receptions despite the criticism of the religious institutions. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem did not hesitate to define Storrs as a

⁹⁷ Ashbee, *Jerusalem 1918-1920*, 37.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ PC, The Papers of Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 6, Box III, The Globe, New York, 1919; PRO, CO 742/1, Official Gazette, Jerusalem, 16 March 1920.

¹⁰⁰ *The Palestine News* (Jerusalem), Gazette no. 5, August 1, 1918.

¹⁰¹ Storrs, *The Memoirs*, 416.

“disaster” as he permitted fancy balls which were strictly forbidden in Ottoman times.¹⁰²

The most difficult task faced by Storrs was the political issue of Zionism and the politics of the various religious institutions. Storrs never gained full support of these bodies of Jerusalem; the Arabs (both Muslims and Christians) thought Storrs was pro Zionist as he was part of the British establishment who supported Zionism and Jewish immigration to Palestine; Zionists thought Storrs was pro-Arab and non-local Christians never fully trusted him.¹⁰³

6.2.3 Planning Jerusalem

With the British occupation of Jerusalem modern planning began. It was Ronald Storrs who initiated the planning of the city following the basic policy of the Status Quo. Storrs never transferred the activity of planning to the Pro-Jerusalem Society; indeed the minutes of the meetings of the Society prove that the planning of the city was never even discussed.¹⁰⁴ As mentioned earlier Storrs was a preservationist, that is he used the Status Quo in order to protect the old city and its environs, rather than promoting changes and particular developments. A good example is the removal of the Clock Tower built by the Ottomans in 1902 above the Jaffa Gate in 1922 as in the mind of the British planners and of

¹⁰² ASV, Sacra Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari, Pos. 102 Fasc. 69, Latin Patriarch to Gasparri, Jerusalem 4 February 1921; See also Pos. 102, Fasc. 70, Latin Patriarch to Gasparri, Appendix 2, Jerusalem, April 1921.

¹⁰³ See comments of Weizmann in relation to the British Administration in Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Weizmann to Zionist Executive, 25 March 1920, in I. Friedman, *Riots in Jerusalem, San Remo Conference, April 1920*, (London: Garland, 1987), 2;

CTS, Diario della Guerra, see comments written in relation to the British Occupation of Jerusalem.

¹⁰⁴ Hyman, “British Planners,” 85 and 362.

Storrs in particular, the clock tower represented an alien element in the old city, ugly and not in keeping with the ancient walls.¹⁰⁵

In 1918 William McLean, a civil engineer with experience in the Sudan Civil Service and former municipal engineer of Khartoum and Alexandria in Egypt, was called to Jerusalem by the Military Administration where he prepared the first town planning scheme.¹⁰⁶ He arrived in March and by July 1918 he completed the plan which was approved by Allenby later in the same month.¹⁰⁷ The plan was simple and aimed to preserve the old city and to surround the walls with a green belt whilst the modern city was to be developed to the west.¹⁰⁸ McLean's scheme however was short lived, in fact it was opposed first by Ashbee, whose duty was to implement the plan, by the city engineer Guini and also by the Zionists who suspected the plan could have been contrary to Jewish interests. Besides the plan, though signed by Allenby, did not possess binding legal status, in fact Public Notices were meant to regulate and not to initiate developments as suggested by the rule of the Status Quo.¹⁰⁹

The strongest critic of McLean was Patrick Geddes, professor of Botany at St Andrew University but a well known urban planner.¹¹⁰ Geddes persuaded the Zionist Commission to contest McLean's plan; eventually the Zionists hired Geddes who arrived in Palestine in 1919 well publicised also by the *Jewish Chronicle*.¹¹¹ Geddes was asked to work on different projects such as the Hebrew

¹⁰⁵ Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and Its Environs*, 142.

¹⁰⁶ Hyman, "British Planners," 39-40; E. Efrat and A. Noble, "Planning Jerusalem," *Geographical Review* 78, no. 4, (October 1988): 392.

¹⁰⁷ S. Shapiro, "Planning Jerusalem: the First Generation, 1917-1968," in *Urban Geography of Jerusalem*, eds. D. Amiran, A. Shachar and I. Khimi, 141 (Jerusalem: Massada Press, 1973).

¹⁰⁸ Hyman, "British Planners," 53.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 70, 91 and 95.

¹¹⁰ For information in relation to Patrick Geddes see P. Boardman, *The Worlds of Patrick Geddes*, (London: Routledge, 1978).

¹¹¹ *The Jewish Chronicle* (London), August 29, 1919.

University and indeed a general plan for the urban development of Jerusalem.¹¹²

Also the Military Administration hired Geddes with the task to report on the McLean's plan. This indeed raises a question; Geddes was paid by the Zionist Organisation in order to present an alternative plan and at the same time he was paid by the Administration to give comments on the same plan: as I said earlier it is apparent that McLean's scheme was eventually to be short lived. Geddes prepared a new town plan by 1919, however as in Palestine there was no central town planning until 1921 (Town Planning Ordinance) the Military Administration and Storrs in particular worked mainly towards the conservation of the city also constrained by the policy of the Status Quo.¹¹³

According to Hyman, British planners and administrators were agents of culture transfer, I would add that these people did not only want to transfer their own culture in Jerusalem, but they wanted to reshape the city according to their specific purposes as in the case of Geddes who followed Zionist principles or Ashbee and Storrs who looked at the city as something ethereal and to be preserved in its original configuration no matter the cost.

¹¹² Hyman, "British Planners," 113.

¹¹³ Ibid, 297.



Illustration 9: Nebi Musa procession¹¹⁴

The military administration had to deal with several episodes of inter-communal violence from its establishment as in the occurrence of the first anniversary of the issue of the Balfour Declaration when during a Jewish procession there was a scuffle with some Arab bystanders.¹¹⁵ However the riot of April 1920, known as Nebi Musa, proved to be crucial for the fate of the administration; its outcome produced a strong reaction in the Foreign Office and among the political establishment in London. The military administration was in fact accused by Jewish and non-Jewish Zionists of being anti-Zionist and eventually the Prime Minister Lloyd George and Balfour became convinced that

¹¹⁴ NARA, free Copyright, Jerusalem 1920.

¹¹⁵ J. McTague, *British Policy in Palestine 1917-1922*, (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1983): 54.

time had come to establish a civil administration.¹¹⁶ This section will show how the relevance of these particular events has been generally underestimated in the academic literature. I will discuss the role of Arab Nationalists, Zionists in order to show that eventually the riots proved to be the decisive event which triggered the dismissal of the military administration.

6.3.1 The historiographical debate

The Nebi Musa riots have not attracted much academic attention. Historians have considered these events of secondary importance mostly overshadowed by the clashes between Arabs and Jews like the Wailing Wall riots in 1929 or the revolts of 1936-1939. Since the Nebi Musa riots occurred right before the establishment of a civil administration in Palestine the interest of the scholars waned. In fact scholars have failed to grasp first, the catalysing dynamic of the riots in the change of the administration and secondly in the structure of the riot signs of a patterned and organised conflict. Generally speaking this event has been interpreted as the manifestation of political and also social tensions between the Arabs and the Zionists. The literature available covers this event briefly, highlighting the emergence of two clear opposing sides, Jews and Arabs, and also discusses the role played by the military administration mainly in relation to Zionism. Bernard Wasserstein in fact emphasises the deteriorating relations between the military administration and the Zionist Commission underlying the apparent anti-Zionism of the members of the military administration. Wasserstein, therefore, understands the riot more in terms of

¹¹⁶ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 71.

outcomes, as they produce the catalysing effect to change the nature of the administration from military to civil.¹¹⁷

Rashid Khalidi and Yehoshua Porath discuss the Nebi Musa riots as part of the process in the creation of a Palestinian identity but they have not dedicated more than a couple of pages to the analysis of the event.¹¹⁸ Tom Segev has also written on the riots, however, he fails to place these riots into a larger historical context. He has also fallen into the trap of discussing the contingencies that triggered the riots, looking for those responsible for the incidents rather than looking for the historical roots which led to this event.¹¹⁹ Segev stresses that eventually the replacement of the military administration with a civil one, was indeed an achievement of Chaim Weizmann who managed to exploit the riots in favour of the Zionist cause.¹²⁰ Benny Morris also highlights British responsibilities but he suggests the possibility of the involvement of an undefined Damascus based Arab nationalist group.¹²¹ Both Segev and Morris come to the conclusion that this clash was a pogrom, a persecution directed against the Jews. Radically different is the view of Ilan Pappé who claims that it is not actually necessary to look at the riots as a marking point indicating the beginning of the Arab-Jewish conflict. He suggests that the Nebi Musa riots were part of a larger ideological battle between two emerging nationalist ideologies.¹²²

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 58-72.

¹¹⁸ Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*; Porath, *The Emergence*.

¹¹⁹ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 127-144.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 141.

¹²¹ B. Morris, *Righteous Victims*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 96.

¹²² Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*.

A completely different perspective emerges from the account by the Jewish scholar Yehuda Benari in 1975.¹²³ Benari first clearly defines the riots as a pogrom against the Jewish population of Jerusalem, secondly he accuses the British Military administration as having sole responsibility for the "pogrom". Benari defines the military officers as anti-Semites and also scared of the Jews as rumours from Russia depicted the Jews as promoters of the Communist revolution. He also claims that the head of the military administration kept secret meetings with the Arab leaders to the extent they assisted them to fight the Zionists.¹²⁴ Nevertheless Benari fails to provide convincing evidence for his arguments.

6.3.2 Nebi Musa: the context

Nebi Musa was an Islamic religious festival which included processions from different towns (the most important and numerous from Hebron) around Jerusalem leading to the city and celebrating the prophet Moses during the same period as the Christian Easter and the Jewish Passover. The central celebration is the long pilgrimage walk to the traditional burial site of Moses along the Jericho road from Jerusalem.¹²⁵ Celebrations lasted a week. According to a local tradition this festival was established by Salah al-Din in the 12th century, to counterbalance the presence of Christians and Jews flocking to Jerusalem for the Easter celebrations.¹²⁶ Though it is not certain when the festival was first celebrated as I will argue later the Nebi Musa festival was never a fully religious

¹²³ Y. Benari, *El Pogrom de Jerusalem en el Año 1920*, (Buenos Aires: Congreso Judío Latinoamericano, 1975).

¹²⁴ Ibid, 3-20.

¹²⁵ Idinopulos, *Weathered by Miracles*, 166; Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 127.

¹²⁶ Porath, *The Emergence*, 6; Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine a Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 132.

event. This celebration served as an opportunity for the Muslim political and religious leaders to demonstrate their power vis-à-vis the Christian and Jewish communities. The celebrations had the power to create a bond between the various parts of country, normally divided and with poor communications, gathered because of the festival in a single place.¹²⁷ The Nebi Musa procession was indeed an important event for the Muslim and Christian Arabs in order to show their feelings and to gather large attention in the eyes of the numerous foreigner residents of Jerusalem. Leaders of the Arab political parties and associations exploited the excitement and enthusiasm of the festival in order to make sure their petitions would be heard.¹²⁸ The emerging nationalist sentiments in relation to the Nebi Musa riots will be discussed below as part of the analysis of the April events.

6.4 Nebi Musa riots: the development

The discussion and assessment of the Nebi Musa riots will be argued through some of the defining criteria for a "riot" as discussed in the political and anthropological academic literature. Generally a riot is understood as an intense and sudden, though not necessarily unplanned, attack between the members of two or more communities.¹²⁹ A riot has been considered a patterned event as opposed to a spontaneous outbreak of violence.¹³⁰ It has been noted that before most riotous events it is possible to perceive a particular kind of "atmosphere"

¹²⁷ Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, 41-42; Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 64.

¹²⁸ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 129-130.

¹²⁹ S.J. Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds*, (London: University of California Press, 1996), 213-220; D.L. Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9-28; P. Van der Veer, "Riots and Rituals: The Construction of Violence and Public Space in Hindu Nationalism," in *Riots and Pogroms*, ed. P.R. Brass, 154-159 (New York: New York University Press, 1996); D. Veer Mehta, *Sociology of Communal Violence*, (New Delhi: Amnol Publications, 1998), 1-12.

¹³⁰ Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, 6-7 and p. 227-229.

which corresponds to a particular socio-political context.¹³¹ In the case of the Nebi Musa riots before the explosion of violence two political parties and one paramilitary organisation emerged opposing each other. As we saw in Chapter 4 which deals with the Christian institution in Jerusalem, Arab Muslim-Christian associations emerged from 1918 in support, first with the incorporation of Palestine into Syria and secondly, these associations flooded the British authorities with anti-Zionist petitions aimed to stop Jewish immigration.¹³² In March 1920 the Syrian Congress declared Faysal king of Syria and Palestine; Arabs who had hoped to be incorporated into his kingdom fuelled large nationalist demonstrations in Jerusalem which also took an anti-Zionism nature.¹³³ At the very same time on the Jewish side, a leading Zionist, Vladimir Jabotinsky started to recruit people in order to form a paramilitary Jewish self defence organisation, then known as Haganah, composed of some 200 troops. Sources available point out that it is likely that by the end of March there were 600 men performing military drills on daily basis.¹³⁴

At the beginning of 1920 the political context in Palestine was becoming complex and in Jerusalem the Zionist Commission felt that they were the victims of the British military administration.¹³⁵ Weizmann wrote in late March 1920:

“Many intelligent Arabs hate us because they genuinely believe we are tools of the English, who have come in now to grab the whole of the Near East. I shall go further and say that if not for the English, who are at present taking great care that we

¹³¹ Ibid, 89-94. Horowitz calls “The Lull” a particular atmosphere before the riot; Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*, 8-9.

¹³² Pappe, *A History of Modern Palestine*, 82.

¹³³ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 60.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 63; Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, 195.

¹³⁵ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 85-101; Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 34-57.

should not get into direct touch with the Arabs, we could comparatively easily make friends with the Arabs.”¹³⁶

However the Zionists were quite scared of Faysal and the possible consequences of his attempt to gain control of Syria. Zionists felt that in front of Arab pressure the Balfour Declaration could be eluded and eventually the establishment of a “National Home” delayed if not forgotten; on the other hand Arab elites were scared of the strong Jewish immigration coming into the country that could lead to the eventual dispossession of Arab properties and lands.¹³⁷ Arab elites were also afraid of the Zionist Commission as it was seen as a government within the government as mentioned earlier in relation to the military British administration and a sign of the will to establish a Jewish State. Once the effects of the Balfour Declaration began to be clear and intelligible in 1920 to the Arab elites and population the attitude towards the Jews radically changed assuming a more confrontational tone.¹³⁸ According to Rashid Khalidi a local Arab Palestinian identity was already developing during the late Ottoman rule as shown by the publication of the paper *al-Filastin*.¹³⁹ This paper, whose name clearly shows the emergence of a local sentiment, became the strongest opponent of Zionism but also the voice of the Arab Orthodox who were attempting to free themselves from the domination of the Greek Orthodox hierarchy.¹⁴⁰ It is apparent therefore that a local patriotism was already on the scene and that

¹³⁶ Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Weizmann to Zionist Executive, 25 March 1920, in *Riots in Jerusalem, San Remo Conference*, ed. I. Friedman, 2 (London: Garland, 1987).

¹³⁷ Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, 38-40; TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920; Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 47; Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*; TNA: PRO FO 371/5034, Director of the Arab Club (Mohammed Derweesh) to Allenby, Jerusalem April 1920.

¹³⁸ TNA: PRO FO 371/5034, Director of the Arab Club (Mohammed Derweesh) to Allenby, Jerusalem April 1920: “We declare that we cannot accept the Jews in our Country. [...] We declare that we do not accept the Jews neither as guests nor as neighbours in Palestine.”

¹³⁹ Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 126.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Zionism acted as catalyser for the development of this local sentiment into a larger ideological milieu.

Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist Commission in Palestine, in late March 1920 wrote to the Zionist Commission in London:

“Relations between the Jews and the Administration have gone from bad to worse. [...] In view of possible outbreaks of hostility against us, the Military Authorities have found it necessary to take measures, but the order which has been issued to the troops is in my opinion almost a direct provocation not to do anything in case outbreaks do take place.”¹⁴¹

Weizmann, according to his own definition, was actually predicting a pogrom. Zionists were quite concerned at the benevolent treatment that the military administration reserved for Arab nationalists as in the case of the limited British military intervention after the Arab nationalist demonstration in March 1920.¹⁴² After these demonstrations and with the Nebi Musa festival approaching a delegation of the Jewish Self-Defence Force asked Storrs for the right to carry weapons during the festival in order to protect the Jewish population of Jerusalem; Storrs rejected the request on the basis that: “every precaution will be [...] taken by the Authorities to ensure public security.”¹⁴³

Colonel Meinertzhagen, the Chief political officer of the Military Administration and a open Zionist supporter, wrote to Lord Curzon (the Minister of Foreign Affairs) expressing his concern: “Though I do not anticipate any immediate trouble in Palestine, there is always the risk of isolated cases of Jews being killed, of reprisal by the Jews, or of extensive Arab raids along the Palestine border.”¹⁴⁴ The “atmosphere” depicted was indeed not idyllic. Vladimir

¹⁴¹ Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Weizmann to Zionist Executive, 25 March 1920, in *Riots in Jerusalem, San Remo Conference*, ed. I. Friedman, 2 (London: Garland, 1987).

¹⁴² Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 62-63.

¹⁴³ CZA, Z4/16078/66, Storrs to Jewish Self-Defence League, 31 March 1920.

¹⁴⁴ TNA: PRO FO 371/5034, Meinertzhagen to Curzon, Cairo, 31 March 1920.

Jabotinsky on the other hand wrote to Weizmann on 12 March predicting that a pogrom would be liable to break out any day.¹⁴⁵ Considering the tone of a letter from the Arab Club, a Muslim-Christian society, to Allenby it is possible to see how early signs of a riot were quite visible: "We declare that we cannot accept the Jews in our country. Should they be permitted to do what they intend doing, we shall fight against them till death."¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless there were those who thought differently particularly Ronald Storrs who, having prohibited the carrying of weapons by the Jewish Self-Defence Force wrote to Allenby suggesting that so far as he could gather, information from preliminary signs and reports, showed that tensions were no greater than the previous year and that he thought nothing serious would happen.¹⁴⁷ The question is therefore, was this lack of judgment or premeditated negligence?

6.4.1 The Riots and their causalities

The causalities differ from the causes of a riot as the causality of the event may be triggered by single episodes which cannot explain alone the cause for the explosion of violence.¹⁴⁸ The causality is generally not self explanatory, meaning the causalities cannot alone explain the reasons for the outbreak of violence as in the case of the Nebi Musa riots in Jerusalem. On Friday 2 April the first ceremony of the Nebi Musa festival passed without incident and it seems the small police force dealing with the procession was successful.¹⁴⁹ On Sunday 4

¹⁴⁵ Quoted in Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 131.

¹⁴⁶ TNA: PRO FO 371/5034, Mohammed Derweesh (Director of the Arab Club) to Allenby, Jerusalem, April 1920.

¹⁴⁷ PC, The Paper of Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 7, Box III, Storrs to Samuel, Jerusalem 18 August 1920.

¹⁴⁸ See a list of proximate causes of communal rioting in D. Veer Mehta, *Sociology of Communal Violence*, 2-4.

¹⁴⁹ N. Caplan, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question 1917-1925*, (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 58.

April, the day of the main pilgrimage from the shrine of the prophet Moses to Jerusalem, the procession stopped on the Jaffa road just opposite the Jaffa gate and notables and religious leaders started to deliver strong and vivacious political speeches, contrary to the usual protocol.¹⁵⁰ Among the people that proclaimed speeches, two are worthy of report. Aref al-Aref the editor of the popular nationalist newspaper published since 1919, *al-Suriyya al-Janubiyya* (The Southern Syria), declared: "If we don't use force against the Jews, we will never be rid of them" and then the crowd chanted "Nashrab dam al Yahud" (We will drink the blood of the Jews).¹⁵¹ Also the mayor, Musa Kazim al-Husayni spoke from a balcony whilst the crowd after his speech roared: "Palestine is our land, the Jews are our dogs!" Pictures of Faysal were also displayed and he was greeted as King of Syria and Palestine.¹⁵² As shown in the picture above flags and banner supporting Faysal were also displayed

At this point the riot began just inside Jaffa gate. Although it is not clear what was the exact incident that triggered the riot it is arguable according to the sources available that there was more than one.¹⁵³ In the vicinity of the Arab rally some Zionists were listening to the speeches. Some evidence suggests that these Jewish spectators were quite provocative. Allegedly a Jew had pushed an Arab carrying a nationalist flag similar to the one used by Faysal in Syria, and he tried to spit on the banner and on the Arab crowd.¹⁵⁴ Another accident reported as the

¹⁵⁰ TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem April 1920.

¹⁵¹ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 95.

¹⁵² Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 128; TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920.

¹⁵³ TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920.

¹⁵⁴ Abcarius, *Palestine Through the Fog of Propaganda*, 67; TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920.

trigger of the riot suggests that a Muslim pilgrim was attacked by a Jewish soldier.¹⁵⁵

Shops were looted and spectators were beaten with stones.¹⁵⁶ Some Jews involved carried weapons, as in the case of two old Jews that fired from a house which overlooked the procession route. Both were then shot by the British-Indian police deployed by Storrs.¹⁵⁷ The incidents started at 10 am and it was practically over by midday. During the night everything appeared to be quiet. Early on Monday morning the pilgrims from Hebron, who had been confined for the night in the Police barracks, were escorted out of the city through St. Stephen's gate. Disorders broke out again early in the morning and lasted until 3 pm when martial law was declared.¹⁵⁸ The following day, Tuesday, the looting and violence continued but at a lower scale. A number of Jews entered the city through the Arab quarter where they had been accommodated in a synagogue. Two cases of rape against Jewish women were reported. By the evening the situation was under control.¹⁵⁹ The reported casualties amounted to 251, of which 9 died and 22 were critically wounded. 5 Jews and 4 Muslims had been killed; the great difference is in the number of wounded: 211 Jews reported wounded as opposed to 21 Muslims and 3 Christians. 7 British soldiers were also wounded, however it appears that the police were never the target of the attackers whether Arabs or Jews.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. The Indian Muslim police was deployed, from the British occupation of the city, in the old city in order to protect Muslim sacred shrines.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid; Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Weizmann to Lloyd George, Beirut 10 April 1920, in *Riots in Jerusalem, San Remo Conference*, ed. I. Friedman, 22 (London: Garland, 1987); CZA Z4/16084, Zionist Commission Memorandum, Jerusalem, 11 April 1920.

6.4.2 Analysis of the Riots

In this section I will discuss the riots from the perspective of victims, “specialists”, third party and pogrom in order to define the nature of the Nebi Musa riots.

A criterion defining a riot is in relation to targets or victims of the riot itself.¹⁶¹ The term target has been used by those who see riotous crowds as organised and motivated, acting purposefully rather than randomly. The term victims, on the other hand, has been used by those who see crowds as chaotic, disorganised, leaderless and aimlessly.¹⁶² However, riots involve both targets and victims. When in a fight the people involved define the casualties of the struggle itself as targets, it generally means that one or more groups acted as structured entities. These groups can also possess a strong identification in particular values, in fact their attack is not random but directed towards a specific objective. If the casualties of incidents, on the other hand, are defined as victims, it is arguable that the actors did not belong to any organised structure and they are moved more by passion rather than a clear purpose. Victims define turmoil, whilst casualties to an extent are defined as targets, the latter define a riot.¹⁶³

The term “victims” also bears a secondary meaning, quite problematic, when used by one side to describe their own casualties, for then the “victims” may have been “assailants”.¹⁶⁴ This second meaning is crucial in the interpretation and analyses of the events as it may indicate which side has been taken by the people involved or the scholars studying the event. Besides

¹⁶¹ Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*, 21-26; Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, 124-128.

¹⁶² Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*, 21.

¹⁶³ Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riots*, 7.

¹⁶⁴ Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*, 25.

“victims” and “targets” in a riotous event we may have “innocent” casualties: when a passer by, mere onlookers or simply people stacked in the crowd, are injured or even killed. Nonetheless “innocent” may also be problematic as one side may define its own casualties as “innocent”;¹⁶⁵ I would suggest that the term “neutral” casualties be used as these particular players did not take any side in the riot.

The structural development of the riots and the dynamics discussed suggest that it is indeed more accurate to use the definition of “target” rather than “victims”. The riots saw two competing nationalist aspirations, Arab and Zionist, with a strong national and religious identity following rational and specific political purposes: to promote Arab nationalism and the opposition to Zionism and on the other hand the creation of a Jewish national home that in Zionist ideology meant the creation of a Jewish state. Both crowds were not leaderless and looked organised. Arabs were led by notable and nationalist leaders whilst Zionists were led by Jabotinsky as leader of the Haganah who took part directly in the fight; he was then arrested and charged for illegal possession of weapons and sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment, the sentence was eventually revoked in 1920.¹⁶⁶ Though in their own statements Arabs and Zionists described the casualties as “victims”, they had been targets of a planned conflict by both sides. The Zionist Commission defined the Jewish casualties of the riots as victims of a pogrom.¹⁶⁷ In contrast, the Muslim-Christian Society writing to Storrs in the aftermath of the riots accused the Jews of disturbing the peace of

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 23.

¹⁶⁶ Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 137-138; 143-144.

¹⁶⁷ CZA, ZA/16084, Zionist Commission Memorandum, Jerusalem 11 April 1920. A later statement of the Zionist Organisation in London, however, changed the tone and “victims” became “casualties”, see TNA: PRO FO 371/5117, Secretary of the Zionist Organisation (Samuel Landman) to Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, London 16 April 1920.

Jerusalem which led to the "massacre of a number of innocent Muslims and Christians."¹⁶⁸ Systematically Arabs looted Jewish shops, whilst Jews fired, with illegally possessed guns, upon Arabs. The difference in the number of casualties may be explained by the number of Arabs in the city. On an average day the Jews were the majority in Jerusalem but the number of Muslims in the city soared in connection with the celebrations.¹⁶⁹

Eventually the two crowds were composed of committed people interested in fighting for their own cause; however among the casualties we may count some "innocents" that is persons not involved in the incidents, as explained earlier, and with no interests in the actual fight. These "innocents" casualties were a few Orthodox Jews not politically interested in the fighting as they did not indeed support Zionism and they looked suspiciously at the newly Muslim-Christian alliance. In the development of the riots it is not clear the circumstances these people had been involved and as in the case of a Muslim girl who apparently fell victim to random shooting.¹⁷⁰

In the analysis of the riots we may look at two particular external criteria in relation to the development of the riotous events between two communities. A riot may be defined in accordance to the presence of "specialists" that is a particular category composed of people who are ready to be called out on riotous occasions, who profit from it, and whose activities profit others who may or may not be actually paying for the violence carried out like mercenaries.¹⁷¹ Some "specialists" are sometimes employed in order to escalate the nature of a fight

¹⁶⁸ TNA: PRO FO 371/5114, Muslim-Christian Society to Storrs, Jerusalem April 1920.

¹⁶⁹ For population figures see Ch 2.

¹⁷⁰ TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920.

¹⁷¹ Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*, 12-13.

from initial incident to more serious riots. Among the “specialists” we may also have journalists and pamphleteers who deliberately spread rumours and propaganda against a particular group.¹⁷² The second external criterion to be discussed in defining the Nebi Musa riots is the “third party”. Between two fighting parties we may have a third side that should be neutral and may possibly grant order and safety. Nevertheless, the third party may decide to support one of the sides involved in order to protect its own interests; the support to one of the side is generally secret and it may, although not exclusively, consist of financial or technological support. A third party may also be interested in supporting all the fighting sides as following the classical principle of *divide et impera*. Academic literature tends to consider the “third party” as the intervention of the State or public institutions.¹⁷³

In relation to the presence of specialists according to the reports available it is arguable that amongst the Arabs gathered outside Jaffa gate there were agent provocateurs, likely to have belonged to some associations with the purpose of ensuring that the inflammatory speeches would be followed by direct action.¹⁷⁴ However considering the already present high tension between the parties and simply the lack of evidence concerning agent provocateurs, I would argue these agents did not play a decisive role in the riots. In relation to the Jewish side no evidence has been found to support the idea of the presence of specialists amongst the Zionists.

¹⁷² Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, 74-75.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 231-252; Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*, 26-32.

¹⁷⁴ TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920.

Moving to the question of the third party it is necessary to underline that this is the most complex issue in the analyses of the Nebi Musa riots. There are a number of questions that should be addressed. What role did the British military administration play? Did they support one of the sides involved or did they try to simply restore order as quickly as possible? Were there any divisions among the British military officers?

From the reports available in late April and from the Commission of Inquiry established by the High Commissioner of Egypt and Commander in Chief Allenby in April 1920, we understand that Storrs seems to have ignored early warnings of impending troubles.¹⁷⁵ The local Police Force had been accused by Zionists of being inadequate and with a clear Arab majority.¹⁷⁶ Storrs deployed only a fraction of the force available in the old city at the beginning of the Nebi Musa festival as he did not consider more troops were necessary to keep order.¹⁷⁷ On Friday, the day before the outbreak, the ceremony passed without incident as mentioned earlier; this led Storrs to think, or at least to claim, that the small local police force, composed mainly of Arabs, could cope with the main procession. After the first day of riots Storrs decided to withdraw the main bulk of the troops from the Old City in order to enable business to proceed as usual. Storrs believed that showing that normality was restored could prevent more violence breaking out. Eventually the Court of Inquiry stated that the "removal of the inner pickets proved to be a very serious error in judgement."¹⁷⁸ The report of

¹⁷⁵ Ibid: "[...] Colonel Storrs inclines to consider the actual danger at the Nebi Musa Festival itself was greater in the preceding year. The majority of witnesses are not of his opinion."

¹⁷⁶ TNA: PRO FO 371/5117, Landman (Secretary of the Zionist Organisation) to the Under Secretary of State for the Foreign Affairs, London, 16 April 1920.

¹⁷⁷ TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

the Court of Enquiry on one hand did not claim that the Military Administrators favoured one side, and on the other hand showed that the military administration was indeed divided, with one side, the majority, being pro Arab and the other side, the minority, being pro Zionist. The prime minister's secretary, Philip Kerr, wrote to the Foreign Office asking for more details in relation to the alleged anti-Zionist attitude of members of the military administration.¹⁷⁹ Indeed the matter was no longer self contained in Palestine and it was becoming an issue which required the attention of the Prime Minister.

The political officer Col. Meinertzhagen openly claimed that the Administration was warned of pending troubles in Jerusalem and that the military took inadequate steps to prevent it and failed to keep order in the city when trouble arose. Meinertzhagen was shocked when he found out that officers of the British Administration were actively implicated and plotting against their own government. He warned both Allenby and Bols (the chief administrator) but according to him they preferred silence to exposure.¹⁸⁰ As evidence Meinertzhagen stated that on the day of rioting a notice was displayed all over Jerusalem: "The Government is with us, Allenby is with us kill the Jews; there is no punishment for killing Jews."¹⁸¹ Looking at the developments of the events it is quite difficult not to think that Meinertzhagen was right; however the lack of more substantial evidence leads us to think that the Military Administration was likely to have been anti-Zionist, but far from supporting an open conflict.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ TNA: PRO FO 371/5119, P. Kerr to Foreign Office, London, 19 May 1920.

¹⁸⁰ R. Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary*, (London: Cresset Press, 1959), 79-84.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² See for instance TNA: PRO FO 371/5119, Philip Kerr to Campbell (FO), 29 May 1920: "[...]The existing administration is taking no effective steps to prevent such an outbreak, but that if they did take a few firm steps and made it perfectly clear to the Arab leaders that they would suffer severely....if."

The last issue I shall discuss is the Jewish definition of the riots as a pogrom. Pogrom is a Russian word that defines an organised massacre; in the English speaking world since the beginning of the 20th century the definition of pogrom has been chiefly applied to those who organised slaughter directed against the Jews.¹⁸³ Furthermore the term pogrom also connotes collusion between the official power and one of the sides involved in the struggle.¹⁸⁴ I would argue that a pogrom is mainly a subcategory of the riot, since this definition has eventually ended up defining only attacks on Jews.¹⁸⁵

Zionists did not hesitate to define the Nebi Musa riots as a pogrom. Meinertzhagen also considered these events as a miniature pogrom.¹⁸⁶ According to a narrow definition of pogrom as an attack against persons and properties of particular group, the April riots were indeed a pogrom; Arabs as a distinctive ethnic group fought against the Zionist which represented another distinct ethnic and religious group. However if one considers the pogrom as a riot with the participation of the state and/or its agents, the question becomes more complex. As argued earlier there is evidence suggesting that the military administration was at odds with the Zionists; the military felt uncomfortable with the presence of the Zionist Commission and also some of the officials were openly anti Semite. Nevertheless to state that the British were actively involved in the Nebi Musa riots is to jump to an uncritical conclusion. The *Jewish Chronicle*, the popular

¹⁸³ Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*, 33.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, 20.

¹⁸⁶ Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary*, 79-84.

Jewish paper published in London, was hesitant to believe in a British manoeuvre against the Zionists.¹⁸⁷

6.5 Some conclusions on Military Administration and Nebi Musa riots

In this chapter I have discussed four main themes. In terms of the continuities and ruptures with the Ottoman administration, British rule proved to rely to a great extent on the existent political and social structures and institutions. Although Ottoman administrative councils were dissolved the municipality was maintained as a bridge between the British and the local population. The administrative changes implemented were limited by the convention ruling the status of military occupied territories known as the *status quo ante bellum*. The political and institutional picture of the Military Administration is a complex one. On one hand, bounded by the policy of the status quo the military was not fully operational. This favoured the Foreign Office in London which gained some time in order to plan the future of Palestine and Jerusalem. The attempt of the Foreign Office to control the military machine and administration failed to the extent that the majority of the military officers employed in Jerusalem proved to possess prejudices against the Jews, which was contrary to the main policy making favouring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine as illustrated by the Balfour Declaration. The Chief Political Office Colonel Meinertzhagen, the only top official being openly pro-Zionist, had enough evidence when after the Nebi Musa riots he wrote to Allenby accusing the officers of the Administration, almost without exception of being anti-Zionist.¹⁸⁸ This anti-

¹⁸⁷ *The Jewish Chronicle* (London), April 16, 1920.

¹⁸⁸ TNA: PRO FO 372/85, Meinertzhagen to Allenby, Jerusalem 14 April 1920.

Zionism had several roots but was certainly fuelled by the presence of the Zionist Commission which was seen as an alien institution in competition with the Military Administration and contrary to the customs laid down in the military manual of war. In fact the establishment of the Zionist Commission was indeed a breach of the status quo.

Secondly, the relationship between the military administration and the local elites composed of the notables suggest that the military establishment regarded the landowning class as the natural intermediary and pursued a careful politics of notables as suggested by Wasserstein.¹⁸⁹

The second part of the chapter dealt with the case study of the Nebi Musa riots that took place early in April 1920. The dynamics of this riot show how the military administration dealt with the riots which was indeed a representation of the emerging Arab-Jewish conflict. The military apparatus allowed the demonstrations to take place and they adopted a sort of "wait and see" policy. Only when incidents became evident and unstoppable did the military intervene in order to bring to a halt the riots. The apparent British failure to prevent and to deal with the riots has shown the political limits of the military administration which proved to be openly anti-Zionist and supportive of the Arab cause. The military was clearly distant from the Foreign Office which was indeed supportive of the Zionist cause. The riots took place a few weeks before the San Remo Conference which sanctioned the allocation of the mandates for the administration of the former Ottoman Arab lands. The riots became a strong argument for the Foreign Office in order to speed up the process of transfer from a military to a civil administration in Palestine. This shift is not only a cosmetic

¹⁸⁹ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, 15.

change, in fact it represents the primacy of politics over military decisions; besides it represented the reallocation of political values, the Military rule represented anti-Zionism and the civil administration was to represent pro-Zionism. Despite the fact that the British had not yet signed the peace treaty with Turkey, signed only at Lausanne in 1923, they decided to dissolve the O.E.T.A. and to establish a civil administration though it was contrary to the customs of the *status quo ante bellum*. It is therefore arguable that the Nebi Musa riots catalysed and accelerated the process of change from military to civilian administration which reflected the re-establishment of the main political aims of the British in Palestine and a victory for the Zionists. We may also view this as a double victory for the Zionists and in particular for the Zionist Commission. In fact as first High Commissioner for Palestine the British Government appointed Herbert Samuel, a capable officer but also a secular Jew strongly in favour of Zionism.

Conclusion

What is Jerusalem? The *umbilicus mundi* for Christians, the “mountain of the Lord” for Jews and the original *qibla* for Muslims. Whilst it is difficult to define the political, religious and historical meaning of the city, Jerusalem has proved to be a contested city in history, an urban space which according to the three religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, is the gate-way to the divine world. This very nature has made the city the subject of various conflicts for its political and religious control. It is because of the religious value of Jerusalem that when the British took over in 1917, religion and politics went hand in hand as it has been argued in Chapter Three. In this respect Abigail Jacobson rightly argues, that the British attempted to underplay the religious symbolism of the occupation as in the case of the restrictions on publication of articles concerning the crusades.¹ However this event was exploited in terms of internal propaganda in order to boost the morale of a nation heavily involved in the war effort. This study has shown that religious symbolism did play a crucial role in London.

This thesis has developed three main areas of investigation in order to fill major gaps in the existing literature on the history of Jerusalem at the beginning of the twentieth century. Firstly by making use of the historiographical approach known as microhistory, it has investigated and highlighted particular political and religious aspects of the history of Jerusalem. I have focused on the transitional period from Ottoman to British rule between 1914 and 1920 which has been understudied and whose importance for our overall understanding of the late Ottoman and mandatory histories of the city has been underestimated. This transitional period has often been dismissed by non-academics merely as the end

¹ Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire,” 293.

of the "evil Turkish rule" whilst some scholars like Martin Gilbert have stressed the re-establishment of a Christian rulership over the city ending eight centuries of Muslim rule. Focusing on the microhistorical approach, it has been shown that the transitional period was more than a simple change in administrative patterns, it also represents complex continuities. In addition it was a redefinition of ideologies (Arab Nationalism vs. Zionism) and identities (Arab and Jewish/Zionist). Political values deriving from those changes have been also redefined, in fact Zionists often portrayed themselves as the natural carriers of modernity and western values in Palestine, in opposition to the traditionalist block represented in Jerusalem by local Arabs and Jews settled in Jerusalem. On the other hand, the once divided Arabs turned discussions regarding nationalism and Zionism into political action as represented by the creation of the Christian-Muslim associations which became the first representation of political struggle against Zionism.

A second theme discussed in the thesis is the administrative, political and religious changes which occurred in Jerusalem following the British occupation of the city in 1917. The administrative transformations brought about by the British, and the problematic question of the *status quo ante bellum* - which according to part of the military administration and the non-Jewish population of the city was violated with the Balfour Declaration and the promise of a national home to the Zionists - reshaped the political and demographic structure of the city. Though demographically the Jews were the majority in the city during the late Ottoman administration, they did not possess any political power which was exercised exclusively by Muslim and Christian Arabs as suggested by the

composition of the local administrative councils. The arrival of the British and establishment of the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem meant that the Jews were now ready to enter the local political arena and to exploit politically their demographic superiority and the promises made by the British government in the form of the Balfour Declaration.

In administrative terms the military nature of the British rule did not constitute a radical rupture with the previous state of affairs. In fact during the war the city was led by a military Turkish governor who ruled on a personal basis, in accordance with war time commitments and with the local notables. Similarly the British administration of the city was led by the appointed Ronald Storrs, who as military governor of Jerusalem used a more consistently personal approach. This manifested itself thorough the enforcement of decrees which reflected his personal tastes as in the case of the arts and architecture, in order to rule the city. Storrs had in mind a Jerusalem which should have been British and looking at the Biblical past with the result of alienating both Arabs and Zionists, but also those British who disagreed with the main British policy making.

As mentioned earlier the British occupation changed the political balance amongst the population of Jerusalem in favour of the Zionists. Arabs, Christians and Muslims became united against the new common enemy represented by Zionism as shown for instance by the establishment of the Christian-Muslim associations. The greatest change in the political balance of the city after the British occupation was represented by the establishment of the Zionist Commission which became a parallel *and* the competitor institution to the British military administration. Eventually, the competition between the two

administrative institutions came into open conflict through direct criticism of one another as suggested by the frequent exchange of letters and administrative obstructionism enforced by the British military. After the Nebi Musa riots in April 1920, this conflict was ended by the Foreign Office in favour of the wishes of the Zionist Commission with the establishment of a civil administration in July of the same year which, ended more than two years of British military rule.

Thirdly, urban life and the relationship between the city and its foreigner population - variously defined as consuls, private citizens, religious authorities, pilgrims and institutions - has also been investigated. The presence of foreigners in the city under Ottoman administration - as often in urban areas of the Arab Middle East - was crucial for the modernisation of the city in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Jerusalem acquired new hospitals and schools but also lighting and a new railway connection to Jaffa built with foreign capital. It was also a crucial factor for the income of the Ottoman administration as well as of the religious institutions that benefited from the visitors, mainly pilgrims from all over the world, to the Holy City. Foreign presence during the period of the transition from Ottoman to British rule was mainly represented by a few diplomats, religious clergy and members of the American Colony who carried out mainly relief work supporting the inhabitants of Jerusalem, who were suffering from the disruptions caused by the war. The British occupation, to a degree, reshaped the role of the foreigners in the city. Pilgrims began to flock and tourists increased as a consequence of a larger selection of tourist facilities and services. Consuls and businessmen returned to the Holy City with new interests and new commercial activities. Religious institutions galvanised by a potential

freedom never experienced under Ottoman rule restarted their promotion of political, religious and economic interests competing against each other and bidding the British administrators. Zionists, after the break caused by the war, resumed their multiple activities in order to change their status from foreigners to locals. Zionists of different nationalities aspired to acquire legal local residence in Jerusalem and Palestine by lobbying the British, acquiring land from Arabs and promoting their world-wide project to re-establish the Jews in Palestine. Jerusalem was not the focus of the Zionists as the city was the symbol of the old Jewish population. For the British, Jerusalem was the natural capital of the region, the Zionists as a result were forced to establish the Zionist Commission in the same city. The result of which was that Jerusalem became the primary scene of the Arab-Zionist struggle as suggested by the Nebi Musa riots and the following incidents of 1929.

In the discussion of the foreign presence in Jerusalem I have particularly focused on two key figures: the Spanish consul Conde de Ballobar who never left the city during the war period, and the American consul Otis Glazebrook, who only left Jerusalem in 1917 when the United States joined the war. If on one hand the study of the Spanish consul has shed light on the diplomatic relations still in existence in the city during the war and the complex net of relations between the different Christian denominations; on the other hand the study of Glazebrook's activities has been crucial in order to understand the complex network of charitable organisations supporting the inhabitants of Jerusalem, especially those Zionist organisations around the world which supported the Jews of Jerusalem and Palestine showing also the beginning of the pro-American position vis-à-vis

Zionism. Glazebrook proved to be the key character in this operation as the financial support coming from America was channelled through him; he was eventually in charge of the distribution of aid as shown by the numerous receipts preserved in the American archives. It has also been possible to highlight the relevant role of American Jewry who became one of the most prominent sources of financial support for the Jews and in particular for the Zionists.

APPENDIX A

American Consuls in Jerusalem¹

J W Gorham	1856 – 1860
Willian R Page	1860 – 1861
Franklin Olcott	1861 – 1862
Isaac van Etten	1863
Albert Rhodes	1863 – 1865
Victor Beauboucher	1865 – 1870
Richard Beardsley	1870 – 1873
Frank S de Hass	1873 – 1877
J G Wilson	1877 – 1882
Selah Merrill	1882 – 1885
Nageeb J Arbeely	1885
Henry Gillman	1886 – 1891
Selah Merrill	1891 – 1893
Edwin S Wallace	1893 – 1898
Selah Merrill	1898 – 1907
Thomas R Wallace	1907 – 1910
William Coffin	1910 – 1913
Dr. Otis A Glazebrook	1914 – 1917

¹ Lipman, *Americans and the Holy Land*, 309.

APPENDIX B

*British Consuls in Jerusalem*²

William Tanner Young	1841 – 1845
James Finn	1845 – 1862
Noel Temple Moore	1862 – 1890
John Dickson	1890 – 1906
Edward Charles Blech	1906 – 1909
Harold Eustace Satow	1909 – 1912
P J C MacGregor	1912 – 1914
William Hough	1914

APPENDIX C

*German Consuls in Jerusalem*³

Ernst Gustav Schultz	1842 – 1851
Dr. Georg Rosen	1852 – 1867
Prof. Heinrich Julius Petermann	1868 – 1869
Baron Karl von Alten	1869 – 1873
Baron Thankmar von Münchausen	1874 – 1881
Dr. Julius Reitz	1881 – 1885
Dr. Paul von Tischendorf	1886 – 1899
Dr. Friedrich Rosen	1899 – 1900
Edmund Schmidt	1901 – 1916
Dr. Johann Wilhelm H Brode	1916 – 1917

² Eliav, *Britain and the Holy Land*.

³ ISA, RG 67, List of German Consuls who served Jerusalem till 1917.

APPENDIX D

*Late Turkish Governor of Jerusalem*⁴

Ali Ekrem Bey	1906 – 1908
Subhi Bey	1908 – 1909
Nazim Bey	1909 – 1910
Azmi Bey	1910 – 1911
Çevdet Bey	1911 – 1912
Muhaddi Bey	1912
Tahir Hayreddin Bey	1912 – 1913
Macid Çevdet Bey	1913 – 1914
Midhat Paşa	1915
Ahmet Münir Paşa	1916 – 1917
Izzet Paşa	1917

APPENDIX E

*British Military Administrators*⁵

Edmund Allenby	1917 – 1918
Arthur Money	1919 – 1919
H. Watson (acting)	1919
Louis J. Bols	1919 – 1920

⁴ Eliav, *Britain and the Holy Land*, 411; Kushner, "The Ottoman Governors of Palestine 1864-1914," 277.

⁵ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*.

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